Editing Attack on Pearl Harbor (section)

==Approach and attack==
{{See also|Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor}}
[[File:Kirishima Kaga and Hiei at Hitokappu.jpg|thumb|Part of the Japanese task force on November 22, 1941, prior to its departure]]
On November 26, 1941, a Japanese task force (the [[Kido Butai|Striking Force]]) of six aircraft carriers{{snd}}{{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Akagi||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Kaga||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Sōryū||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Hiryū||2}}, {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Shōkaku||2}}, and {{ship|Japanese aircraft carrier|Zuikaku||2}}{{snd}}departed [[Kasatka Bay|Hittokapu Bay]] on [[Iturup|Etorofu]] (now Iterup) Island in the [[Kuril Islands]], ''en route'' to a position northwest of Hawaii, intending to launch its 408 aircraft to attack Pearl Harbor: 360 for the two attack waves and 48 on defensive [[combat air patrol]] (CAP), including nine fighters from the first wave.

The first wave was to be the primary attack, while the second wave was to attack carriers as its first objective and cruisers as its second, with battleships as the third target.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|p=132}}</ref> The first wave carried most of the weapons designed to attack capital ships, mainly specially adapted [[Type 91 torpedo|Type 91]] [[aerial torpedo]]es which were designed with an anti-roll mechanism and a rudder extension that let them operate in shallow water.<ref>{{Harvnb|Peattie|2001|p=145}}</ref> The aircrews were ordered to select the highest-value targets (battleships and [[aircraft carrier]]s) or, if these were not present, any other high-value ships (cruisers and destroyers). First-wave [[dive bomber]]s were to attack ground targets. Fighters were ordered to strafe and destroy as many parked aircraft as possible to ensure they did not intercept the bombers, especially in the first wave. When the fighters' fuel got low, they were to refuel aboard the aircraft carriers and return to combat. Fighters were to assume CAP duties where needed, especially over American airfields.{{citation needed|date = September 2014}}

Before the attack commenced, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched reconnaissance [[floatplanes]] from [[heavy cruiser]]s {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Chikuma|1938|2}} and {{ship|Japanese cruiser|Tone|1937|2}}, to scout Oahu and Lahaina Roads, Maui, respectively, with orders to report on American fleet composition and location.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/usar/scrs/scrs2t.htm | title=Japanese Naval Aircraft at Pearl Harbor | publisher=National Park Service | work=21 April 2001 | accessdate=13 April 2024}}</ref> Reconnaissance aircraft flights risked alerting the Americans,<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|pp=173, 174}}</ref> and were not necessary. Fleet composition and preparedness information in Pearl Harbor were already known from the reports of the Japanese spy [[Takeo Yoshikawa]]. A report of the absence of the American fleet at Lahaina anchorage off Maui was received from the ''Tone''{{'}}s floatplane and the fleet submarine {{Nowrap|{{Jsub|I-72||2}}}}.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|p=153}}</ref> Another four scout planes patrolled the area between the Japanese carrier force (the [[Kidō Butai]]) and [[Niihau]], to detect any counterattack.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB">{{Harvnb|DiGiulian|2021}}</ref>

===Submarines===
Fleet submarines {{Jsub|I-16||2}}, {{Jsub|I-18||2}}, {{Jsub|I-20||2}}, {{Jsub|I-22|1938|2}}, and {{Jsub|I-24|1939|2}} each embarked a [[Ko-hyoteki class submarine|Type A]] [[midget submarine]] for transport to the waters off Oahu.<ref name="Stewart1974p56">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=56}}</ref> The five I-boats left [[Kure Naval District]] on November 25, 1941.<ref name="Stewart1974p56"/> On December 6, they came to within {{cvt|10|nmi|km mi}} of the mouth of Pearl Harbor<ref>{{Harvnb|Goldstein|Dillon|2000|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q2pFnALHfykC&pg=PA146 146]}}</ref> and launched their midget subs at about 01:00 local time on December 7.<ref name="Stewart1974p57">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=57}}</ref> At 03:42 Hawaiian time, the [[Minesweeper (ship)|minesweeper]] {{USS|Condor|AMc-14|2}} spotted a midget submarine periscope southwest of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy and alerted the destroyer {{USS|Ward|DD-139|2}}.<ref>{{Harvnb|Smith|1999|p=36}}</ref><ref name="Stewart1974p58">{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|p=58}}</ref> The midget may have entered Pearl Harbor. However, ''Ward'' sank another midget submarine at 06:37<ref name="Stewart1974p58"/>{{refn|She was located by a [[University of Hawaiʻi]] research submersible on August 28, 2002, in {{cvt|400|m|ft}} of water, {{cvt|6|nmi|km}} outside the harbor.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/gallery/archaeology/midget.html |title=Japanese Midget Submarine |access-date=January 20, 2014 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20121212152317/http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/HURL/gallery/archaeology/midget.html |archive-date=December 12, 2012 }}</ref>|group=nb}} in the first American shots in the Pacific Theater. A midget submarine on the north side of [[Ford Island]] missed the [[seaplane tender]] {{USS|Curtiss|AV-4|2}} with her first torpedo and missed the attacking destroyer {{USS|Monaghan|DD-354|2}} with her other one before being sunk by ''Monaghan'' at 08:43.<ref name="Stewart1974p58"/>

A third midget submarine, ''[[HA. 19 (Japanese Midget Submarine)|Ha-19]]'', grounded twice, once outside the harbor entrance and again on the east side of Oahu, where it was captured on December 8.<ref>{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|pp=59–61}}</ref> Ensign [[Kazuo Sakamaki]] swam ashore and was captured by [[Hawaii National Guard]] Corporal [[David Akui]], becoming the first Japanese [[prisoner of war]].{{refn|While the nine sailors who died in the attack were quickly lionized by the Japanese government as ''Kyūgunshin'' ("The Nine War Heroes"), the news of Sakamaki's capture, which had been publicized in American news broadcasts, was kept secret. Even after the war, however, he received recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not sacrificing his own life.|group=nb}}<ref>{{Citation |title=Kazuo Sakamaki, 81, Pacific P.O.W. No. 1 |date=December 21, 1999 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/21/world/kazuo-sakamaki-81-pacific-pow-no-1.html |newspaper=The New York Times |access-date=March 5, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200911011213/https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/21/world/kazuo-sakamaki-81-pacific-pow-no-1.html |url-status=live |archive-date=September 11, 2020}}</ref> A fourth had been damaged by a [[depth charge]] attack and was abandoned by its crew before it could fire its torpedoes.<ref>{{harvnb|Stewart|1974|pp=61–62}}</ref> It was found outside the harbor in 1960. Japanese forces received a radio message from a midget submarine at 00:41 on December 8 claiming to have damaged one or more large warships inside Pearl Harbor.<ref name="USSBSp19">{{harvnb|United States Strategic Bombing Survey|1946|p=19}}</ref>

In 1992, 2000, and 2001 [[Hawaii Undersea Research Laboratory]]'s submersibles found the wreck of the fifth midget submarine lying in three parts outside Pearl Harbor. The wreck was in the debris field where much surplus American equipment had been dumped after the war, including vehicles and landing craft. Both of its torpedoes were missing. This correlates with reports of two torpedoes fired at the [[light cruiser]] {{USS|St. Louis|CL-49|2}} at 10:04 at the entrance of Pearl Harbor, and a possible torpedo fired at destroyer {{USS|Helm|DD-388|2}} at 08:21.<ref>{{Harvnb|Zimm|2011|pp=330–341}}</ref> There is dispute over this official chain of events though. The "torpedo" that ''St. Louis'' saw was also reportedly a porpoising minesweeping float being towed by the destroyer {{USS|Boggs|DD-136|2}}.<ref>Owen, RAdm USN, Thomas B. (1989). Memories of the War Years. Vol. I. Washington: Unpublished memoir.</ref> Some historians and naval architects theorise that a photo taken by a Japanese naval aviator of Battleship Row during the attack on Pearl Harbor that was declassified in the 1990s and publicized in the 2000s to the public,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.okhistory.org/learn/ussok2|title=Pearl Harbor &#124; Oklahoma Historical Society|website=Oklahoma Historical Society &#124; OHS}}</ref> shows the fifth midget submarine firing a torpedo at ''West Virginia'' and another at ''Oklahoma''. These torpedoes were twice the size of the aerial torpedoes so it was possible that both torpedoes heavily contributed to the sinkings of both ships and especially helped to capsize ''Oklahoma'' as ''Oklahoma'' was the only battleship that day to suffer catastrophic damage to her [[belt armor]] at the waterline from a torpedo. Admiral Chester Nimitz, in a report to Congress, confirmed that one midget submarine's torpedo (possibly from the other midget submarine that fired torpedoes but failed to hit a target) which was fired but did not explode was recovered in Pearl Harbor and was much larger than the aerial torpedoes.<ref>[https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2004/december/pearl-harbor-midget-sub-picture Pearl Harbor: A Midget Sub in the Picture?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042049/https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2004/december/pearl-harbor-midget-sub-picture |date=March 23, 2023 }}, Retrieved 22 March 2023</ref><ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCaTpn6F_Ik PBS Pearl Harbor USS Oklahoma The Final Story 2016 Documentary] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042048/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fCaTpn6F_Ik |date=March 23, 2023 }} (Timestamp: 25:10). Retrieved 22 March 2023.</ref>
<ref>[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag Pearl Harbor midget sub attack: Photographic Evidence] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230323042109/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5rhbN9NOSag |date=March 23, 2023 }}. Retrieved 22 March 2023.</ref> Others dispute this theory.<ref>{{Harvard citation no brackets|Zimm|2011|pp=350}}</ref>

===Japanese declaration of war===
{{See also|Japanese war crimes}}

The attack took place before any formal declaration of war was made by Japan, but this was not Admiral Yamamoto's intention. He originally stipulated that the attack should not commence until thirty minutes after Japan had informed the United States that peace negotiations were at an end.<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.historyonthenet.com/when-was-pearl-harbor/ |title=When was Pearl Harbor? |date=2014-11-26 |work=History |access-date=2018-08-17 |archive-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817161358/https://www.historyonthenet.com/when-was-pearl-harbor/ |url-status=live}}</ref> However, the attack began before the notice could be delivered. Tokyo transmitted the 5000-word notification (commonly called the "14-Part Message") in two blocks to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. Transcribing the message took too long for the Japanese ambassador to deliver it at 1:00{{spaces}}p.m. Washington time, as ordered, and consequently the message was not presented until more than one hour after the attack had {{nowrap|begun{{hsp}}{{mdash}}}}{{hsp}} but American code breakers had [[Purple cipher|already deciphered]] and translated most of the message hours before it was scheduled to be delivered.{{sfn|Toland|1983}}<ref name=codebreakers>{{cite book |last1=Kahn |first1=David |title=The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet |date=1996 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-4391-0355-5}}</ref>{{rp|pp.2ff}} The final part of the message is sometimes described as a declaration of war. While it was viewed by a number of senior American government and military officials as a very strong indicator negotiations were likely to be terminated{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=424, 475}} and that war might break out at any moment,{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=493–494}} it neither declared war nor severed diplomatic relations. [[Japanese declaration of war on the United States and the British Empire|A declaration of war]] was printed on the front page of Japan's newspapers in the evening edition of December 8 (late December 7 in the United States),<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |author=Emperor of Japan Hirohito |date=December 8, 1941 |title=Declaration of War against the United States and Britain |url=https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/T-01415_0.pdf |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210715210137/https://www.gilderlehrman.org/sites/default/files/inline-pdfs/T-01415_0.pdf |archive-date=July 15, 2021 |url-status=live |via=[[Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History]]}}</ref> but not delivered to the American government until the day after the attack.

For decades, [[conventional wisdom]] held that Japan attacked without first formally breaking diplomatic relations only because of accidents and bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document hinting at war to Washington.<ref>{{Cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Sterngold |first=James |date=November 21, 1994 |title=Japan Admits It Bungled Notice of War in '41 (Published 1994) |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/world/japan-admits-it-bungled-notice-of-war-in-41.html |access-date=December 1, 2020 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=December 10, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201210000317/https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/21/world/japan-admits-it-bungled-notice-of-war-in-41.html |url-status=live}}</ref> In 1999, however, Takeo Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at [[International Christian University]] in Tokyo, discovered documents that pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, and indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan's intention to break off negotiations and start a war, including a December 7 entry in the war diary saying, "[O]ur deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success." Of this, Iguchi said, "The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations{{spaces}}... and they clearly prevailed."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html |title=Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show |author=Howard W. French |newspaper=The New York Times |date=December 9, 1999 |access-date=February 14, 2017 |url-status=live |archive-date=December 5, 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161205202932/http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |last=Kawabata |first=Tai |date=December 9, 2014 |title=Historian seeks to clear embassy of Pearl Harbor 'sneak attack' infamy |newspaper=[[The Japan Times]] |url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/09/national/history/historian-seeks-to-clear-embassy-of-pearl-harbor-sneak-attack-infamy/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210516225555/https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/12/09/national/history/historian-seeks-to-clear-embassy-of-pearl-harbor-sneak-attack-infamy/ |archive-date=May 16, 2021}}</ref>

In any event, even if the Japanese had decoded and delivered the 14-Part Message before the beginning of the attack, it would not have constituted either a formal break of diplomatic relations or a declaration of war.<ref>{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|p=485}}. "[The] fourteenth part was not a formal declaration of war. It did not even rupture diplomatic relations. It merely broke off the discussions."</ref> The final two paragraphs of the message read:<ref>{{cite web |mode=cs2 |date=December 7, 1941 |title=Japanese 'Fourteen Part' Message of December 7, 1941 |type=Memorandum |via=HyperWar Foundation |url=https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170917001957/http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/Dip/Fourteen.html |archive-date=September 17, 2017 |url-status=live}}</ref>

{{blockquote| Thus the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.{{parabr}}The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.}}

United States naval intelligence officers were alarmed by the unusual timing for delivering the {{nowrap|message{{hsp}}{{mdash}}{{hsp}}}}1:00{{spaces}}p.m. on a Sunday, which was 7:30{{spaces}}a.m. in {{nowrap|Hawaii{{hsp}}{{mdash}}{{hsp}}}}and attempted to alert Pearl Harbor. But due to communication problems the warning was not delivered before the attack.<ref name=codebreakers/>{{rp|Ch. 1}}

===First wave composition===
[[File:Pearlmap1.png|thumb|The Japanese attacked in two waves. The first wave was detected by [[United States Army]] [[radar]] at {{convert|136|nmi|km|0}}, but was misidentified as [[United States Army Air Forces]] [[bombers]] arriving from the American mainland.<br />'''Top:''' {{nowrap|A: Ford Island NAS.}} {{nowrap|B: Hickam Field.}} {{nowrap|C: Bellows Field.}} {{nowrap|D: Wheeler Field.}} {{nowrap|E: Kaneohe NAS.}} {{nowrap|F: Ewa MCAS.}} {{nowrap|R-1: Opana Radar Station.}} {{nowrap|R-2: Kawailoa RS.}} {{nowrap|R-3: Kaaawa RS.}} {{nowrap|G: Kahuku.}} {{nowrap|H: Haleiwa.}} {{nowrap|I: Wahiawa.}} {{nowrap|J: Kaneohe.}} {{nowrap|K: Honolulu.}} {{nowrap|0: B-17s from mainland.}} {{nowrap|1: First strike group.}} {{nowrap|1-1: Level bombers.}} {{nowrap|1–2: Torpedo bombers.}} {{nowrap|1–3: Dive bombers.}} {{nowrap|2: Second strike group.}} {{nowrap|2-1: Level bombers.}} {{nowrap|2-1F: Fighters.}} {{nowrap|2-2: Dive bombers.}}<br />'''Bottom:''' {{nowrap|A: Wake Island.}} {{nowrap|B: Midway Islands.}} {{nowrap|C: Johnston Island.}} {{nowrap|D: Hawaii.}} {{nowrap|D-1: Oahu.}} {{nowrap|1: {{USS|Lexington|CV-2|2}}.}} {{nowrap|2: {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.}} {{nowrap|3: First Air Fleet.}}]]
[[File:Pearlmap2.png|thumb|{{legend inline|#E1E1E1|City}} {{legend inline|#4E583F|Army base}} {{legend inline|#808080|Navy base}}<br />'''Attacked targets:''' {{nowrap|1: {{USS|California|BB-44|6}}.}} {{nowrap|2: {{USS|Maryland|BB-46|6}}.}} {{nowrap|3: {{USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|6}}.}} {{nowrap|4: {{USS|Tennessee|BB-43|6}}.}} {{nowrap|5: {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|6}}.}} {{nowrap|6: {{USS|Arizona|BB-39|6}}.}} {{nowrap|7: {{USS|Nevada|BB-36|6}}.}} {{nowrap|8: {{USS|Pennsylvania|BB-38|6}}.}} {{nowrap|9: [[Ford Island|Ford Island NAS]].}} {{nowrap|10: [[Hickam Air Force Base|Hickam field]].}}<br />'''Ignored infrastructure targets:''' {{nowrap|A: Oil storage tanks.}} {{nowrap|B: CINCPAC headquarters building.}} {{nowrap|C: Submarine base.}} {{nowrap|D: Navy Yard.}}]]
The first attack wave of 183 airplanes, led by Commander [[Mitsuo Fuchida]], was launched north of Oahu.<ref>{{Harvnb|Fuchida|2011|loc=chs. 19, 20}}</ref> Six airplanes failed to launch due to technical difficulties.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB" /> The first wave included three groups of airplanes:{{refn|The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs, 40 Kates with torpedoes, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks.<ref name="IJN">{{cite web |title=Aircraft Attack Organization |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-2.html#appendix3 |publisher=Ibiblio.org |access-date=July 17, 2011 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110623081726/http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/PTO-Campaigns/USSBS-PTO-2.html |archive-date=June 23, 2011}}</ref>|group=nb}}

*'''1st Group''' (targets: battleships and aircraft carriers)<ref name="navsource-ijnaf">{{Harvnb|Yarnell|2003}}</ref>
**49 [[Nakajima B5N]] ''Kate'' bombers armed with 800{{nbh}}kg (1760{{spaces}}lb) [[armor-piercing bomb]]s, organized in four sections (one failed to launch)
**40 B5N bombers armed with [[Type 91 torpedo]]es, also in four sections
*'''2nd Group''' – (targets: [[Ford Island]] and [[Wheeler Field]])
**51 [[Aichi D3A]] ''Val'' dive bombers armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} [[general-purpose bomb]]s (3 failed to launch)
*'''3rd Group''' – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
**43 [[Mitsubishi A6M Zero|Mitsubishi A6M "Zero"]] fighters for air control and [[strafe|strafing]]<ref name="IJN" /> (2 failed to launch)

As the first wave approached Oahu, it was [[Radar warning of Pearl Harbor attack|detected]] by United States Army [[SCR-270 radar]] positioned at [[Opana Radar Site|Opana Point]] near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.<ref>{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=730–731}}. "'Short mishandled radar{{spaces}}...' In his (Short's) words '...{{spaces}}more for training than any idea it would be real'".</ref> The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and [[Joseph Lockard]], reported a target to Private [[Joseph P. McDonald]], a private stationed at [[Fort Shafter]]'s Intercept Center near Pearl Harbor.<ref>{{Harvnb|Evans|1998|p=309}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |mode=cs2 |author=<!--Staff, no by-line--> |date=December 6, 2013 |title=Son recounts father's day during bombing of Pearl Harbor |newspaper=New Haven Register |url=https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Son-recounts-father-s-day-during-bombing-of-11416239.php |access-date=December 10, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210817215302/https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Son-recounts-father-s-day-during-bombing-of-11416239.php |archive-date=August 17, 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite report |mode=cs2 |title=Testimony of Joseph P. McDonald, Technician Fourth-Class; 580th Aircraft Warning |series=Proceedings of Army Pearl Harbor Board |pages=2121–2123 |url=http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/mcdonald_1.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210421035329/http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/radar/mcdonald_1.html |archive-date=April 21, 2021 |url-status=live |via=iBiblio.org}}</ref> Lieutenant [[Kermit A. Tyler]], a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six [[Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress|B-17]] bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers,<ref>{{Harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p=98}}</ref> and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.<ref name="prange501">{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1981|pp=500–501}}</ref> Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).<ref name="prange501"/>

As the first wave approached Oahu, they encountered and shot down several American aircraft. At least one of these radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed or awaiting confirmation when the Japanese air assault began at 7:48{{spaces}}a.m. Hawaiian time<ref name="Prange 1941, p.174">{{harvnb|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p=174}}</ref> (3:18{{spaces}}a.m. December 8 [[Japanese Standard Time]], as kept by ships of the ''Kido Butai''),<ref>{{Harvnb|Symonds|2011|p=218}}</ref> with the attack on Kaneohe. A total of 353<ref name="parillo288"/> Japanese planes reached Oahu in two waves. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked American [[Military airbase|air bases]] across Oahu, starting with [[Hickam Field]], the largest, and [[Wheeler Field]], the main United States Army Air Forces fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Army Air Forces' [[Bellows Field]], near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only aerial opposition came from a handful of [[P-36 Hawk]]s, [[P-40 Warhawk]]s and some [[SBD Dauntless]] dive bombers from the carrier {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}{{refn|In the twenty-five sorties flown, USAF Historical Study No.85 credits six pilots with ten planes destroyed: 1st Lieutenant Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lieutenants Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, [[killed in action]]), Harry W. Brown (P-36), [[Kenneth M. Taylor]] (P-40, 2), and [[George Welch (pilot)|George S. Welch]] (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval [[Anti-aircraft warfare|anti-aircraft]] fire.<ref>{{cite report |author=Office of Air Force History |date=1978 |title=USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II |series=USAF Historical Study |volume=85 |id={{DTIC|ADA542272}} |publisher=Alfred F. Simpson Historical Research Center |location=Montgomery, AL}}
</ref>{{pages needed|date=January 2024}}|group=nb}}

In the first-wave attack, about eight of the forty-nine 800{{nbh}}kg (1760{{spaces}}lb) armor-piercing bombs dropped hit their intended battleship targets. At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, while four hit other ships.{{sfn|Hone|1977}} Men aboard the ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire, prompting them to dress as they ran to [[General quarters|General Quarters]] stations. (The famous message "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not<!--sic--> drill."{{refn|Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard Navy telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate.|group=nb}} was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior Hawaiian command to respond.) American servicemen were caught unprepared by the attack. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip in the open to prevent sabotage,<ref name="parillo293">{{Harvnb|Parillo|2006|p=293}}</ref> guns unmanned (none of the Navy's [[5"/38 caliber gun|5"/38s]], only a quarter of its machine guns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).<ref name="parillo293" /> Despite this low [[Alert state|alert status]], many American military personnel responded effectively during the attack.{{refn|The gunners that did get in action scored most of the victories against Japanese aircraft that morning, including the first of the attack by {{USS|Tautog|SS-199|2}}, and [[Dorie Miller]]'s [[Navy Cross]]-worthy effort. Miller was an African-American cook aboard ''West Virginia'' who took over an unattended [[anti-aircraft gun]] on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the [[Navy Cross]].<ref name="navyfaq57">{{cite web |url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/biographies-list/bios-m/miller-doris.html |title=Miller, Doris |website=Naval History and Heritage Command |date=June 6, 2017 |access-date=February 8, 2018 |archive-date=May 11, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190511152931/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/biographies-list/bios-m/miller-doris.html |url-status=live }}</ref>|group=nb}} Ensign [[Joseph K. Taussig Jr.|Joseph Taussig Jr.]], aboard {{USS|Nevada|BB-36|2}}, commanded the ship's antiaircraft guns and was severely wounded but remained at his post. Lieutenant Commander F. J. Thomas commanded ''Nevada'' in the captain's absence and got her underway until the ship was grounded at 9:10{{spaces}}a.m.<ref>{{Harvnb|Bonner|1996|p=105}}</ref> One of the destroyers, {{USS|Aylwin|DD-355|2}}, got underway with only four officers aboard, all ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty; she operated at sea for 36 hours before her commanding officer managed to get back aboard.<ref>{{Harvnb|DANFS ''Aylwin''}}</ref> Captain [[Mervyn Bennion]], commanding {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2}}, led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb which hit {{USS|Tennessee|BB-43|2}}, moored alongside.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Biographical Sketch of Mervyn S. Bennion |url=https://www.usswestvirginia.org/stories/story.php?id=10 |access-date=August 30, 2021 |website=USSWestVirginia.org |archive-date=May 29, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210529125155/https://www.usswestvirginia.org/stories/story.php?id=10 |url-status=live}}</ref>

===Second wave composition===
[[File:B5N2 Bomber "Kate" Over Hickam Field.jpg|thumb|Second wave B5N2 Bomber ''Kate'' Over Hickam Field]]
[[File:Message pertaining to the attack on Pearl Harbor. - NARA - 296806.jpg|thumb|This message, in response to the question "Is channel clear?" denotes the first U.S. ship, relates to orders for {{USS|St. Louis|CL-49|2}} to clear [[Pearl Harbor]]. It is now housed with the [[National Archives and Records Administration]]]]
The second planned wave consisted of 171 planes: 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms, commanded by [[Lieutenant-Commander]] [[Shigekazu Shimazaki]].<ref name="IJN"/> Four planes failed to launch because of technical difficulties.<ref name="DiGiulian OOB" /> This wave and its targets also comprised three groups of planes:<ref name="IJN"/>
*'''1st Group''' – 54 B5Ns armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} and {{cvt|132|lb|kg}} general-purpose bombs<ref name="navsource-ijnaf" />
**27 B5Ns – aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island, and Barbers Point
**27 B5Ns – hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
*'''2nd Group''' (targets: aircraft carriers and cruisers)
**78 D3As armed with {{cvt|550|lb|kg|0}} general-purpose bombs, in four sections (3 aborted)
*'''3rd Group''' – (targets: aircraft at Ford Island, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Barber's Point, Kaneohe)
**35 A6Ms for defense and strafing (1 aborted)
The second wave was divided into three groups. One was tasked to attack Kāne{{okina}}ohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions.

===American casualties and damage===
{{multiple image
 | align       = center
 | total_width = 880
 | image1      = The USS Arizona (BB-39) burning after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor - NARA 195617 - Edit.jpg
 | alt1        = 
 | caption1    = ''Arizona'' during the attack
 | image2      = USS Nevada passing seaplane ramp prior to first grounding NARA 80-G-32894.jpg
 | alt2        = 
 | caption2    = ''Nevada'', on fire and down at the bow, attempting to leave the harbor before being deliberately beached
 | image3      = USS West Virginia2.jpg
 | alt3        = 
 | caption3    = ''West Virginia'' was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs during the attack.
 | image4      = SB2U-3 VMSB-231 Ewa 7Dec1941.jpg
 | alt4        = 
 | caption4    = A destroyed [[Vought SB2U Vindicator|Vindicator]] at [[Marine Corps Air Station Ewa|Ewa field]], the victim of one of the smaller attacks on the approach to Pearl Harbor
}}

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,008 sailors were killed and 710 others wounded; 218 soldiers and airmen (who were part of the Army prior to the independent [[United States Air Force]] in 1947) were killed and 364 wounded; 109 Marines were killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In total, 2,403 Americans were killed, and 1,178 were wounded.<ref>{{Cite web |mode=cs2 |url=https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during-the-attack/ |title=How many people died at Pearl Harbor during the attack? |website=Pearl Harbor Visitors Bureau |url-status=live |access-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-date=August 17, 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180817124953/https://visitpearlharbor.org/faqs/how-many-people-died-at-pearl-harbor-during-the-attack/}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last=Rosenberg |first=Jennifer |date=January 23, 2019 |title=Facts About the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor |url=https://www.thoughtco.com/pearl-harbor-facts-1779469 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024020725/https://www.thoughtco.com/pearl-harbor-facts-1779469 |archive-date=October 24, 2021 |access-date=December 10, 2021 |website=ThoughtCo. Humanities > History & Culture |mode=cs2}}</ref> Eighteen ships were sunk or run aground, including five battleships.{{sfn|Conn|Engelman|Fairchild|2000|p=194}}<ref>{{Harvnb|Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack – "The Japanese Attack And Its Aftermath" |1946 |loc=Damage to United States Naval Forces and Installations as a Result of the Attack |pp=[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/congress/part_2.html#64 64–65]}}</ref> All of the Americans killed or wounded during the attack were legally non-combatants, given that there was no state of war when the attack occurred.{{sfn|McCaffrey|2004|pp=210–229}}{{sfn|Shepherd|2004|p=57}}

Of the American fatalities, nearly half were due to the explosion of {{USS|Arizona|BB-39|2}}'s forward [[Gunpowder magazine|magazine]] after she was hit by a modified {{convert|16|in|mm|adj=on}} shell.{{refn|The wreck has become a [[USS Arizona Memorial|memorial]] to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of [[fuel oil]], decades after the attack.|group=nb}} Author Craig Nelson wrote that the vast majority of the U.S. sailors killed at Pearl Harbor were junior enlisted personnel. "The officers of the Navy all lived in houses and the junior people were the ones on the boats, so pretty much all of the people who died in the direct line of the attack were very junior people", Nelson said. "So everyone is about 17 or 18 whose story is told there."<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.uso.org/stories/1732-9-things-you-might-not-know-about-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor |title=9 Things You Might Not Know About the Attack on Pearl Harbor |author=Chad Stewart |date=December 1, 2018 |publisher=[[United Service Organizations]] |access-date=March 31, 2019 |archive-date=March 31, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190331220410/https://www.uso.org/stories/1732-9-things-you-might-not-know-about-the-attack-on-pearl-harbor |url-status=live}}</ref>

Among the notable [[civilian casualties]] were nine [[Honolulu Fire Department]] firefighters who responded to Hickam Field during the bombing in Honolulu, becoming the only fire department members on American soil to be attacked by a foreign power in history. Fireman Harry Tuck Lee Pang of Engine{{spaces}}6 was killed near the hangars by machine-gun fire from a Japanese plane. Captains Thomas Macy and John Carreira of Engine{{spaces}}4 and Engine{{spaces}}1, respectively, died while battling flames inside the hangar after a Japanese bomb crashed through the roof. An additional six firefighters were wounded by Japanese shrapnel. The wounded later received [[Purple Heart]]s (originally reserved for service members [[Wounded in action|wounded]] by enemy action while partaking in armed conflicts) for their peacetime actions that day on June 13, 1944; the three firefighters killed did not receive theirs until December 7, 1984, on the 43rd anniversary of the attack. This made the nine men the only non-military firefighters to receive such an award in American history.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.firehouse.com/home/article/10447100/fire-service-history-firefighters-at-dec-7-pearl-harbor-attack-firefighter-history |title=Fire History: Dec. 7, 1941: A Day of Infamy And Fire |author=Paul Hashgen |date=November 1, 2011 |publisher=Firehouse |access-date=April 1, 2019 |archive-date=April 1, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190401085357/https://www.firehouse.com/home/article/10447100/fire-service-history-firefighters-at-dec-7-pearl-harbor-attack-firefighter-history |url-status=live}}</ref>

Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, ''Nevada'' attempted to exit the harbor. She was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got under way and sustained more hits from {{cvt|250|lb|kg|0}} bombs, which started further fires. She was deliberately beached to avoid risking blocking the harbor entrance if she sank there. {{USS|California|BB-44|2}} was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from ''Arizona'' and {{USS|West Virginia|BB-48|2}} was drifted down toward her and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed [[target ship]] {{USS|Utah|BB-31|2}} was holed twice by torpedoes. ''West Virginia'' was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. {{USS|Oklahoma|BB-37|2}} was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her [[belt armor]], which caused her to capsize. {{USS|Maryland|BB-46|2}} was hit by two of the converted 16" shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser {{USS|Helena|CL-50|2}} was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer {{USS|Oglala|CM-4|2}}. Two destroyers in [[dry dock]], {{USS|Cassin|DD-372|2}} and {{USS|Downes|DD-375|2}}, were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel [[Bunker fuel|bunkers]]. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. ''Cassin'' slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against ''Downes''. The light cruiser {{USS|Raleigh|CL-7|2}} was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser {{USS|Honolulu|CL-48|2}} was damaged but remained in service. The repair vessel {{USS|Vestal|AR-4|2}}, moored alongside ''Arizona'', was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender ''Curtiss'' was also damaged. The destroyer {{USS|Shaw|DD-373|2}} was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.<ref>{{Harvnb|DANFS ''Shaw''}}</ref>

Of the 402 American aircraft in Hawaii, 188 were destroyed and 159 damaged, 155 of them on the ground.<ref name="parillo288" /> Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base. Eight Army Air Forces pilots managed to get airborne during the attack,{{sfn|Dorr|Borch|2008}} and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack: 1st Lieutenant Lewis M. Sanders and 2nd Lieutenants [[Phil Rasmussen|Philip M. Rasmussen]], [[Kenneth M. Taylor]], [[George Welch (pilot)|George S. Welch]], [[Harry W. Brown (pilot)|Harry W. Brown]], and Gordon H. Sterling Jr.{{sfn|Arakaki|1991|loc=ch. IV}}{{sfn|Potter|1982}} Of 33 [[Consolidated PBY Catalina]]s in Hawaii, 30 were destroyed, while three on patrol at the time of the attack returned undamaged. Friendly fire brought down some American planes on top of that, including four from an inbound flight from {{USS|Enterprise|CV-6|2}}.{{sfn|Toland|1970|p=235}}

At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down.<ref name="ALA">{{Harvnb|Watson|2007|p=[{{Google books|IHb_geGUpFcC|p=592|plainurl=yes}} 592]}}</ref>

===Japanese losses===
Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the attack, and one, [[Kazuo Sakamaki]], was captured. Of Japan's 414<ref name="IJN"/> available planes, 350 took part in the raid. Twenty-nine were lost, nine in the first wave (three fighters, one dive bomber, and five torpedo bombers) and twenty in the second (six fighters and fourteen dive bombers),<ref name="USSBSp18">{{harvnb|United States Strategic Bombing Survey|1946|p=18}}</ref>{{refn|[[USAAF]] pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed ten. Overall, the Americans claimed to have shot down 41 Japanese aircraft.|group=nb}} with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}

===Possible third wave===
According to some accounts, several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to sink more of the Pearl Harbor's remaining warships, and damage the base's maintenance shops, drydock facilities and oil tank yards.<ref name=Gailey1997p68 /> Most notably, Fuchida gave a firsthand account of this meeting several times after the war. However, some historians have [[Mitsuo Fuchida#Historical controversy|cast doubt]] on this and many other of Fuchida's later claims, which sometimes conflict with documented historic records.{{sfn|Parshall|2010}} Genda, who opined during the planning for the attack that [[Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor#Concept of Japanese invasion of Hawaii|without an invasion]] three strikes were necessary to fully disable the Pacific Fleet,{{sfn|Caravaggio|2014}} denied requesting an additional attack.{{sfn|Willmott|2001|p=156–157}} Regardless, it is undisputed that the captains of the other five carriers in the task force reported they were willing and ready to carry out a third strike soon after the second returned,{{sfn|Horn|2005|p=16}} but Nagumo decided to withdraw for several reasons:
*American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}}
*The location of the American carriers remained unknown. In addition, the admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=190}} Nagumo was uncertain whether the United States had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against his carriers.{{sfn|Hoyt|2000|p=191}}
*A third wave would have required substantial preparation and turnaround time, and would have meant returning planes would have had to land at night. At the time, only the [[Royal Navy]] had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.{{sfn|Stephen|1988|pp=34–38}} The first two waves had launched the entirety of the Combined Fleet's air strength. A third wave would have required landing both the first and second wave before launching the first wave again. Compare Nagumo's situation in the [[Battle of Midway]], where an attack returning from Midway kept Nagumo from launching an immediate strike on American carriers.
*The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer, since he was at the very limit of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.{{sfn|Prange|Goldstein|Dillon|1988|p={{Page needed|date=August 2021}}}}
*He believed the second strike had essentially accomplished the mission's main objective (neutralizing the United States Pacific Fleet) and did not wish to risk further losses.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} Moreover, it was IJN practice to prefer the conservation of strength over the total destruction of the enemy.{{sfn|Willmott|1983|p=16}}

Although a hypothetical third strike would have likely focused on the base's remaining warships,{{refn|Fuchida would later claim he had designated Pearl Harbor's oil storage facilities as the primary target, although this contradicted Japanese military doctrine and even several interviews on the subject he had given earlier in life{{sfn|Parshall|2010}}}} military historians have suggested any potential damage to the shore facilities would have hampered the Pacific Fleet far more seriously.{{sfn|Willmott|1983}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}}{{sfn|Blair|1975}}{{page needed|date=December 2015}} If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year";{{sfn|Gailey|1997|pp=97–98}} according to Admiral [[Chester W. Nimitz]], later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years".{{sfn|Yergin|1991|p=327}}

At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=97}} In retrospect, sparing the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and the oil tank farm meant the United States could respond relatively quickly in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.{{sfn|Gailey|1997|p=98}}