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===Resistance against the Soviet Union (1979–1989)=== {{Main|Soviet–Afghan War}} [[File:Afghanistan insurgency 1985.png|thumb|Major resistance forces against the Soviets 1985; Army-green depicts locations of [[Jamiat-i Islami]]. [[Shura-e Nazar]] (Massoud's alliance) comprised many Jamiat positions but also those of other groups.]] Following the [[1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan|1979 Soviet invasion]] and occupation of Afghanistan, Massoud devised a strategic plan for expelling the invaders and overthrowing the communist regime. The first task was to establish a popularly based resistance force that had the loyalty of the people. The second phase was "active defense" of the Panjshir stronghold, while carrying out [[asymmetric warfare]]. In the third phase, the "strategic offensive", Massoud's forces would gain control of large parts of Northern Afghanistan. The fourth phase was the "general application" of Massoud's principles to the whole country, and the defeat of the Afghan communist government.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}} Massoud's [[mujahideen]] attacked the occupying Soviet forces, ambushing Soviet and Afghan communist convoys travelling through the [[Salang Pass]], and causing fuel shortages in Kabul.<ref name="Iyer">{{cite news |first2=Pico |last2=Iyer |last1=van Voorst |first1=Bruce |last3=Aftab |first3=Mohammad |title=Afghanistan: The bear descends on the lion |url=http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954295,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070930061145/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,954295,00.html |archive-date=September 30, 2007 |newspaper=Time|location=New York |date=May 7, 1984 |access-date=August 16, 2007}}</ref> The Soviets mounted a [[Panjshir offensives|series of offensives]] against the Panjshir. Between 1980 and 1985, these offensives were conducted twice a year. Despite engaging more men and hardware on each occasion, the Soviets were unable to defeat Massoud's forces. In 1982, the Soviets began deploying major combat units in the Panjshir, numbering up to 30,000 men. Massoud pulled his troops back into subsidiary valleys, where they occupied fortified positions. When the Soviet columns advanced onto these positions, they fell into ambushes. When the Soviets withdrew, Afghan army garrisons took over their positions. Massoud and his mujahideen forces attacked and recaptured them one by one.<ref>Roy, p. 199.</ref> In 1983, the Soviets offered Massoud a temporary truce, which he accepted in order to rebuild his own forces and give the civilian population a break from Soviet attacks. He put the respite to good use. In this time he created the [[Shura-e Nazar]] (Supervisory Council), which subsequently united 130 commanders from 12 Afghan provinces in their fight against the Soviet army. This council existed outside the Peshawar parties, which were prone to internecine rivalry and bickering, and served to smooth out differences between resistance groups, due to political and ethnic divisions. It was the predecessor of what could have become a unified Islamic Afghan army.<ref>Barry, Michael (2002). ''Massoud, de l'islamisme à la liberté'', p. 216. Paris: Audibert. {{in lang|fr}} {{ISBN|2-84749-002-7}}</ref> Relations with the party headquarters in [[Peshawar]] were often strained, as Rabbani insisted on giving Massoud no more weapons and supplies than to other Jamiat commanders, even those who did little fighting. To compensate for this deficiency, Massoud relied on revenues drawn from exports of [[emerald]]s<ref>{{cite web |author1=Bowersox, Gary |author2=Snee, Lawrence |author3=Foord, Eugene |author4=Seal, Robert |url=http://www.gems-afghan.com/articles/page26a.jpg |title=''Emeralds of the Panjshir valley, Afghanistan'' |year=1991 |publisher=www.gems-afghan.com |access-date=August 17, 2007 |archive-date=September 28, 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928075908/http://www.gems-afghan.com/articles/page26a.jpg }}</ref> and [[lapis lazuli]],<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Afghanistan-les_seigneurs_de_guerre.pdf|title=Le pouvoir des seigneurs de guerre et la situation sécuritaire en Afghanistan|language=fr|publisher= commission-refugies.fr|access-date=August 16, 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070928075907/http://www.commission-refugies.fr/IMG/pdf/Afghanistan-les_seigneurs_de_guerre.pdf|archive-date=September 28, 2007 |url-status = live}}</ref> that are traditionally exploited in Northern Afghanistan. Regarding infighting among different mujahideen factions, following a Soviet truce, Massoud said in an interview:{{blockquote|text=[[Hezb-i Islami Gulbuddin|Hezb-i Islami]] men are like cancer, that is why one has to treat the cancer first.<ref>{{Cite web|title=The Causes of the Failure of Government of Afghanistan Under Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani|url=http://prr.hec.gov.pk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1322/1/799S.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210426094908/http://prr.hec.gov.pk/jspui/bitstream/123456789/1322/1/799S.pdf|archive-date=2021-04-26|website=gov.pk}}</ref>}} Britain's [[MI6]] having activated long-established networks of contacts in Pakistan were able to support Massoud, and soon [[United Kingdom in the Soviet-Afghan War|became their key ally]]. MI6 sent an annual mission of two of their officers as well as military instructors to Massoud and his fighters. They also gave supplies to Massoud which included sniper rifles with silencers and mortars. As well as training Massoud's junior commanders, MI6 team's most important contribution was help with organisation and communication via radio equipment which was highly useful for Massoud to coordinate his forces and be warned of any impending Soviet attacks.<ref name="Dorril752">{{cite book |last1=Dorril |first1=Stephen |title=MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service |date=2002 |publisher=Simon & Schuster |isbn=978-0743217781 |page=[https://archive.org/details/mi6insidecovertw00dorr/page/752 752]}}</ref> The United States provided him with comparatively less support than other factions.<ref name="phillips" /> Part of the reason was that it permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan, which favored the rival mujahideen leader [[Gulbuddin Hekmatyar]]. In an interview, Massoud said, "We thought the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] knew everything. But they didn't. They supported some bad people [meaning Hekmatyar]."{{Citation needed|date=August 2011}} Primary advocates for supporting Massoud were the US [[State Department]]'s [[Edmund McWilliams]] and [[Peter Tomsen]], who were on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Others included two [[The Heritage Foundation|Heritage Foundation]] foreign policy analysts, [[Michael Johns (policy analyst)|Michael Johns]] and James A. Phillips, both of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of U.S. support under the [[Reagan Doctrine]].<ref name="phillips">Phillips, James A. (May 18, 1992). {{unfit|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20150616160328/http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1992/05/winning-the-endgame-in-afghanistan "Winning the Endgame in Afghanistan"]}}, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #181.</ref><ref>Johns, Michael (January 19, 2008). [http://michaeljohnsonfreedomandprosperity.blogspot.com/2008/01/charlie-wilsons-war-was-really-americas.html "Charlie Wilson's War Was Really America's War"].</ref> Thousands of foreign Islamic volunteers entered Afghanistan to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviet troops. To organize support for the mujahideen, Massoud established an administrative system that enforced law and order (''nazm'') in areas under his control. The Panjshir was divided into 22 bases (''qarargah'') governed by a military commander and a civilian administrator, and each had a judge, a prosecutor and a [[public defender]].<ref>Davies, L. Will; Shariat, Abdullah (2004). ''Fighting Masoud's War'', Melbourne: Lothian, p. 200. {{ISBN|0-7344-0590-1}}</ref> Massoud's policies were implemented by different committees: an economic committee was charged with funding the war effort. The health committee provided health services, assisted by volunteers from foreign [[Humanitarian aid|humanitarian]] [[non-governmental organization]]s, such as [[Aide médicale internationale]]. An education committee was charged with the training of the military and administrative [[En cadre|cadre]]. A culture committee and a judiciary committee were also created.<ref>Barry, p. 194.</ref> This expansion prompted [[Babrak Karmal]] to demand that the Red Army resume their offensives, in order to crush the Panjshir groups. Massoud received warning of the attack through Britain's [[GCHQ]] intelligence and he evacuated all 130,000 inhabitants from the valley into the Hindukush mountains, leaving the Soviet bombings to fall on empty ground and the Soviet battalions to face the mountains.<ref>Roy, p. 201.</ref> With the defeat of the Soviet-Afghan attacks, Massoud carried out the next phase of his strategic plan, expanding the resistance movement and liberating the northern provinces of Afghanistan. In August 1986, he captured [[Farkhar District|Farkhar]] in [[Takhar Province]]. In November 1986, his forces overran the headquarters of the government's 20th division at Nahrin in [[Baghlan Province]], scoring an important victory for the resistance.<ref>Roy, p. 213.</ref> This expansion was also carried out through diplomatic means, as more mujahideen commanders were persuaded to adopt the Panjshir military system. Despite almost constant attacks by the Red Army and the Afghan army, Massoud increased his military strength. Starting in 1980 with a force of less than 1,000 ill-equipped guerrillas, the Panjshir valley mujahideen grew to a 5,000-strong force by 1984.<ref name="Iyer" /> After expanding his influence outside the valley, Massoud increased his resistance forces to 13,000 fighters by 1989.<ref>Isby, p. 98.</ref> The junior commanders were trained by Britain's [[Special Air Service|SAS]] as well as private military contractors, some being sent as far as [[Oman]] and even SAS training grounds in the [[Scottish Highlands]]. These forces were divided into different types of units: the locals (mahalli) were tasked with static defense of villages and fortified positions. The best of the mahalli were formed into units called grup-i zarbati (shock troops), semi-mobile groups that acted as [[Military reserve|reserve]] forces for the defense of several strongholds. A different type of unit was the mobile group (grup-i-mutaharek), a lightly equipped [[commando]]-like formation numbering 33 men, whose mission was to carry out [[Hit-and-run tactics|hit-and-run]] attacks outside the Panjshir, sometimes as far as 100 km from their base. These men were professional soldiers, well-paid and trained, and, from 1983 on, they provided an effective strike force against government outposts. Uniquely among the mujahideen, these groups wore uniforms, and their use of the ''[[pakul]]'' made this headwear emblematic of the Afghan resistance.{{citation needed|date=September 2022}} Massoud's military organization was an effective compromise between the traditional Afghan method of warfare and the modern principles of guerrilla warfare which he had learned from the works of [[Mao Zedong]] and [[Che Guevara]]. His forces were considered the most effective of all the various Afghan resistance movements.<ref>Roy, p. 202.</ref> The Soviet army and the Afghan communist army were mainly defeated by Massoud and his mujahideen in numerous small engagements between 1984 and 1988{{citation needed|date=August 2021}}. After describing the Soviet Union's military engagement in Afghanistan as "a bleeding wound" in 1986,<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Schmemann|first1=Serge|last2=Times|first2=Special To the New York|date=February 26, 1986|title=Gorbachev Says U.S. Arms Note Is Not Adequate |language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/26/world/gorbachev-says-us-arms-note-is-not-adequate.html|access-date=August 19, 2021|issn=0362-4331|quote=Mr. Gorbachev described Afghanistan as a ''bleeding wound,'' and he said the Soviet Union would like to withdraw its troops ''in the nearest future''.}}</ref> Soviet General Secretary [[Mikhail Gorbachev]] began a withdrawal of Soviet troops from the nation in May 1988. On February 15, 1989, in what was depicted as an improbable victory for the mujahideen, the last Soviet soldier left the nation.<ref>{{Cite news|last1=Keller|first1=Bill|last2=Times|first2=Special To the New York|date=February 16, 1989|title=Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan After 9 Years, 15,000 Dead and Great Cost|language=en-US|work=The New York Times|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/16/world/last-soviet-soldiers-leave-afghanistan-after-9-years-15000-dead-and-great-cost.html|access-date=August 19, 2021|issn=0362-4331}}</ref>
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