Editing Battle of Cambrai (1917) (section)

===Third Army===
[[File:Cambrai salient north, 1917.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Cambrai salient north, 1917}}]]
The battle began at dawn, approximately 06:30 on 20 November, with a predicted bombardment by {{nowrap|1,003 guns}} on German defences, followed by smoke and a creeping barrage at {{convert|270|m|yd|order=flip|abbr=on}} ahead to cover the first advances. Despite efforts to preserve secrecy, the Germans had received sufficient intelligence to be on moderate alert: an attack on Havrincourt was anticipated, as was the use of tanks. The attacking force was six infantry divisions of the [[III Corps (United Kingdom)|III Corps]] (Lieutenant-General [[William Pulteney Pulteney|Pulteney]]) on the right and [[IV Corps (United Kingdom)|IV Corps]] (Lieutenant-General [[Charles Woollcombe]]) on the left, supported by nine battalions of the Tank Corps with about {{nowrap|437 tanks.}} In reserve was one infantry division in IV Corps and the three divisions of the Cavalry Corps (Lieutenant-General [[Charles Kavanagh]]). Initially, there was considerable success in most areas and it seemed as if a great victory was within reach; the Hindenburg Line had been penetrated with advances of up to {{convert|8|km|mi|order=flip|abbr=on}}. On the right, the [[12th (Eastern) Division]] advanced as far as Lateau Wood before being ordered to dig in. The [[20th (Light) Division]] forced a way through La Vacquerie and then advanced to capture a bridge across the [[Canal de Saint-Quentin]] at [[Masnières]]. The bridge collapsed under the weight of a tank halting the hopes for an advance across the canal.{{sfn|Miles|1991|p=69}} In the centre the [[6th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)|6th Division]] captured Ribécourt and Marcoing but when the cavalry passed through late, they were repulsed from Noyelles.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=66–67}}

[[File:Pont escaut.jpg|thumb|The bridge at [[Masnières]], collapsed by the weight of a Mark IV tank]]
On the IV Corps front, the [[51st (Highland) Division]] (Major-General [[George Harper (British Army officer)|George Harper]]) was held at Flesquières, its first objective, which left the attacking divisions on each flank exposed to enfilade fire. Harper had used a local variation of the tank drill instead of the standard one laid down by the Tank Corps.{{efn|Hammond rebutted claims that Harper's changes contributed to the British failure and wrote that they had been exaggerated by Wilfrid Miles, Christopher Baker-Carr and others. The attack was the sixth occasion when the division operated with tanks and the ground in the 51st (Highland) Division area had far more small fortifications. The methods chosen had been tested in training and were not the cause of the check at Flesquières, which was due to the presence in the German 54th Division of Field Artillery Regiment 108 (FAR 108), specially trained in anti-tank tactics and the reluctance of Harper, to commit his reserve brigade.{{sfn|Hammond|2009|pp=83–86, 435}}}} Flesquières was one of the most fortified points in the German line and was flanked by other strong points. Its defenders under Major Krebs acquitted themselves well against the tanks, almost forty being knocked out by the artillery in the vicinity.{{efn|Some accounts claim five were knocked out by an artillery officer, Theodor Krüger, of FAR 108. Haig's dispatch praised the gunner's bravery in his diary.{{sfn|Sheffield|Bourne|2005|p=348}} There is little evidence for Krüger's actions, although it is possible that he may have been responsible for as many as nine tanks. Twenty-eight tanks were lost in the action, through German artillery-fire and breakdowns. Haig concluded that skirmishing infantry was needed, to bring the artillery crews under small-arms fire to allow the tanks to operate.{{sfn|Hammond|2009|p=233}}}} The [[Lone gunner of Flesquières]] (a common explanation of the "mythical" German officer) ignored the fact that the British tanks were opposed by a specialist anti-tank unit benefiting from the experience against French tanks in the Nivelle Offensive. The Germans abandoned Flesquières during the night.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=59, 108}}

[[File:The Battle of Cambrai, November-december 1917 Q6291.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Men of the 16th Battalion, Royal Irish Rifles of the 36th (Ulster) Division moving to the front line 20 November 1917}}]]
To the west of Flesquières, the [[62nd (2nd West Riding) Division]] swept all the way through Havrincourt and Graincourt to within reach of the woods on Bourlon Ridge and on the British left, the [[British 36th (Ulster) Division|36th Division]] reached the Bapaume–Cambrai road. Of the tanks, 180 were out of action after the first day, although only {{nowrap|65 had}} been destroyed. Of the other casualties, 71 had suffered mechanical failure and 43 had ditched.{{sfn|Miles|1991|p=90}} The British lost {{circa|4,000 casualties}} and took {{nowrap|4,200 prisoners,}} a casualty rate half that of the [[Battle of Passchendaele|Third Battle of Ypres]] (Passchendaele) and a greater advance in six hours than in three months at Flanders but the British had failed to reach Bourlon Ridge.{{sfn|Miles|1991|p=88}} The German command was quick to send reinforcements and was relieved that the British did not manage fully to exploit their early gains.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=98–100}} When the battle was renewed on 21 November, the pace of the British advance was greatly slowed. Flesquières, that had been abandoned and Cantaing were captured in the very early morning but in general the British took to consolidating their gains rather than expanding.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=101–107}} The attacks by III Corps were terminated and attention was turned to IV Corps.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=88–93}}

[[File:Cambrai salient south, 1917.jpg|thumb|{{centre|Cambrai salient south, 1917}}]]
The effort was aimed at [[Bourlon Ridge]]. Fighting was fierce around Bourlon and at Anneux (just before the woods) was costly.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=108–114}} German counter-attacks squeezed the British out of Moeuvres on 21 November and Fontaine on 22 November; when Anneux was taken, the 62nd Division found themselves unable to enter Bourlon Wood. The British were left exposed in a salient. Haig still wanted Bourlon Ridge and the exhausted 62nd Division was replaced by the [[40th Infantry Division (United Kingdom)|40th Division]] (Major-General [[John Ponsonby (British Army officer)|John Ponsonby]]) on 23 November. Supported by almost {{nowrap|100 tanks}} and {{nowrap|430 guns}}, the 40th Division attacked into the woods of Bourlon Ridge on the morning of 23 November and made little progress. The Germans had put two divisions of {{lang|de|Gruppe Arras}} on the ridge with another two in reserve and {{lang|de|Gruppe Caudry}} was reinforced.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=115–136}}

The 40th Division attack reached the crest of the ridge but were held there and suffered more than {{nowrap|4,000 casualties}} in three days. More British troops were pushed in to move beyond the woods but the British reserves were rapidly depleted and more German reinforcements were arriving.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=126–136}} The final British effort was on 27 November by the 62nd Division aided by {{nowrap|30 tanks.}} Early success was soon reversed by a German counter-attack. The British now held a salient roughly {{convert|11|×|9.5|km|mi|order=flip|abbr=on}} with its front along the crest of the ridge.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=144–161}} On 28 November, the offensive was stopped and the British troops were ordered to lay wire and dig in. The Germans were quick to concentrate their artillery on the new British positions. On 28 November, more than {{nowrap|16,000 shells}} were fired into the wood.{{sfn|Miles|1991|pp=162–175}}