Editing Alfred von Schlieffen (section)

== Influence ==
[[File:Invalidenfriedhof, Grabmal von Schlieffen.jpg|thumb|right|Grave at the [[Invalidenfriedhof Cemetery]], [[Berlin]]]]

Schlieffen was perhaps the best-known contemporary strategist of his time, but he was criticised for his "narrow-minded military scholasticism."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age|last=Paret|first=Peter|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1984|isbn=0-691-09235-4|location=Princeton, New Jersey|pages=311}}</ref>

Schlieffen's [[operational art|operational]] theories were to have a profound impact on the development of [[manoeuvre warfare]] in the 20th century, largely through his [[wikt:seminal|seminal]] treatise, ''[https://web.archive.org/web/20070311025853/http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Cannae/cannae.asp#cannae Cannae]'', which concerned the decidedly un-modern 216 BCE [[Battle of Cannae]] in which [[Hannibal]] defeated the Romans. His treatise had two main purposes. First, it was to clarify, in writing, Schlieffen's concepts of manoeuvre, particularly the manoeuvre of encirclement, along with other fundamentals of warfare.  Second, it was to be an instrument for the Staff, the War Academy, and for the Army all together.{{sfn|Dupuy|1977|p= 132}} His theories were studied exhaustively, especially in the higher army academies of the United States and Europe after the [[First World War]]. American military thinkers thought so highly of him that his principal literary legacy, ''Cannae'', was translated at [[Fort Leavenworth]] and distributed within the US Army and to the academic community.

Along with the great militarist man that Schlieffen is famous for being, there are also underlying traits about Schlieffen that often go untold. As we know, Schlieffen was a strategist. Unlike the Chief of Staff, Waldersee, Schlieffen avoided political affairs and instead was actively involved in the tasks of the General Staff, including the preparation of war plans and the readiness of the German Army for war. He focused much of his attention on planning. He devoted time to training, military education and the adaptation of modern technology for the use of military purposes and strategic planning.{{sfn|Dupuy|1977|p= 129}}

It was evident that Schlieffen was very much involved in preparing and planning for future combat. He considered one of his primary tasks was to prepare the young officers to act responsibly in planning manoeuvres but also to direct these movements after the planning had taken place.{{sfn|Dupuy|1977|p= 133}}

With regards to Schlieffen's tactics, General [[Walter Bedell Smith]], chief of staff to General [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in the [[Second World War]], pointed out that General [[Dwight Eisenhower]] and many of his staff officers, products of these academies, "were imbued with the idea of this type of wide, bold maneuver for decisive results."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Smith |first=Walter Bedell |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GndvCwAAQBAJ&q=walter+bedell+smith+%2522were+imbued+with+the+idea+of+this+type+of+wide,+bold+maneuver+for+decisive+results%2522&pg=PT126 |title=Eisenhower's Six Great Decisions: Europe, 1944–1945 |date=13 June 2014 |publisher=Pickle Partners Publishing |isbn=978-1-78289-218-2 |pages=126 |language=en}}</ref>

General [[Erich Ludendorff]], a disciple of Schlieffen who applied his teachings of [[encirclement]] in the [[Battle of Tannenberg (1914)|Battle of Tannenberg]], once famously christened Schlieffen as "one of the greatest soldiers ever."<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Paret |first1=Peter |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=raIZRUQfAasC&q=Erich+Ludendorff+%2522one+of+the+greatest+soldiers+ever%2522&pg=PA311 |title=Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age |last2=Craig |first2=Gordon A. |last3=Gilbert |first3=Felix |date=1 October 2010 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-1-4008-3546-1 |pages=311 |language=en}}</ref>

Long after his death, the [[German General Staff]] officers of the [[interwar period]] and the [[Second World War]], particularly General [[Hans von Seeckt]], recognised an intellectual debt to Schlieffen theories during the development of the ''[[Blitzkrieg]]'' doctrine.{{citation needed|date=February 2020}} The original plan for the 1940 German invasion of France was based on the Schlieffen Plan.<ref>[[B.H. Liddell Hart|Hart, B.H.L.]], ''The Rommel Papers'', [https://ia600901.us.archive.org/22/items/THEROMMELPAPERS/THE%20ROMMEL%20PAPERS_text.pdf p.4] (New York: [[Harcourt (publisher)|Harcourt, Brace and Co.]], 1953) (retrieved Jan. 1, 2024).</ref> [[Adolf Hitler]], however, is said to have deprecated Schlieffen's memory, going so far as to command that Schlieffen's name never be uttered in his presence and to admonish [[Walter Scherff]], official chronicler of the ''Wehrmacht'', to omit Schlieffen's name from any histories he might write.<ref>[[Heinz Linge|Linge, Heinz]], ''With Hitler to the End: The Memoirs of Hitler's Valet'', [https://archive.org/details/withhitlertoendm00ling/page/150/mode/1up?view=theater p.150] (New York: [[Skyhorse Publishing]], 2009) (retrieved Jan. 1, 2024).</ref>