Editing Babrak Karmal (section)

==Leadership==

===Domestic policies===
Karmal's ascension was quickly troubled as he was effectively installed by the invading Soviet Union, delegitimizing him. Unrest in the country quickly escalated, and in Kabul two major uprisings, on [[3 Hoot uprising|3 Hoot (22 February)]] and the months long [[1980 student protests in Kabul|students' protests]] were early signs of trouble. Karmal would also arrest Major Saddiq Alamyar in 1980, the commander of the 444th Commando Battalion, who committed the [[Kerala massacre]] while Afghanistan was still under the leadership of the [[Khalq]]. Other perpetrators were also arrested, such as other commandos and soldiers in the 11th Division of the Afghan Army. Alamyar remained in jail for a decade, even after Karmal was removed from his post as president.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2 November 2015 |title=Head of Afghan Commando Unit Detained Over 1,000 Killings |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/head-afghan-commando-unit-detained-over-1-000-killings-n455586 |access-date=15 September 2023 |website=NBC News |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=1 November 2015 |title=A 36-Year Wait for Justice? Dutch arrest suspected Afghan war criminal |url=https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/rights-freedom/a-36-year-wait-for-justice-dutch-arrest-suspected-afghan-war-criminal/ |access-date=15 September 2023 |website=Afghanistan Analysts Network - English |language=ps-GB}}</ref>

====The "Fundamental Principles" and amnesty====
When he came to power, Karmal promised an end to executions, the establishment of democratic institutions and free elections, the creation of a constitution, and legalization of alternative political parties. Prisoners incarcerated under the two previous governments would be freed in a general [[amnesty]] (which occurred on 6 January). He promised the creation of a coalition government which would not espouse [[socialism]]. At the same time, he told the Afghan people that he had negotiated with the Soviet Union to give economic, military and political assistance. The mistrust most Afghans felt towards the government was a problem for Karmal. Many still remembered he had said he would protect private capital in 1978—a promise later proven to be a lie.{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA71 71–72] }}
{{multiple image
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| header            = Flag change under Karmal
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| image1            = Flag of Afghanistan (1978-1980).svg
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| caption1          = Flag in use from 1978 to 1980
| image2            = Flag of Afghanistan (1980-1987).svg
| width2            = 150
| caption2          = Flag in use from 1980 to 1987
}}
Karmal's three most important promises were the general amnesty of prisoners, the promulgation of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the adoption of a new flag containing the traditional black, red and green (the flag of Taraki and Amin was red). His government granted concessions to religious leaders and the restoration of confiscated property. Some property, which was confiscated during earlier land reforms, was also partially restored. All these measures, with the exception of the general amnesty of prisoners, were introduced gradually. Of 2,700 prisoners, 2,600 were released from prison; 600 of these were Parchamites. The general amnesty was greatly publicized by the government. While the event was hailed with enthusiasm by some, many others greeted the event with disdain, since their loved ones or associates had died during earlier purges. Amin had planned to introduce a general amnesty on 1 January 1980, to coincide with the PDPA's sixteenth anniversary.{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA72 72]}}

Work on the Fundamental Principles had started under Amin: it guaranteed democratic rights such as [[freedom of speech]], the right to security and life, the right to peaceful association, the right to demonstrate and the right that "no one would be accused of crime but in accord with the provisions of law" and that the accused had the right to a [[fair trial]]. The Fundamental Principles envisaged a democratic state led by the PDPA, the only party then permitted by law. The Revolutionary Council, the organ of supreme power, would convene twice every year. The Revolutionary Council in turn elected a Presidium which would take decisions on behalf of the Revolutionary Council when it was not in session. The Presidium consisted mostly of [[Politburo of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA Politburo]] members. The state would safeguard three kinds of property: state, cooperative and private property. The Fundamental Principles said that the state had the right to change the Afghan economy from an economy where man was exploited to an economy where man was free. Another clause stated that the state had the right to take "families, both parents and children, under its supervision."{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA73 73]}} While it looked democratic at the outset, the Fundamental Principles was based on contradictions.{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA73 73]}}

The Fundamental Principles led to the establishment of two important state organs: the Special Revolutionary Court, a specialized court for crimes against [[national security]] and territorial integrity, and the Institute for Legal and Scientific Research and Legislative Affairs, the supreme legislative organ of state, This body could amend and draft laws, and introduce regulations and decrees on behalf of the government. The introduction of more Soviet-style institutions led the Afghan people to distrust the communist government even more.{{sfn|Yassari|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=CMGfLzYWeW4C&pg=PA13 13]}}

The Fundamental Principles constitution came into power on 22 April 1980.

====Dividing power: Khalq–Parcham====
With Kārmal's ascension to power, Parchamites began to "settle old scores".{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=104}} [[NKVD troika|Revolutionary Troikas]] were created to arrest, sentence and execute people. Amin's guard were the first victims of the terror which ensued. Those commanders who had stayed loyal to Amin were arrested, filling the prisons. The Soviets protested, and Kārmal replied, "As long as you keep my hands bound and do not let me deal with the Khalq faction there will be no unity in the PDPA and the government cannot become strong&nbsp;... They tortured and killed us. They still hate us! They are the enemies of the party&nbsp;..."{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=104}} Amin's daughter, along with her baby, was imprisoned for twelve years, until [[Mohammad Najibullah]], then leader of the PDPA, released her.{{sfn|Braithwaite|2011|p=104}} When Karmal took power, leading posts in the Party and Government bureaucracy were taken over by Parchamites. The Khalq faction was removed from power, and only [[technocrat]]s, [[Opportunism|opportunists]] and individuals which the Soviets trusted would be appointed to the higher echelons of government. Khalqists remained in control of the [[Ministry of the Interior (Afghanistan)|Ministry of Interior]], but Parchamites were given control over [[KHAD]] and the secret police. The Parchamites and the Khalqists controlled an equal share of the military. Two out of Karmal's three Council of Ministers deputy chairmen were Khalqists. Khalqists controlled the [[Ministry of Communications (Afghanistan)|Ministry of Communications]] and the interior ministry. Parchamites, on the other hand, controlled the [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] and the [[Ministry of Defence (Afghanistan)|Ministry of Defence]].{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA44 44]}} In addition to the changes in government, the Parchamites held clear majority in the [[Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan|PDPA Central Committee]]. Only one Khalqi, Saleh Mohammad Zeary, was a member of the PDPA Secretariat during Karmal's rule.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA45 45]}}

Over 14 and 15 March 1982 the PDPA held a party ''conference'' at the Kabul Polytechnic Institute instead of a party ''congress'', since a party congress would have given the Khalq faction a majority and could have led to a Khalqist takeover of the PDPA. The rules of holding a party conference were different, and the Parchamites had a three-fifths majority. This infuriated several Khalqists; the threat of expulsion did not lessen their anger.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA48 48]}} The conference was not successful, but it was portrayed as such by the official media. The conference broke up after one and a half days of a 3-day long program, because of the inter-party struggle for power between the Khalqists and the Parchamites. A "program of action" was introduced, and party rules were given minor changes. As an explanation of the low party membership, the official media also made it seem hard to become a member of the party.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA49 49]}}

====PDPA base====
{| class="wikitable collapsible collapsed" width=60% style="float:right; margin:0 15px;"
!colspan="9" | Karmal cabinet (1979–1981){{sfn|Adamec|2011|pp=Iii, Iiii & lv}}
|-
!Office
!Incumbent
!Took office
!Left office
|-
|Deputy Chairman of the [[Council of Ministers (Afghanistan)|Council of Ministers]]
|[[Assadullah Sarwari]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Planning (Afghanistan)|Minister of Planning]]
|[[Sultan Ali Keshtmand]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Minister of Defence (Afghanistan)|Minister of National Defence]]
|[[Muhammad Rafie]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of the Interior (Afghanistan)|Minister of Interior]]
|[[Sayed Mohammad Gulabzoy]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan)|Minister of Foreign Affairs]]
|[[Shah Muhammad Dost]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Education (Afghanistan)|Minister of Education]]
|[[Anahita Ratebzad]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan)|Minister of Finance]]
|[[Abdul Wakil]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Transport (Afghanistan)|Minister of Transport]]
|[[Sherjan Mazduryar]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Border and Tribes (Afghanistan)|Minister of Border and Tribes]]
|[[Faiz Muhammad]]
|28 December 1979
|14 September 1980
|-
|[[Ministry of Trade (Afghanistan)|Minister of Trade]]
|[[Muhammad Khan Jalalar]]
|28 December 1979
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Communications (Afghanistan)|Minister of Communications]]
|[[Muhammad Aslam Watanjar]]
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Mines, Industries|Minister of Mines, Industries]]
|[[Muhammad Isma'il Danesh]]
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Water, Power (Afghanistan)|Minister of Water, Power]]
|[[Raz Muhammad Paktin]]
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Higher Education (Afghanistan)|Minister of Higher Education]]
|Guldad
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Health (Afghanistan)|Minister of Health]]
|[[Nazar Muhammad]]
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|-
|[[Ministry of Agriculture (Afghanistan)|Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform]]
|[[Fazl Rahim Mohmand]]
|10 January 1980
|11 June 1981
|}
When Karmal took power, he began expanding the support base of the PDPA. Karmal tried to persuade certain groups, which had been referred to [[class enemy|class enemies]] of the revolution during Taraki and Amin's rule, to support the PDPA.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA45 45–46]}} Karmal appointed several non-communists to top positions. Between March and May 1980, 78 out of the 191 people appointed to government posts were not members of the PDPA. Karmal reintroduced the old Afghan custom of having an Islamic invocation every time the government issued a proclamation. In his first live speech to the Afghan people, Karmal called for the establishment of the [[National Front (Afghanistan)|National Fatherland Front]] (NFF); the NFF's founding congress was held in June 1981. Unfortunately for Karmal, his policies did not lead to a notable increase in support for his regime, and it did not help Karmal that most Afghans saw the Soviet intervention as an invasion.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA46 46]}}

By 1981, the government gave up on political solutions to the conflict. At the fifth PDPA Central Committee plenum in June, Karmal resigned from his Council of Ministers chairmanship and was replaced by [[Sultan Ali Keshtmand]], while [[Nur Ahmad Nur]] was given a bigger role in the Revolutionary Council. This was seen as "base broadening".{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA48 48]}} The previous weight given to non-PDPA members in top positions ceased to be an important matter in the media by June 1981. This was significant, considering that up to five members of the Revolutionary Council were non-PDPA members. By the end of 1981, the previous contenders, who had been heavily presented in the media, were all gone; two were given ambassadorships, two ceased to be active in politics, and one continued as an advisor to the government. The other three changed sides, and began to work for the opposition.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA48 48]}}

The national policy of reconciliation continued: in January 1984 the land reform introduced by Taraki and Amin was drastically modified, the limits of landholdings were increased to win the support of middle class peasants, the literacy programme was continued, and concessions to women were made. In 1985 the [[Loya Jirga]] was reconvened. The 1985 Loya Jirga was followed by a tribal jirga in September. In 1986 [[Abdul Rahim Hatef]], a non-PDPA member, was elected to the NFF chairmanship. During the 1985–86 elections it was said that 60 percent of the elected officials were non-PDPA members. By the end of Karmal's rule, several non-PDPA members had high-level government positions.{{sfn|Staff writers|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=e5Az1lGCJwQC&pg=PA64 64]}}

====Civil war and military====
{{further|Soviet–Afghan War}}
{| class="wikitable" width=60% style="float:right; margin:0 15px;"
|+ Troop levels
!Soldiers!!As of
|-
|25,000
|1980{{sfn|Arnold|1983|p = [https://books.google.com/books?id=cd85ioPsz6cC&pg=PA111 111]}}
|-
|25–30,000
|1981{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994a|p=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n203 180]}}
|-
|25–30,000
|1982{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994a|p=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n203 180]}}
|-
|40,000
|1983{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994a|p=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n204 181]}}
|-
|40,000
|1984{{sfn|Bonosky|2001|p=[https://archive.org/details/afghanistanwashi00bono/page/261 261]}}
|-
|35–40,000
|1985{{sfn|Levite|Jenteleson|Berman|1992|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tA8jTFUFuzQC&pg=PA80 80]}}
|}
In March 1979, the military budget was 6.4&nbsp;million US$, which was 8.3 percent of the government budget, but only 2.2 of [[gross national product]]. After the Soviet intervention, the defence budget increased to 208 million US$ in 1980, and 325&nbsp;million US$ by 1981. In 1982 it was reported that the government spent around 22 percent of total expenditure.{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994a|p=[https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_RUSNyMH1aFQC/page/n211 186]}}

When the political solution failed ([[#PDPA base|see "PDPA base" section]]), the Afghan government and the Soviet military decided to solve the conflict militarily. The change from a political to a military solution did not come suddenly. It began in January 1981, as Karmal doubled wages for military personnel, issued several promotions, and decorated one general and thirteen colonels. The draft age was lowered, the obligatory length of arms duty was extended and the age for reservists was increased to thirty-five years of age. In June 1981, [[Assadullah Sarwari]] lost his seat in the PDPA Politburo, replaced by [[Mohammad Aslam Watanjar]], a former tank commander and [[Ministry of Communications (Afghanistan)|Minister of Communications]], [[Major General]] [[Mohammad Rafi (politician)|Mohammad Rafi]] was made [[Ministry of Defence (Afghanistan)|Minister of Defence]] and [[Mohammad Najibullah]] appointed [[KHAD]] Chairman.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA47 47]}}

These measures were introduced due to the collapse of the army during the Soviet intervention. Before the intervention the army could field 100,000 troops, after the intervention only 25,000. Desertions were pandemic, and the recruitment campaigns for young people often drove them to the opposition.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA47 47]}} To better organize the military, seven military zones were established, each with its own Defence Council. The Defence Councils were established at the national, provincial and district level to empower the local PDPA.{{sfn|Arnold|1994|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TmMJnaMVN6oC&pg=PA48 48]}} It is estimated that the Afghan government spent as much as 40 percent of government revenue on defense.{{sfn|Staff writers|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=e5Az1lGCJwQC&pg=PA86 86]}}

Karmal refused to recognize the rebels as genuine, saying in an interview:
{{Blockquote|The people of Afghanistan do not recognise [the rebels] who include a number of hired people of the reactionary circles of Pakistan, Chinese chauvinists, imperialist America and Britain, and the reactionaries of Arab countries and the Zionists, who pretend to be the representatives of Afghanistan.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/19800515-india-has-always-been-a-good-friend-of-afghanistan-babrak-karmal-806665-2014-01-28|title=India has always been a good friend of Afghanistan: Babrak Karmal|date=28 January 2014 |access-date=4 August 2021|archive-date=4 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210804174137/https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/19800515-india-has-always-been-a-good-friend-of-afghanistan-babrak-karmal-806665-2014-01-28|url-status=live}}</ref>}}

====Economy====
{| class="wikitable" width=60% style="float:right; margin:0 15px;"
! colspan="2" width=30%|Indicators
! width=1%| 1980
! width=1%| 1981
! width=1%| 1982
! width=1%| 1986
|-
!rowspan="3" | '''Expenditure'''
|Total (millions of [[Afghan afghani|afghanis]])
|31,692
|40,751
|42,112
|88,700
|-
|Ordinary (in percent)
|62
|66
|69
|74
|-
|Development (in percent)
|38
|34
|31
|26
|-
!rowspan="5"|'''Sources of Finances'''
|Domestic revenue: excluding gas (in percent)
|50
|40
|37
|31
|-
|Sales of natural gas (in percent)
|33
|34
|34
|17
|-
|Foreign aid (in percent)
|28
|26
|28
|29
|-
|Rentier income (in percent)
|61
|59
|62
|48
|-
|Domestic borrowing (in percent)
|−11
|1
|0
|23
|}
During the civil war and the ensuing [[Soviet–Afghan War]], most of the country's infrastructure was destroyed. Normal patterns of economic activity were disrupted.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Economy |url=http://www.afghanistans.com/Information/Economy/default.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205010307/http://www.afghanistans.com/information/Economy/default.htm |archive-date=5 February 2012 |access-date=1 February 2012 |publisher=Afghanistan.com}}</ref> The [[Gross national product]] (GNP) fell substantially during Karmal's rule because of the conflict; trade and transport was disrupted with loss of labor and capital. In 1981 the Afghan GDP stood at 154.3&nbsp;billion [[Afghan afghani]]s, a drop from 159.7&nbsp;billion in 1978. [[GNP per capita]] decreased from 7,370 in 1978 to 6,852 in 1981. The dominant form of economic activity was in the [[Agriculture in Afghanistan|agricultural sector]]. Agriculture accounted for 63 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1981; 56 percent of the labor force was working in agriculture in 1982. Industry accounted for 21 percent of GDP in 1982, and employed 10 percent of the labor force. All industrial enterprises were government-owned. The service sector, the smallest of the three, accounted for 10 percent of GDP in 1981, and employed an estimated one-third of the labour force. The [[balance of payments]], which had grown in the pre-communist administration of [[Muhammad Daoud Khan]], decreased, turning negative by 1982 at 70.3&nbsp;million $US. The only economic activity which grew substantially during Karmal's rule was export and import.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Country Profile: Afghanistan |url=http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/country.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20011106230711/http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/country.html |archive-date=6 November 2001 |access-date=1 February 2012 |publisher=[[Illinois Institute of Technology]]}}</ref>

===Foreign policy===
Karmal observed in early 1983 that without Soviet intervention, "It is unknown what the destiny of the Afghan Revolution would be&nbsp;... We are realists and we clearly realize that in store for us yet lie trials and deprivations, losses and difficulties."{{sfn|Collins|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1TDa1YNhSjgC&pg=PA306 306]}} Two weeks before this statement [[Sultan Ali Keshtmand]], the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, lamented the fact that half the schools and three-quarters of communications had been destroyed since 1979.{{sfn|Collins|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1TDa1YNhSjgC&pg=PA306 306]}} The Soviet Union rejected several Western-made peace plans, such as the Carrington Plan, since they did not take into consideration the PDPA government. Most Western peace plans had been made in collaboration with the Afghan opposition forces. At the [[26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) [[Leonid Brezhnev]], the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] of the CPSU [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Central Committee]], stated;{{sfn|Collins|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1TDa1YNhSjgC&pg=PA313 313–314]}}
{{blockquote|We do not object to the questions connected with Afghanistan being discussed in conjunction with the question of security in the [[Persian Gulf]]. Naturally here on only the international aspects of the Afghan problem can be discussed, not internal Afghan affairs. The sovereignty of Afghanistan must be fully protected, as must its nonaligned status.}}

The stance of the Pakistani government was clear, demanding complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the establishment of a non-PDPA government. Karmal, summarizing his discussions with Iran and Pakistan, said "Iran and Pakistan have so far not opted for concrete and constructive positions."{{sfn|Collins|1986|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1TDa1YNhSjgC&pg=PA314 314]}} During Karmal's rule [[Afghanistan–Pakistan relations|Afghan–Pakistani relations]] remained hostile; the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was the catalyst for the hostile relationship. The increasing numbers of [[Afghans in Pakistan|Afghan refugees in Pakistan]] challenged the PDPA's legitimacy to rule.{{sfn|Qassem|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t_Qn9PZMU4wC&pg=PA87 87–88]}}

The Soviet Union threatened in 1985 that it would support the [[Baloch nationalism|Baloch separatist movement]] in Pakistan if the Pakistani government continued to aid the [[Afghan mujahideen]].{{sfn|Hilali|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=nhqRa0glD9oC&pg=PA50 50]}} Karmal, problematically for the Soviets, did not want a Soviet withdrawal, and he hampered attempts to improve relations with Pakistan since the Pakistani government had refused to recognise the PDPA government.{{sfn|Qassem|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t_Qn9PZMU4wC&pg=PA78 78]}}

===Public image===
Because Karmal was put into power without a formal ceremony as in Afghan tradition, he was seen as an illegitimate leader in many eyes of his people. A poor performance in foreign interviews also did not help his public image where he was noted to speak like an "exhibitionist" rather than a statesman.<ref name="cdlib">{{Cite web|url=https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7b69p12h;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print|title=Afghanistan|access-date=4 August 2021|archive-date=13 August 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210813153023/https://publishing.cdlib.org/ucpressebooks/view?docId=ft7b69p12h;chunk.id=0;doc.view=print|url-status=live}}</ref> Karmal was widely viewed as a [[puppet]] leader of the Soviet Union by Afghans and the Western press.<ref>[https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22hansard80%2Fhansardr80%2F1980-02-19%2F0067%22;src1=sm1 Parlinfo - Afghanistan-Invasion By Soviet Union<!-- Bot generated title -->]</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=Z54rBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA174|title = Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared|isbn = 9781136316579|last1 = Borer|first1 = Douglas A.|date = February 2013| publisher=Routledge |access-date = 4 August 2021|archive-date = 4 August 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210804203551/https://books.google.com/books?id=Z54rBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA174|url-status = live}}</ref>

Despite his position, Karmal was apparently not permitted to make key decisions as he was following advice from Soviet advisers. The Soviet control of the Afghan state was apparently so much that Karmal himself admitted to a friend of his unfree life, telling him: “The Soviet comrades love me boundlessly, and for the sake of my personal safety, they don’t obey even my own orders.”<ref name="cdlib"/>

{{blockquote|The hands, feet and tongue of the poor Sultan had been tied, and he had no right to speak [without permission] with his personal friends.|author=Zia Majid, a personal friend of Babrak Karmal<ref name="cdlib"/>}}

===Fall from power and succession===
[[Mikhail Gorbachev]], then [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|General Secretary]] of the [[Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]], said, "The main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help."{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA74 74]}} Karmal's position became less secure when the Soviet leadership began blaming him for the failures in Afghanistan. Gorbachev, worried over the situation, told the Soviet Politburo "If we don't change approaches [to evacuate Afghanistan], we will be fighting there for another 20 or 30 years."{{sfn|H. Kakar|M. Kakar|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QyTmFj5tUGsC&pg=PA75 75]}} It is not clear when the Soviet leadership began to campaign for Karmal's dismissal, but [[Andrei Gromyko]] discussed the possibility of Karmal's resignation with [[Javier Pérez de Cuéllar]], the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]] in 1982. While it was Gorbachev who would dismiss Karmal, there may have been a consensus within the Soviet leadership in 1983 that Karmal should resign. Gorbachev's own plan was to replace Karmal with [[Mohammad Najibullah]], who had joined the PDPA at its creation.{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA95 95]}} Najibullah was thought highly of by [[Yuri Andropov]], [[Boris Ponomarev]] and [[Dmitriy Ustinov]], and negotiations for his succession may have started in 1983. Najibullah was not the Soviet leadership's only choice for Karmal's succession; a [[Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye|GRU]] report noted that the majority of the PDPA leadership would support [[Assadullah Sarwari]]'s ascension to leadership. According to the GRU, Sarwari was a better candidate as he could balance between the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbeks; Najibullah was a Pashtun nationalist. Another viable candidate was [[Abdul Qadir (Afghan communist)|Abdul Qadir]], who had been a participant in the [[Saur Revolution]].{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA96 96]}}

Najibullah was appointed to the PDPA Secretariat in November 1985. During Karmal's March 1986 visit to the Soviet Union, the Soviets tried to persuade Karmal that he was too ill to govern, and that he should resign.{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA96 96–97]}} This backfired, as a Soviet doctor attending to Karmal told him he was in good health. Karmal asked to return home to Kabul, and said that he understood and would listen to the Soviet recommendations. Before leaving, Karmal promised he would step down as PDPA General Secretary. The Soviets did not trust him and sent [[Vladimir Kryuchkov]], the head of intelligence ([[First Chief Directorate|FCD]]) in the [[KGB]], into Afghanistan. At a meeting in Kabul, Karmal confessed his undying love for the Soviet Union, comparing his ardor to his Muslim faith. Kryuchkov, concluding that he could not persuade Karmal to resign, left the meeting. After Kryuchkov left the room, the Afghan defence minister and the state security minister visited Karmal's office, telling him that he had to resign from one of his posts. Understanding that his Soviet support had been eliminated, Karmal resigned from the office of the General Secretary at the 18th PDPA Central Committee plenum. He was succeeded in his post by Najibullah.{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA97 97]}}

Karmal still had support within the party, and used his base to curb Najibullah's powers. He began spreading rumors that he would be reappointed General Secretary. Najibullah's power base was in the [[KHAD]], the Afghan equivalent to the KGB, and not the party.{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA97 97]}} Considering the fact that the Soviet Union had supported Karmal for over six years, the Soviet leadership wanted to ease him out of power gradually. [[Yuli Vorontsov]], the [[Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan]], told Najibullah to begin undermining Karmal's power slowly. Najibullah complained to the Soviet leadership that Karmal used most of his spare time looking for errors and "speaking against the [[National Reconciliation (Afghanistan)|National Reconciliation]] programme".{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA98 98]}} At a meeting of the Soviet Politburo on 13 November 1986 it was decided that Najibullah should remove Karmal; this motion was supported by Gromyko, Vorontsov, [[Eduard Shevardnadze]], [[Anatoly Dobrynin]] and [[Viktor Chebrikov]]. A PDPA meeting in November relieved Karmal of his Revolutionary Council chairmanship, and exiled him to Moscow where he was given a state-owned apartment and a [[dacha]].{{sfn|Kalinovsky|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rf1Yg2SGLQgC&pg=PA98 98]}} Karmal was succeeded as Revolutionary Council chairman by [[Haji Mohammad Tsamkani]], who was not a member of the PDPA.{{sfn|Amtstutz|1994b|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=a0Mp1AHpp0gC&pg=PA152 152]}}