Editing Arthur Schopenhauer (section)

== Philosophy ==

=== Theory of perception ===
In November 1813 [[Johann Wolfgang von Goethe|Goethe]] invited Schopenhauer to help him on his [[Theory of Colours]]. Although Schopenhauer considered colour theory a minor matter,<ref>Letter to Goethe on 23 January 1816:  "Ich weiß, daß durch mich die Wahrheit geredet hat, – in dieser kleinen Sache, wie dereinst in größern."</ref> he accepted the invitation out of admiration for Goethe. Nevertheless, these investigations led him to his most important discovery in epistemology: finding a demonstration for the ''a priori'' nature of causality.

Kant openly admitted that it was [[David Hume|Hume]]'s skeptical assault on causality that motivated the critical investigations in ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'' and gave an elaborate proof to show that causality is ''a priori''. After [[Gottlob Ernst Schulze|G. E. Schulze]] had made it plausible that Kant had not disproven Hume's skepticism, it was up to those loyal to Kant's project to prove this important matter.

The difference between the approaches of Kant and Schopenhauer was this: Kant simply declared that the empirical content of perception is "given" to us from outside, an expression with which Schopenhauer often expressed his dissatisfaction.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|volume=1. Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy|quote=But the whole teaching of Kant contains really nothing more about this than the oft-repeated meaningless expression: 'The empirical element in perception is given from without.' ... always through the same meaningless metaphorical expression: 'The empirical perception is given us.'}}</ref> He, on the other hand, was occupied with the questions: how do we get this empirical content of perception; how is it possible to comprehend subjective sensations "limited to my skin" as the objective perception of things that lie "outside" of me?<ref>{{Cite book|title=On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=§ 21|quote=For sensation is and remains a process within the organism and is limited, as such, to the region within the skin; it cannot therefore contain any thing which lies beyond that region, or, in other words, anything that is outside us. ... It is only when the Understanding begins to apply its sole form, the causal law, that a powerful transformation takes place, by which subjective sensation becomes objective perception.}}</ref>

{{Quotation|The sensations in the hand of a man born blind, on feeling an object of cubic shape, are quite uniform and the same on all sides and in every direction: the edges, it is true, press upon a smaller portion of his hand, still nothing at all like a cube is contained in these sensations. His Understanding draws the immediate and intuitive conclusion from the resistance felt, that this resistance must have a cause, which then presents itself through that conclusion as a hard body; and through the movements of his arms in feeling the object, while the hand's sensation remains unaltered, he constructs the cubic shape in Space. If the representation of a cause and of Space, together with their laws, had not already existed within him, the image of a cube could never have proceeded from those successive sensations in his hand.<ref>{{Cite book|title=On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=§ 21}}</ref>|sign=|source=}}

Causality is therefore not an empirical concept drawn from objective perceptions, as Hume had maintained; instead, as Kant had said, objective perception presupposes knowledge of causality.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|volume=1, § 4.|quote=The contrary doctrine that the law of causality results from experience, which was the scepticism of Hume, is first refuted by this. For the independence of the knowledge of causality of all experience,—that is, its a priori character—can only be deduced from the dependence of all experience upon it; and this deduction can only be accomplished by proving, in the manner here indicated, and explained in the passages referred to above, that the knowledge of causality is included in perception in general, to which all experience belongs, and therefore in respect of experience is completely a priori, does not presuppose it, but is presupposed by it as a condition.}}</ref>

By this intellectual operation, comprehending every effect in our sensory organs as having an external cause, the external world arises. With vision, finding the cause is essentially simplified due to light acting in straight lines. We are seldom conscious of the process that interprets the double sensation in both eyes as coming from one object, that inverts the impressions on the retinas, and that uses the change in the apparent position of an object relative to more distant objects provided by binocular vision to perceive depth and distance.

Schopenhauer stresses the importance of the intellectual nature of perception; the senses furnish the raw material by which the intellect produces the world as representation. He set out his theory of perception for the first time in ''[[On Vision and Colors]]'',<ref name=":0" /> and, in the subsequent editions of ''Fourfold Root'', an extensive exposition is given in § 21.

=== World as representation ===
Schopenhauer saw his philosophy as an extension of Kant's, and used the results of Kant's theoretical and epistemological investigations ([[transcendental idealism]]) as starting point for his own. Kant had argued that the [[Empirical evidence|empirical]] world is merely a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our [[mental representation]]s.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|at=§ 52c|translator-last=Paul Carus}}</ref> Schopenhauer did not deny that the external world existed and was known empirically, yet he followed Kant in claiming that our knowledge and experience of the world is always in some sense dependent on ''us''.<ref>See the quotation of Schopenhauer in {{Cite book| publisher = University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-78665-0| last = Storm| first = Jason Josephson| title = Metamodernism: The Future of Theory| location = Chicago| date = 2021|pages=36–37| url = https://books.google.com/books?id=pEQ6EAAAQBAJ}}</ref> For Schopenhauer in particular, the spatiotemporal form and causal structure of the external world are contributed to our experiences of it by the mind as it renders perceptions.<ref name="On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition)">{{cite web |last1=Schopenhauer |first1=Arthur |title=On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, and On the Will in Nature: Two Essays (revised edition) |url=https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/50966/pg50966-images.html#Pg031 |website=gutenberg.org |publisher=Project Gutenberg |ref=p.65 |access-date=27 September 2024 |archive-date=3 December 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241203105520/https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/50966/pg50966-images.html#Pg031 |url-status=live }}</ref> Schopenhauer reiterates this in the first sentence of his main work: "The world is my representation (''Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung'')". Everything that there is for cognition (the entire world) exists simply as an object in relation to a subject—a 'representation' to a subject. Everything that belongs to the world is, therefore, 'subject-dependent'. In Book One of ''The World as Will and Representation'', Schopenhauer considers the world from this angle—that is, insofar as it is representation.

Kant had previously argued that we perceive reality as something spatial and temporal not because reality is inherently spatial and temporal, but because that is how our minds operate in perceiving an object. Therefore, understanding objects in space and time represents our 'contribution' to an experience. For Schopenhauer, Kant's 'greatest service' lay in the 'differentiation between [[phenomena]] and the thing-in-itself ([[noumena]]), based on the proof that between everything and us there is always a perceiving mind.' In other words, Kant's primary achievement is to demonstrate that instead of being a blank slate where reality merely reveals its character, the mind, with sensory support, actively participates in constructing reality. Thus, Schopenhauer believed that Kant had shown that the everyday world of experience, and indeed the entire material world related to space and time, is merely 'appearance' or 'phenomena,' entirely distinct from the thing-in-itself.'<ref>{{Cite book|last=Young|first=Julian|date=2005|url=https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781134328833|title=Schopenhauer|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-32883-3|edition=1|pages=4–25|language=en|doi=10.4324/9780203022108}}</ref>

=== World as will ===
{{main|The World as Will and Representation}}

In Book Two of ''The World as Will and Representation'', Schopenhauer considers what the world is beyond the aspect of it that appears to us—that is, the aspect of the world beyond representation, the world considered "[[thing-in-itself|in-itself]]" or "[[noumena]]", its inner essence. The very being in-itself of all things, Schopenhauer argues, is will (''Wille''). The empirical world that appears to us as representation has plurality and is ordered in a spatio-temporal framework. The world as thing in-itself must exist outside the subjective forms of space and time. Although the world manifests itself to our experience as a multiplicity of objects (the "objectivation" of the will), each element of this multiplicity has the same blind essence striving towards existence and life. Human rationality is merely a secondary phenomenon that does not distinguish humanity from the rest of nature at the fundamental, essential level. The advanced cognitive abilities of human beings, Schopenhauer argues, serve the ends of willing—an illogical, directionless, ceaseless striving that condemns the human individual to a life of suffering unredeemed by any final purpose. Schopenhauer's philosophy of the will as the essential reality behind the world as representation is often called [[Voluntarism (philosophy)|metaphysical voluntarism]].<ref name=Brit/>

For Schopenhauer, understanding the world as will leads to ethical concerns (see the [[#Ethics|ethics section below]] for further detail), which he explores in the Fourth Book of ''The World as Will and Representation'' and again in his two prize essays on ethics, ''[[On the Freedom of the Will]]'' and ''[[On the Basis of Morality]]''. No individual human actions are free, Schopenhauer argues, because they are events in the world of appearance and thus are subject to the principle of sufficient reason: a person's actions are a necessary consequence of motives and the given character of the individual human. Necessity extends to the actions of human beings just as it does to every other appearance, and thus we cannot speak of freedom of individual willing. Albert Einstein quoted the Schopenhauerian idea that "a man can ''do'' as he will, but not ''will'' as he will."<ref>Einstein, Albert (1935). ''The World as I See It'', p. 14. Snowball Publishing. {{ISBN|1-4948-7706-6}}.</ref> Yet the will as thing in-itself is free, as it exists beyond the realm of representation and thus is not constrained by any of the forms of necessity that are part of the principle of sufficient reason.

According to Schopenhauer, salvation from our miserable existence can come through the will's being "tranquillized" by the metaphysical insight that reveals individuality to be merely an illusion. The saint or 'great soul' intuitively "recognizes the whole, comprehends its essence, and finds that it is constantly passing away, caught up in vain strivings, inner conflict, and perpetual suffering".<ref>''The World as Will and Representation, Vol. 1'', §68</ref> The negation of the will, in other words, stems from the insight that the world in-itself (free from the forms of space and time) is one. [[Asceticism|Ascetic]] practices, Schopenhauer remarks, are used to aid the will's "self-abolition", which brings about a blissful, redemptive "will-less" state of emptiness that is free from striving or suffering.

=== Art and aesthetics ===
{{Main|Arthur Schopenhauer's aesthetics}}
[[File:Johannes Vermeer - Het melkmeisje - Google Art Project.jpg|thumb|In his main work, Schopenhauer praised the [[Dutch Golden Age painting|Dutch Golden Age artists]], who "directed such purely objective perception to the most insignificant objects, and set up a lasting monument of their objectivity and spiritual peace in paintings of ''[[still life]]''. The aesthetic beholder does not contemplate this without emotion."<ref>''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 1, §38</ref>]]
For Schopenhauer, human "willing"—desiring, craving, etc.—is at the root of [[suffering]]. A temporary way to escape this pain is through aesthetic contemplation. Here one moves away from ordinary cognizance of individual things to cognizance of eternal Platonic ''Ideas''—in other words, cognizance that is free from the service of will. In aesthetic contemplation, one no longer perceives an object of perception as something from which one is separated; rather "it is as if the object alone existed without anyone perceiving it, and one can thus no longer separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, the entirety of consciousness entirely filled and occupied by a single perceptual image".<ref>''The World as Will and Representation,'' Vol. 1, §34</ref> Subject and object are no longer distinguishable, and the ''Idea'' comes to the fore.

From this aesthetic immersion, one is no longer an individual who suffers as a result of servitude to one's individual will but, rather, becomes a "pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject of cognition". The pure, will-less subject of cognition is cognizant only of Ideas, not individual things: this is a kind of cognition that is unconcerned with relations between objects according to the Principle of Sufficient Reason (time, space, cause and effect) and instead involves complete absorption in the object.

Art is the practical consequence of this brief aesthetic contemplation, since it attempts to depict the essence/pure Ideas of the world. Music, for Schopenhauer, is the purest form of art because it is the one that depicts the will itself without it appearing as subject to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, therefore as an individual object. According to [[Daniel Albright]], "Schopenhauer thought that [[philosophy of music|music]] was the only art that did not merely copy ideas, but actually embodied the will itself".<ref>Daniel Albright, ''Modernism and Music'', 2004, p. 39, footnote 34</ref> He deemed music a timeless, universal language comprehended everywhere, that can imbue global enthusiasm, if in possession of a significant melody.<ref name=Music >{{cite book|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|title=Essays and Aphorisms|year=1970|publisher=Penguin Classics |isbn=978-0-14-044227-4|page=[https://archive.org/details/essaysaphorisms00scho/page/162 162]|url=https://archive.org/details/essaysaphorisms00scho/page/162}}</ref>

=== Mathematics ===
Schopenhauer's [[Mathematical realism|realist]] views on mathematics are evident in his criticism of contemporaneous attempts to prove the [[parallel postulate]] in [[Euclidean geometry]]. Writing shortly before the discovery of [[hyperbolic geometry]] demonstrated the logical independence of the [[axiom]]—and long before the [[general theory of relativity]] revealed that it does not necessarily express a property of physical space—Schopenhauer criticized mathematicians for trying to use indirect [[concept]]s to prove what he held was directly evident from [[intuition|intuitive perception]].

{{blockquote|text=The Euclidean method of demonstration has brought forth from its own womb its most striking parody and caricature in the famous controversy over the theory of ''parallels'', and in the attempts, repeated every year, to prove the eleventh axiom (also known as the fifth postulate). The axiom asserts, and that indeed through the indirect criterion of a third intersecting line, that two lines inclined to each other (for this is the precise meaning of "less than two right angles"), if produced far enough, must meet. Now this truth is supposed to be too complicated to pass as self-evident, and therefore needs a proof; but no such proof can be produced, just because there is nothing more immediate.<ref name="ReferenceB">''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', vol. 2, ch. 13</ref>}}

Throughout his writings,<ref>"I wanted in this way to stress and demonstrate the great difference, indeed opposition, between knowledge of perception and abstract or reflected knowledge. Hitherto this difference has received too little attention, and its establishment is a fundamental feature of my philosophy&nbsp;..." – ''The World as Will and Representation.'', vol. 2, ch. 7, p. 88 (trans. Payne)</ref> Schopenhauer criticized the logical derivation of philosophies and mathematics from mere concepts, instead of from intuitive perceptions.

{{blockquote|text=In fact, it seems to me that the logical method is in this way reduced to an absurdity. But it is precisely through the controversies over this, together with the futile attempts to demonstrate the ''directly'' certain as merely ''indirectly'' certain, that the independence and clearness of intuitive evidence appear in contrast with the uselessness and difficulty of logical proof, a contrast as instructive as it is amusing. The direct certainty will not be admitted here, just because it is no merely logical certainty following from the concept, and thus resting solely on the relation of predicate to subject, according to the principle of contradiction. But that eleventh axiom regarding parallel lines is a [[synthetic proposition]] ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'', and as such has the guarantee of pure, not empirical, perception; this perception is just as immediate and certain as is the [[principle of contradiction]] itself, from which all proofs originally derive their certainty. At bottom this holds good of every geometrical theorem&nbsp;...}}

Although Schopenhauer could see no justification for trying to prove Euclid's parallel postulate, he did see a reason for examining another of Euclid's axioms.<ref>This comment by Schopenhauer was called "an acute observation" by [[T. L. Heath|Sir Thomas L. Heath]]. In his translation of [[Euclid's Elements|The Elements]], vol. 1, Book I, "Note on Common Notion 4", Heath made this judgment and also noted that Schopenhauer's remark "was a criticism in advance of [[Hermann von Helmholtz|Helmholtz']] theory". Helmholtz had "maintained that geometry requires us to assume the actual existence of rigid bodies and their free mobility in space" and is therefore "dependent on mechanics".</ref>

{{blockquote|text=It surprises me that the eighth axiom,<ref>What Schopenhauer calls the eighth axiom is Euclid's Common Notion 4.</ref> "Figures that coincide with one another are equal to one another", is not rather attacked. For ''"coinciding with one another"'' is either a mere [[Tautology (logic)|tautology]], or something quite [[empirical]], belonging not to pure intuition or perception, but to external sensuous experience. Thus it presupposes mobility of the figures, but [[matter]] alone is movable in [[space]]. Consequently, this reference to coincidence with one another forsakes pure space, the sole element of [[geometry]], in order to pass over to the material and empirical.<ref name="ReferenceB"/>}}

This follows [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s reasoning.<ref>"Motion of an ''object'' in space does not belong in a pure science, and consequently not in geometry. For the fact that something is movable cannot be cognized ''a priori'', but can be cognized only through experience." (Kant, ''[[Critique of Pure Reason]]'',  B 155, Note)</ref>

=== Ethics ===
{{Main|On the Basis of Morality}}

Schopenhauer asserts that the task of ethics is not to prescribe moral actions that ought to be done, but to investigate moral actions. As such, he states that philosophy is always theoretical: its task to explain what is given.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 53.}}</ref>

According to Kant's transcendental idealism, space and time are forms of our sensibility in which phenomena appear in multiplicity. Reality [[thing-in-itself|in itself]] is free from multiplicity, not in the sense that an object is one, but that it is outside the ''possibility'' of multiplicity. Two individuals, though they appear distinct, are in-themselves not distinct.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 23.}}</ref>

Appearances are entirely subordinated to the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. The egoistic individual who focuses his aims on his own interests has to deal with empirical laws as well as he can.

What is relevant for ethics are individuals who can act against their own self-interest. If we take a man who suffers when he sees his fellow men living in poverty and consequently uses a significant part of his income to support ''their'' needs instead of his ''own'' pleasures, then the simplest way to describe this is that he makes ''less distinction between himself'' and others than is usually made.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 66.}}</ref>

Regarding how things ''appear'' to us, the egoist asserts a gap between two individuals, but the altruist experiences the sufferings of others as his own. In the same way a compassionate man cannot hurt animals, though they appear as distinct from himself.

What motivates the altruist is compassion. The suffering of others is for him not a cold matter to which he is indifferent, but he feels connectiveness to all beings. Compassion is thus the basis of morality.<ref>{{Cite book|title=On the Basis of Morality|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=§ 19}}</ref>

==== Eternal justice ====
Schopenhauer calls the principle through which multiplicity appears the ''[[principium individuationis]]''. When we behold nature we see that it is a cruel battle for existence. Individual manifestations of the will can maintain themselves only at the expense of others—the will, as the only thing that exists, has no other option but to devour itself to experience pleasure. This is a fundamental characteristic of the will, and cannot be circumvented.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Parerga and Paralipomena|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 2, § 173}}</ref>

Unlike temporal or human justice, which requires time to repay an evil deed and "has its seat in the state, as requiting and punishing",<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63"/> eternal justice "rules not the state but the world, is not dependent upon human institutions, is not subject to chance and deception, is not uncertain, wavering, and erring, but infallible, fixed, and sure".<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63">''The World as Will and Idea'' Vol. 1 § 63</ref> Eternal justice is not retributive, because retribution requires time. There are no delays or reprieves. Instead, punishment is tied to the offence, "to the point where the two become one. ... Tormenter and tormented are one. The [Tormenter] errs in that he believes he is not a partaker in the suffering; the [tormented], in that he believes he is not a partaker in the guilt."<ref name="World as will and idea Vol. 1 § 63"/>

Suffering is the moral outcome of our attachment to pleasure. Schopenhauer deemed that this truth was expressed by the Christian dogma of [[original sin]] and, in Eastern religions, by the [[Reincarnation|dogma of rebirth.]]

==== Quietism ====
He who sees through the ''principium individuationis'' and comprehends suffering ''in general'' as his own will see suffering everywhere and, instead of fighting for the happiness of his individual manifestation, will abhor life itself since he knows that it is inseparably connected with suffering. For him, a happy individual life in a world of suffering is like a beggar who dreams one night that he is a king.<ref name="Ascetic">{{Cite book|title=The World as Will and Representation|last=Schopenhauer|first=Arthur|at=Vol. 1, § 68.}}</ref>

Those who have experienced this intuitive knowledge cannot affirm life, but exhibit asceticism and quietism, meaning that they are no longer sensitive to motives, are not concerned about their individual welfare, and accept without resistance the evil that others inflict on them. They welcome poverty and neither seek nor flee death.<ref name="Ascetic"/> Schopenhauer referred to asceticism as the denial of the [[will to live]].

Human life is a ceaseless struggle for satisfaction and, instead of continuing their struggle, ascetics break it. It does not matter if these ascetics adhere to the dogmata of Christianity or to [[Dharmic faith|Dharmic religions]], since their way of living is the result of intuitive knowledge.

{{Quotation|The [[Christian mysticism|Christian mystic]] and the teacher of the [[Vedanta philosophy]] agree in this respect also, they both regard all outward works and religious exercises as superfluous for him who has attained to perfection. So much agreement in the case of such different ages and nations is a practical proof that what is expressed here is not, as optimistic dullness likes to assert, an eccentricity and perversity of the mind, but an essential side of human nature, which only appears so rarely because of its excellence.<ref name="Ascetic"/>}}

=== Psychology ===
Philosophers have not traditionally been impressed by the necessity of sex, but Schopenhauer addressed sex and related concepts forthrightly:

{{blockquote|...&nbsp;one ought rather to be surprised that a thing [sex] which plays throughout so important a part in human life has hitherto practically been disregarded by philosophers altogether, and lies before us as raw and untreated material.<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur. [[:s:The World as Will and Representation/Supplements to the Fourth Book|''The World as Will and Representation: Supplements to the Fourth Book'']]</ref>}}

He named a force within man that he felt took invariable precedence over reason: the [[will to live]] or will to life (''Wille zum Leben''), defined as an inherent drive within human beings, and all creatures, to stay alive; a force that inveigles<ref name="inveigles">{{cite book|title=The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary|year=1991|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Schopenhauer|isbn=978-0-19-861248-3|page=1298}}</ref> us into reproducing.

Schopenhauer refused to conceive of love as either trifling or accidental, but rather understood it as an immensely powerful force that lay unseen within man's [[psyche (psychology)|psyche]], guaranteeing the quality of the human race:

{{blockquote|The ultimate aim of all love affairs ... is more important than all other aims in man's life; and therefore it is quite worthy of the profound seriousness with which everyone pursues it. What is decided by it is nothing less than the composition of the next generation ...<ref>Schopenhauer, Arthur, [[:s:The World as Will and Representation/Supplements to the Fourth Book|''The World as Will and Representation'', Supplements to the Fourth Book]]</ref>}}

It has often been argued that Schopenhauer's thoughts on sexuality foreshadowed the [[evolution|theory of evolution]], a claim met with satisfaction by [[Charles Darwin|Darwin]] as he included a quotation from Schopenhauer in his ''[[The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex|Descent of Man]]''.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page%3ADescent_of_Man_1875.djvu/602|title=The Descent of Man|last=Darwin|first=Charles|page=586|archive-date=21 October 2021|access-date=3 December 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211021102750/https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Page%3ADescent_of_Man_1875.djvu/602|url-status=live}}</ref> This has also been noted about [[Sigmund Freud|Freud]]'s concepts of the [[libido]] and the [[unconscious mind]], and [[evolutionary psychology]] in general.<ref>"Nearly a century before Freud ... in Schopenhauer there is, for the first time, an explicit philosophy of the unconscious and of the body." Safranski p. 345.</ref>

=== Political and social thought ===

==== Politics ====
[[File:FFM Wallanlagen Schopenhauer-Denkmal.jpg|thumb|Bust in [[Frankfurt]]]]
Schopenhauer's politics were an echo of his system of ethics, which he elucidated in detail in his ''Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik'' (the two essays ''On the Freedom of the Will'' and ''On the Basis of Morality'').

In occasional political comments in his ''[[Parerga and Paralipomena]]'' and ''Manuscript Remains'', Schopenhauer described himself as a proponent of [[limited government]]. Schopenhauer shared the view of [[Thomas Hobbes]] on the necessity of the state and state action to check the innate destructive tendencies of our species. He also defended the independence of the legislative, judicial and executive branches of power, and a monarch as an impartial element able to practise justice (in a practical and everyday sense, not a cosmological one).<ref>''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. 2, Ch. 47</ref>

He declared that monarchy is "natural to man in almost the same way as it is to bees and ants, to cranes in flight, to wandering elephants, to wolves in a pack in search of prey, and to other animals".<ref name="Paralipomena, Vol p. 254">''Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2'', "On Jurisprudence and Politics," §127, trans. Payne (p. 254).</ref> Intellect in monarchies, he writes, always has "much better chances against stupidity, its implacable and ever-present foe, than it has in republics; but this is a great advantage."<ref name="Paralipomena, Vol p. 254"/> On the other hand, Schopenhauer disparaged [[republicanism]] as being "as unnatural to man as it is unfavorable to higher intellectual life and thus to the arts and sciences".<ref>''Parerga and Paralipomena, Vol. 2'', "On Jurisprudence and Politics," §127, trans. Payne (p. 255).</ref>

By his own admission, Schopenhauer did not give much thought to politics, and several times he wrote proudly of how little attention he paid "to political affairs of [his] day". In a life that spanned several revolutions in French and German government, and a few continent-shaking wars, he maintained his position of "minding not the times but the eternities". He wrote many disparaging remarks about Germany and the Germans. A typical example is: "For a German it is even good to have somewhat lengthy words in his mouth, for he thinks slowly, and they give him time to reflect."<ref>''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. 2, Ch. 12</ref>

==== Punishment ====
The State, Schopenhauer claimed, punishes criminals to prevent future crimes. It places "beside every possible motive for committing a wrong a more powerful motive for leaving it undone, in the inescapable punishment. Accordingly, the criminal code is as complete a register as possible of counter-motives to all criminal actions that can possibly be imagined&nbsp;..."<ref name="twwr62">Schopenhauer, ''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. I, § 62.</ref> He claimed that this doctrine was not original to him but had appeared in the writings of [[Plato]],<ref>"...&nbsp;he who attempts to punish in accordance with reason does not retaliate on account of the past wrong (for he could not undo something which has been done) but for the future, so that neither the wrongdoer himself, nor others who see him being punished, will do wrong again." Plato, "[[Protagoras (dialogue)|Protagoras]]", 324 B. Plato wrote that punishment should "be an example to other men not to offend". Plato, "[[Laws (dialogue)|Laws]]", Book IX, 863.</ref> [[Seneca the Younger|Seneca]], [[Thomas Hobbes|Hobbes]], [[Samuel von Pufendorf|Pufendorf]], and [[Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach|Anselm Feuerbach]].

==== Races and religions ====
Schopenhauer attributed civilizational primacy to the northern "white races" due to their sensitivity and creativity (except for the ancient Egyptians and Hindus, whom he saw as equal):

<blockquote>The highest civilization and culture, apart from the [[History of Hinduism|ancient Hindus]] and [[Ancient Egypt|Egyptians]], are found exclusively among the white races; and even with many dark peoples, the ruling caste or race is fairer in colour than the rest and has, therefore, evidently immigrated, for example, the [[Brahmans]], the [[Inca Empire|Incas]], and the rulers of the [[South Sea Islands]]. All this is due to the fact that necessity is the mother of invention because those tribes that emigrated early to the north, and there gradually became white, had to develop all their intellectual powers and invent and perfect all the arts in their struggle with need, want and misery, which in their many forms were brought about by the climate. This they had to do in order to make up for the parsimony of nature and out of it all came their high civilization.<ref>''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. 2, "On Philosophy and Natural Science," §92, trans. Payne (p. 158-159).</ref></blockquote>

Schopenhauer was fervently [[Abolitionism|opposed to slavery]]. Speaking of the treatment of slaves in the [[Slavery in the United States|slave-holding states of the United States]], he condemned "those devils in human form, those bigoted, church-going, strict sabbath-observing scoundrels, especially the Anglican parsons among them" for how they "treat their innocent black brothers who through violence and injustice have fallen into their devil's claws". The slave-holding states of North America, Schopenhauer writes, are a "disgrace to the whole of humanity".<ref>''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Vol. 2, "On Ethics," §114, trans. Payne (p. 212).</ref>

Schopenhauer also maintained a marked metaphysical and political [[anti-Judaism]]. He argued that Christianity constituted a revolt against what he styled the materialistic basis of Judaism, exhibiting an Indian-influenced ethics reflecting the [[Aryan]]-[[Vedas|Vedic]] theme of spiritual self-conquest. He saw this as opposed to the ignorant drive toward earthly utopianism and superficiality of a worldly "Jewish" spirit:

<blockquote>[Judaism] is, therefore, the crudest and poorest of all religions and consists merely in an absurd and revolting [[theism]]. It amounts to this that the [[Kyrios|''κύριος'' ['Lord']]], who has created the world, desires to be worshipped and adored; and so above all he is jealous, is envious of his colleagues, of all the other gods; if sacrifices are made to them he is furious and his Jews have a bad time ... It is most deplorable that this religion has become the basis of the prevailing religion of Europe; for it is a religion without any metaphysical tendency. While all other religions endeavor to explain to the people by symbols the metaphysical significance of life, the religion of the Jews is entirely immanent and furnishes nothing but a mere war-cry in the struggle with other nations.<ref>"Fragments for the History of Philosophy", ''Parerga and Paralipomena'', Volume I, trans. Payne (p. 126).</ref></blockquote>

==== Women ====
In his 1851 essay "On Women", Schopenhauer expressed opposition to what he called "Teutonico-Christian stupidity" of "reflexive, unexamined reverence for the female (''abgeschmackten Weiberveneration'')".<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://aboq.org/schopenhauer/parerga2/weiber.htm|title=Arthur Schopenhauer: Ueber die Weiber|website=aboq.org|access-date=19 September 2022|archive-date=18 October 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231018015127/https://aboq.org/schopenhauer/parerga2/weiber.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> He wrote: "Women are directly fitted for acting as the nurses and teachers of our early childhood by the fact that they are themselves childish, frivolous and short-sighted; in a word, they are big children all their life long—a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the full-grown man." He opined that women are deficient in artistic faculties and sense of justice, and expressed his opposition to [[monogamy]].<ref>[[Nigel Rodgers|Rodgers]] (environmentalist) and [[Mel Thompson (writer)|Thompson]] in ''[[Philosophers Behaving Badly]]'' call Schopenhauer "a misogynist without rival in ... Western philosophy".</ref> He claimed that "woman is by nature meant to obey". The essay does give some compliments: "women are decidedly more sober in their judgment than [men] are", and are more sympathetic to the suffering of others.

Schopenhauer's writings influenced many, from [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] to nineteenth-century [[feminists]],<ref>''Feminism and the Limits of Equality'' PA Cain – Ga. L. Rev., 1989</ref> and continue to inspire [[Sexism|sexist]] views today. His [[biology|biological]] analysis of the difference between the sexes, and their separate roles in the struggle for survival and reproduction, anticipates some of the claims that were later ventured by [[sociobiology|sociobiologists]] and [[evolutionary psychology|evolutionary psychologists]].<ref name="Young2005">{{cite book|author=Julian Young|title=Schopenhauer|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gfDyeGY0RFMC&pg=PA242|date=23 June 2005|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-33346-7|page=242}}</ref>

When the elderly Schopenhauer sat for [[Arthur Schopenhauer (sculpture)|a sculpture portrait]] by the Prussian sculptor [[Elisabet Ney]] in 1859, he was much impressed by the young woman's wit and independence, as well as by her skill as a visual artist.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Arthur Schopenhauer and Elisabet Ney|first=Sandra Salser|last=Long|journal=[[Southwest Review]]|volume=69|number=2|date=Spring 1984|pages=130–47|jstor=43469632}}</ref> After his time with Ney, he told Richard Wagner's friend [[Malwida von Meysenbug]]: "I have not yet spoken my last word about women. I believe that if a woman succeeds in withdrawing from the mass, or rather raising herself above the mass, she grows ceaselessly and more than a man."<ref>Safranski (1990), Chapter 24. p. 348.</ref>

==== Pederasty ====
In the third, expanded edition of ''The World as Will and Representation'' (1859), Schopenhauer added an appendix to his chapter on the ''Metaphysics of Sexual Love''. He wrote that [[pederasty]] has the benefit of preventing ill-begotten children. Concerning this, he stated that "the vice we are considering appears to work directly against the aims and ends of nature, and that in a matter that is all important and of the greatest concern to her it must in fact serve these very aims, although only indirectly, as a means for preventing greater evils."<ref>{{Harvard citation no brackets|Schopenhauer|1969|p=566}}</ref>
Schopenhauer ends the appendix with the statement that "by expounding these paradoxical ideas, I wanted to grant to the professors of philosophy a small favour. I have done so by giving them the opportunity of slandering me by saying that I defend and commend pederasty."<ref>{{Harvard citation no brackets|Schopenhauer|1969|p=567}}</ref>

==== Heredity and eugenics ====
[[File:Frankfurt Am Main-Portraits-Arthur Schopenhauer-1845.jpg|thumb|upright|Schopenhauer at age 58 on 16 May 1846]]

Schopenhauer viewed personality and [[intellect]] as inherited. He quotes [[Horace]]'s saying, "From the brave and good are the brave descended" (''Odes'', iv, 4, 29) and Shakespeare's line from ''[[Cymbeline]]'', "Cowards father cowards, and base things sire base" (IV, 2) to reinforce his hereditarian argument.<ref>Payne, ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. II, p. 519</ref>
Mechanistically, Schopenhauer believed that a person inherits his intellect through his mother, and personal character through the father.<ref>''On the Suffering of the World'' (1970), p. 35. Penguin Books – Great Ideas.</ref> This belief in heritability of traits informed Schopenhauer's view of love—placing it at the highest level of importance. For Schopenhauer the "final aim of all love intrigues, be they comic or tragic, is really of more importance than all other ends in human life. What it all turns upon is nothing less than the composition of the next generation. ... It is not the weal or woe of any one individual, but that of the human race to come, which is here at stake." This view of the importance for the species of whom we choose to love was reflected in his views on [[eugenics]] or good breeding. Here Schopenhauer wrote:

<blockquote>With our knowledge of the complete unalterability both of character and of mental faculties, we are led to the view that a real and thorough improvement of the human race might be reached not so much from outside as from within, not so much by theory and instruction as rather by the path of generation. Plato had something of the kind in mind when, in the fifth book of his ''Republic'', he explained his plan for increasing and improving his warrior caste. If we could [[castrate]] all scoundrels and stick all stupid geese in a convent, and give men of noble character a whole [[harem]], and procure men, and indeed thorough men, for all girls of intellect and understanding, then a generation would soon arise which would produce a better age than that of [[Pericles]].<ref>{{cite book | last = Schopenhauer | first = Arthur | title = The World as Will and Representation |editor=E. F. J. Payne |volume=II | publisher = Dover Publications | location = New York | year = 1969 |isbn=978-0-486-21762-8 |page=527 }}</ref></blockquote>

In another context, Schopenhauer reiterated his eugenic thesis: "If you want Utopian plans, I would say: the only solution to the problem is the [[despotism]] of the wise and noble members of a genuine aristocracy, a genuine nobility, achieved by [[mating]] the most magnanimous men with the cleverest and most gifted women. This proposal constitutes my Utopia and my Platonic Republic."<ref>''Essays and Aphorisms'', trans. R.J. Hollingdale, Middlesex: London, 1970, p. 154</ref> Analysts (e.g., [[Keith Ansell-Pearson]]) have suggested that Schopenhauer's anti-[[egalitarianism|egalitarianist]] sentiment and his support for eugenics influenced the neo-aristocratic philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, who initially considered Schopenhauer his mentor.<ref>''Nietzsche and Modern German Thought'' by K. Ansell-Pearson – 1991 – Psychology Press.</ref>

==== Animal rights ====
{{main|Arthur Schopenhauer's view on animal rights}}
As a consequence of his [[Monism|monistic]] philosophy, Schopenhauer was very concerned about animal welfare and rights.<ref>Christina Gerhardt, "Thinking With: Animals in Schopenhauer, Horkheimer and Adorno." ''Critical Theory and Animals''. Ed. John Sanbonmatsu. Lanham: Rowland, 2011. 137–157.</ref><ref name="Puryear">Stephen Puryear, [https://philpapers.org/rec/PURSOT "Schopenhauer on the Rights of Animals." ''European Journal of Philosophy'' 25/2 (2017):250–269] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230409102359/https://philpapers.org/rec/PURSOT |date=9 April 2023 }}.</ref> For him, all individual animals, including humans, are essentially phenomenal manifestations of the one underlying Will. For him the word "will" designates force, power, impulse, energy, and desire; it is the closest word we have that can signify both the essence of all external things and our own direct, inner experience. Since every living thing possesses will, humans and animals are fundamentally the same and can recognize themselves in each other.<ref>"Unlike the intellect, it [the Will] does not depend on the perfection of the organism, but is essentially the same in all animals as what is known to us so intimately. Accordingly, the animal has all the emotions of humans, such as joy, grief, fear, anger, love, hatred, strong desire, envy, and so on. The great difference between human and animal rests solely on the intellect's degrees of perfection. ''On the Will in Nature'', "Physiology and Pathology".</ref> For this reason, he claimed that a good person would have sympathy for animals, who are our fellow sufferers.

{{blockquote|Compassion for animals is intimately associated with goodness of character, and it may be confidently asserted that he who is cruel to living creatures cannot be a good man.|''[[On the Basis of Morality]]'', § 19}}

{{blockquote|Nothing leads more definitely to a recognition of the identity of the essential nature in animal and human phenomena than a study of zoology and anatomy.|''On the Basis of Morality'', chapter 8<ref>Quoted in {{cite book | last = Schopenhauer | first = Arthur | title = Philosophical Writings | publisher = Continuum | location = London | year = 1994 |isbn=978-0-8264-0729-0 |page=233}}</ref>}}

{{blockquote|The assumption that animals are without rights and the illusion that our treatment of them has no moral significance is a positively outrageous example of Western crudity and barbarity. Universal compassion is the only guarantee of morality.|''On the Basis of Morality'', chapter 8<ref>Quoted in {{cite book | last = Ryder | first = Richard | title = Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes Towards Speciesism | publisher = Berg Publishers | location = Oxford | year = 2000 |isbn=978-1-85973-330-1 |page=57}}</ref>}}

In 1841, he praised the establishment in London of the [[Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals]], and in Philadelphia of the Animals' Friends Society. Schopenhauer went so far as to protest using the pronoun "it" in reference to animals because that led to treatment of them as though they were inanimate things.<ref>"... in English all animals are of the neuter gender and so are represented by the pronoun 'it,' just as if they were inanimate things. The effect of this artifice is quite revolting, especially in the case of primates, such as dogs, monkeys, and the like...." ''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19.</ref> To reinforce his points, Schopenhauer referred to anecdotal reports of the look in the eyes of a monkey who had been shot<ref>"I recall having read of an Englishman who, while hunting in India, had shot a monkey; he could not forget the look which the dying animal gave him, and since then had never again fired at monkeys." ''On the Basis of Morality'', § 19.</ref> and also the grief of a baby elephant whose mother had been killed by a hunter.<ref>"[Sir William Harris] describes how he shot his first elephant, a female. The next morning he went to look for the dead animal; all the other elephants had fled from the neighborhood except a young one, who had spent the night with its dead mother. Forgetting all fear, he came toward the sportsmen with the clearest and liveliest evidence of inconsolable grief, and put his tiny trunk round them in order to appeal to them for help. Harris says he was then filled with real remorse for what he had done, and felt as if he had committed a murder." ''On the basis of morality'', § 19.</ref>

Schopenhauer was very attached to his succession of pet poodles. He criticized [[Baruch Spinoza|Spinoza]]'s<ref>"His contempt for animals, who, as mere things for our use, are declared by him to be without rights, ... in conjunction with Pantheism, is at the same time absurd and abominable." ''The World as Will and Representation'', Vol. 2, Chapter 50.</ref> belief that animals are a mere means for the satisfaction of humans.<ref>Spinoza, ''Ethics'', Pt. IV, Prop. XXXVII, Note I.: "Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in a way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours&nbsp;..." This is the exact opposite of Schopenhauer's doctrine. Also, ''Ethics'', Appendix, 26, "whatsoever there be in nature beside man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capacities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."</ref><ref>"Such are the matters which I engage to prove in Prop. xviii of this Part, whereby it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellow-men, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I affirm that beasts feel. But I also affirm that we may consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions." ''Ethics'', Part 4, Prop. 37, Note 1.</ref> Tim Madigan wrote that despite all of his bombast, Schopenhauer was a sympathetic character who had concerns for the suffering of animals.
{{blockquote|The greatest benefit conferred by the railways is that they spare millions of draught-horses their miserable existences.|''Essays and Aphorisms'', p. 171<ref>Quoted in {{Cite web|last=Madigan|first=Tim|title=Schopenhauer's Compassionate Morality {{!}} Issue 52 {{!}} Philosophy Now|url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/52/Schopenhauers_Compassionate_Morality#:~:text=It%20is%20compassion,%20or%20fellow,of%20the%20will%20to%20live.|website=Philosophy Now|access-date=2023-09-16|archive-date=18 September 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230918004248/https://philosophynow.org/issues/52/Schopenhauers_Compassionate_Morality#:~:text=It%20is%20compassion,%20or%20fellow,of%20the%20will%20to%20live.|url-status=live}}</ref>}}

===Intellectual interests and affinities===

====Indology====
[[File:Schopenhauer 1852.jpg|thumb|Schopenhauer, 1852]]

Schopenhauer read the Latin translation of the [[Hindu texts|ancient Hindu texts]], the ''[[Upanishads]]'', translated by French writer [[Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron|Anquetil du Perron]]{{sfn|Clarke|1997|page=68}} from the Persian translation of Prince [[Dara Shukoh]] entitled ''Sirre-Akbar'' ("The Great Secret"). He was so impressed by its [[Indian philosophy|philosophy]] that he called it "the production of the highest human wisdom", and believed it contained superhuman concepts. Schopenhauer considered India as "the land of the most ancient and most pristine wisdom, the place from which [[Europeans]] could trace their descent and the tradition by which they had been influenced in so many decisive ways",{{sfn|Clarke|1997|page=68}} and regarded the ''Upanishads'' as "the most profitable and elevating reading which [...] is possible in the world. It has been the solace of my life, and will be the solace of my death."{{sfn|Clarke|1997|page=68}}

Schopenhauer was first introduced to Anquetil du Perron's translation by Friedrich Majer in 1814.{{sfn|Clarke|1997|page=68}} They met during the winter of 1813–1814 in [[Weimar]] at the home of Schopenhauer's mother, according to the biographer Safranski. Majer was a follower of [[Johann Gottfried Herder|Herder]], and an early [[Indologist]]. Schopenhauer did not begin serious study of the Indic texts until the summer of 1814. Safranski maintains that, between 1815 and 1817, Schopenhauer had another important cross-pollination with Indian thought in [[Dresden]]. This was through his neighbor of two years, [[Karl Christian Friedrich Krause]]. Krause was then a minor and rather unorthodox philosopher who attempted to mix his own ideas with ancient Indian wisdom. Krause had also mastered [[Sanskrit]], unlike Schopenhauer, and they developed a professional relationship. It was from Krause that Schopenhauer learned [[meditation]] and received the closest thing to expert advice concerning Indian thought.<ref>Christopher McCoy, 3–4</ref>

{{blockquote|The view of things [...] that all plurality is only apparent, that in the endless series of individuals, passing simultaneously and successively into and out of life, generation after generation, age after age, there is but one and the same entity really existing, which is present and identical in all alike;—this theory, I say, was of course known long before Kant; indeed, it may be carried back to the remotest antiquity. It is the alpha and omega of the oldest book in the world, the sacred [[Vedas]], whose dogmatic part, or rather esoteric teaching, is found in the Upanishads. There, in almost every page this profound doctrine lies enshrined; with tireless repetition, in countless adaptations, by many varied parables and similes it is expounded and inculcated.|''On the Basis of Morality'', chapter 4<ref>{{cite book |last=Schopenhauer |first=Arthur |year=1840 |publication-date=1908 |title=[[On the Basis of Morality]] |chapter-url=https://archive.org/stream/basisofmorality00schoiala#page/269/mode/2up |chapter=Part IV |translator-last=Bullock |translator-first=Arthur Brodrick |location=London |publisher=[[Swan Sonnenschein]] |pages=269–271 |via=[[Internet Archive]]}}</ref>}}

For Schopenhauer, will had [[ontology|ontological]] primacy over the [[intellect]]; desire is prior to thought. Schopenhauer felt this was similar to notions of [[puruṣārtha]] or goals of life in [[Vedānta]] [[Hinduism]].

In Schopenhauer's philosophy, denial of the will is attained by:
* personal experience of an extremely great suffering that leads to loss of the [[will to live]]; or
* knowledge of the essential nature of life in the world through observation of the suffering of other people.

The book ''Oupnekhat'' (Upanishad) always lay open on his table, and he invariably studied it before going to bed. He called the opening up of [[Sanskrit literature]] "the greatest gift of our century", and predicted that the philosophy and knowledge of the Upanishads would become the cherished faith of the West.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.philosophy.ru/library/asiatica/indica/authors/motives.html|title=Western Indologists: A Study in Motives|last=Dutt|first=Purohit Bhagavan|access-date=9 May 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100802010348/http://www.philosophy.ru/library/asiatica/indica/authors/motives.html|archive-date=2 August 2010}}</ref> Most noticeable, in the case of Schopenhauer's work, was the significance of the ''[[Chandogya Upanishad]]'', whose [[Mahāvākyas|Mahāvākya]], [[Tat Tvam Asi]], is mentioned throughout ''The World as Will and Representation''.<ref>Christopher McCoy, 54–56</ref>

==== Buddhism ====
Schopenhauer noted a correspondence between his doctrines and the [[Four Noble Truths]] of [[Buddhism]].<ref>Abelson, Peter (April 1993).
[http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/peter2.htm Schopenhauer and Buddhism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110628204330/http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/peter2.htm |date=28 June 2011 }}. ''Philosophy East and West'' Volume 43, Number 2, pp. 255–278. University of Hawaii Press. Retrieved on: 12 April 2008.</ref> Similarities centered on the principles that life involves suffering, that suffering is caused by desire ([[taṇhā]]), and that the extinction of desire leads to liberation. Thus three of the four "truths of the Buddha" correspond to Schopenhauer's doctrine of the will.<ref>[[Christopher Janaway|Janaway]], Christopher, ''Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy'', pp. 28&nbsp;ff.</ref> In Buddhism, while greed and lust are always unskillful, desire is ethically variable – it can be skillful, unskillful, or neutral.<ref name="David Burton 2004, page 22">David Burton, "Buddhism, Knowledge and Liberation: A Philosophical Study." Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2004, p. 22.</ref>

Buddhist [[nirvāṇa]] is not equivalent to the condition that Schopenhauer described as denial of the will. Nirvāṇa is not the extinguishing of the ''person'' as some Western scholars have thought, but only the "extinguishing" (the literal meaning of nirvana) of the flames of greed, hatred, and delusion that assail a person's character.<ref>John J. Holder, ''Early Buddhist Discourses.'' Hackett Publishing Company, 2006, p. xx.</ref> Schopenhauer made the following statement in his discussion of religions:<ref>
"Schopenhauer is often said to be the first modern Western philosopher to attempt integration of his work with Eastern ways of thinking. That he was the first is true, but the claim that he was ''influenced'' by Indian thought needs qualification. There is a remarkable correspondence in broad terms between some central Schopenhauerian doctrines and Buddhism: notably in the views that empirical existence is suffering, that suffering originates in desires, and that salvation can be attained by the extinction of desires. These three 'truths of the Buddha' are mirrored closely in the essential structure of the doctrine of the will." (On this, see Dorothea W. Dauer, ''Schopenhauer as Transmitter of Buddhist Ideas''. Note also the discussion by Bryan Magee, ''The Philosophy of Schopenhauer'', pp. 14–15, 316–321). Janaway, Christopher, ''Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy'', p. 28&nbsp;f.
</ref>

<blockquote>If I wished to take the results of my philosophy as the standard of truth, I should have to concede to Buddhism pre-eminence over the others. In any case, it must be a pleasure to me to see my doctrine in such close agreement with a religion that the majority of men on earth hold as their own, for this numbers far more followers than any other. And this agreement must be yet the more pleasing to me, inasmuch as ''in my philosophizing I have certainly not been under its influence'' [emphasis added]. For up till 1818, when my work appeared, there was to be found in Europe only a very few accounts of Buddhism.<ref>''[[The World as Will and Representation]]'', Vol. 2, Ch. 17</ref></blockquote>

Buddhist philosopher [[Keiji Nishitani]] sought to distance Buddhism from Schopenhauer.<ref>''Artistic detachment in Japan and the West: psychic distance in comparative aesthetics'' by S. Odin – 2001 – University of Hawaii Press.</ref> While Schopenhauer's philosophy may sound rather mystical in such a summary, his [[methodology]] was resolutely [[empirical]], rather than speculative or transcendental:

<blockquote>Philosophy ... is a science, and as such has no articles of faith; accordingly, in it nothing can be assumed as existing except what is either positively given empirically, or demonstrated through indubitable conclusions.<ref>''Parerga & Paralipomena'', vol. I, p. 106., trans. E.F.J. Payne.</ref></blockquote>

Also note:

<blockquote>This actual world of what is knowable, in which we are and which is in us, remains both the material and the limit of our consideration.<ref>''World as Will and Representation'', vol. I, p. 273, trans. E.F.J. Payne.</ref></blockquote>

The argument that Buddhism affected Schopenhauer's philosophy more than any other [[Dharma|Dharmic]] faith loses credence since he did not begin a serious study of Buddhism until after the publication of ''The World as Will and Representation'' in 1818.<ref>Christopher McCoy, 3</ref> Scholars have started to revise earlier views about Schopenhauer's discovery of Buddhism. Proof of early interest and influence appears in Schopenhauer's 1815–16 notes (transcribed and translated by Urs App) about Buddhism. They are included in a recent case study that traces Schopenhauer's interest in Buddhism and documents its influence.<ref>App, Urs [http://www.sino-platonic.org/complete/spp200_schopenhauer.pdf Arthur Schopenhauer and China. ''Sino-Platonic Papers'' Nr. 200 (April 2010)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100704192558/http://www.sino-platonic.org/complete/spp200_schopenhauer.pdf |date=4 July 2010 }} (PDF, 8.7&nbsp;Mb PDF, 164 p.; Schopenhauer's early notes on Buddhism reproduced in Appendix). This study provides an overview of the actual discovery of Buddhism by Schopenhauer.</ref> Other scholarly work questions how similar Schopenhauer's philosophy actually is to Buddhism.<ref>Hutton, Kenneth [http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2014/12/Hutton-Schopenhauer.pdf Compassion in Schopenhauer and Śāntideva. ''Journal of Buddhist Ethics'' Vol. 21 (2014)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150414055301/http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2014/12/Hutton-Schopenhauer.pdf |date=14 April 2015 }}</ref>

====Magic and occultism====
Some traditions in [[Western esotericism]] and [[parapsychology]] interested Schopenhauer and influenced his philosophical theories. He praised [[animal magnetism]] as evidence for the reality of magic in his ''On the Will in Nature'', and went so far as to accept the division of magic into [[Left-hand path and right-hand path|left-hand and right-hand magic]], although he doubted the existence of demons.<ref name="Myth of Disenchantment">{{Cite book | last = Josephson-Storm | first = Jason | title = The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences | location = Chicago | publisher = University of Chicago Press | date = 2017 |pages = 187–188 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=xZ5yDgAAQBAJ |isbn=978-0-226-40336-6 }}</ref>

Schopenhauer grounded magic in the Will and claimed all forms of magical transformation depended on the human Will, not on ritual. This theory notably parallels [[Aleister Crowley]]'s system of magic and its emphasis on human will.<ref name="Myth of Disenchantment" /> Given the importance of the Will to Schopenhauer's overarching system, this amounts to "suggesting his whole philosophical system had magical powers."<ref>Quote from Josephson-Storm (2017), p. 188.</ref> Schopenhauer rejected the theory of [[disenchantment]] and claimed philosophy should synthesize itself with magic, which he believed amount to "practical metaphysics".<ref>Josephson-Storm (2017), pp. 188–189.</ref>

[[Neoplatonism]], including the traditions of [[Plotinus]] and to a lesser extent [[Marsilio Ficino]], has also been cited as an influence on Schopenhauer.<ref>{{cite book|last=Anderson |first=Mark |title=Pure: Modernity, Philosophy, and the One |chapter=Experimental Subversions of Modernity |date=2009 |publisher=Sophia Perennis |isbn=978-1-59731-094-9}}</ref>