Editing Battle of Leuctra (section)

==Historical significance==
[[File:Battles_of_Ancient_Greece_700-168_BC_(English).svg|thumb|250px|Battles in Ancient Greece.]]
The battle is of great significance in [[Greek history]].<ref name=EB1911/>
{{more citations needed section|date=July 2020}}
The use of these tactics by Epaminondas was, perhaps, a direct result of the use of some similar maneuvers by [[Pagondas]], his countryman, during the
[[Battle of Delium]].  Further, [[Philip II of Macedon]], who studied and lived in Thebes, was no doubt heavily influenced by the battle to develop his own, highly effective approach to tactics and armament.  In turn, his son, [[Alexander the Great|Alexander]], would go on to develop his father's theories to an entirely new level. Many innovations of Philip and Alexander are traced to this battle. Concentration of force, refused flank, and combined arms were tactics that they used in many of their battles. Philip's victories against the Illyrians and at [[Battle of Chaeronea (338 BC)|Chaeronea]] and Alexander's triumphs at [[Battle of the Granicus|the Granicus]], [[Battle of Issus|Issus]], [[Battle of Gaugamela|Gaugamela]], and [[Battle of the Hydaspes|the Hydaspes]] owe credit to the tactical maneuver used to vanquish the Spartans.

Historians [[Victor Davis Hanson]] and [[Donald Kagan]] have argued that Epaminondas' oblique formation was not an intentional and preconceived innovation in infantry tactics, but was rather a clever response to circumstances.{{Citation needed|date=October 2008}}  Because Epaminondas had stacked his left wing to a depth of fifty shields, the rest of his units were naturally left with far fewer troops than normal.  This means that their maintenance of a depth of eight to twelve shields had to come at the expense of either number of companies or their width.  Because Epaminondas was already outnumbered, he had no choice but to form fewer companies and march them diagonally toward the much longer Spartan line in order to engage as much of it as possible.  Hanson and Kagan's argument is therefore that the tactic was more dilatory than anything else.  Whatever its motivation, the fact remains that the tactic did represent an innovation and was undoubtedly highly effective.

The battle's political effects were far-reaching: the losses in material strength and prestige (prestige being an inestimably important factor in the [[Peloponnesian War]]) sustained by the Spartans at Leuctra and subsequently at the [[Battle of Mantinea (362 BC)|Battle of Mantinea]] were key in depriving them forever of their supremacy in Greece.<ref name=EB1911/> Therefore, the battle permanently altered the Greek balance of power, as Sparta was deprived of its former prominence and was reduced to a second-rate power among the Greek [[Polis|city-states]].

Theban supremacy in Greece was short-lived, as it was subsequently lost to the [[Macedonia (ancient kingdom)|Macedonians]], led by [[Philip II of Macedon|Philip II]].<ref>[http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_06/iss_3/CAJ_vol6.3_12_e.pdf The Battle of Leuktra], retrieved 07-07-2010 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130613140712/http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_06/iss_3/CAJ_vol6.3_12_e.pdf |date=June 13, 2013 }}</ref>