Editing Talcott Parsons (section)

==Work==
Parsons produced a general theoretical system for the analysis of society, which he called "theory of action", based on the methodological and epistemological principle of "analytical realism" and on the ontological assumption of "voluntaristic action".<ref>Talcott Parsons, ''The Structure of Social Action.'' New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.</ref> Parsons' concept of analytical realism can be regarded as a kind of compromise between [[nominalist]] and [[philosophical realism|realist]] views on the nature of reality and human knowledge.<ref>Rainer C. Baum and Victor Lidz, "Introduction to Meta-Theory" in Jan J. Loubser et al. (eds.) ''Explorations in General Theory in Social Science: Essays in Honor of Talcott Parsons.'' Volume One. New York: The Free Press, 1976. p. 27.</ref> Parsons believed that objective reality can be related to only by a particular encounter of such reality and that general intellectual understanding is feasible through conceptual schemes and theories. Interaction with objective reality on an intellectual level should always be understood as an approach. Parsons often explained the meaning of analytical realism by quoting a statement by Henderson: "A fact is a statement about experience in terms of a conceptual scheme."<ref>Talcott Parsons, "On Building Social System Theory: A Personal History" in Talcott Parsons, ''Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory.'' New York: The Free Press, 1977. p. 27.</ref>

Generally, Parsons maintained that his inspiration regarding analytical realism had been [[Lawrence Joseph Henderson]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead]]<ref>For the complex relationship between Parsons' action theory and Whitehead's philosophy, see Thomas J. Fararo, "On the Foundations of the Theory of Action in Whitehead and Parsons" in Jan J. Loubser et al. (ed.) ''Explorations in General Theory in Social Science.'' New York: The Free Press, 1976. Chapter 5.</ref> although he might have gotten the idea much earlier. It is important for Parsons' "analytical realism" to insist on the reference to an objective reality since he repeatedly highlighted that his concept of "analytical realism" was very different from the "fictionalism" of Hans Vaihiger (Hans Vaihinger):<ref>Hans Vaihiger, ''The Philosophy of "As If"''. trans. C.K. Cohen. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1952.</ref>
{{blockquote|We must start with the assertion that all knowledge which purports to be valid in anything like the scientific sense presumes both the reality of object known and of a knower. I think we can go beyond that and say that there must be a community of knowers who are able to communicate with each other. Without such a presupposition it would seem difficult to avoid the pitfall of [[solipsism]]. The so-called natural sciences do not, however, impute the "status of knowing subjects" to the objects with which they deal.<ref>Talcott Parsons, "On Theory and Metatheory". ''Humboldt Journal of Social Relations''. 7:1 - Fall/Winter 1979–1980. p. 52.</ref>}}

===''The Structure of Social Action''===
''[[The Structure of Social Action]]'' (SSA), Parsons' most famous work, took form piece by piece. Its central figure was Weber, and the other key figures in the discussion were added, little by little, as the central idea took form. One important work that helped Parsons' central argument in was, in 1932, unexpectedly found: [[Élie Halévy]]'s ''La formation du radicalisme philosophique'' (1901–1904); he read the three-volume work in French. Parsons explained, "Well, Halévy was just a different world&nbsp;... and helped me to really get in to many clarifications of the assumptions distinctive to the main line of British [[utilitarianism|utilitarian]] thought; assumptions about the 'natural identity of interest', and so on. I still think it is one of the true masterpieces in intellectual history."<ref name="Martin U. Martel 1975"/> Parsons first achieved significant recognition with the publication of ''The Structure of Social Action'' (1937), his first grand synthesis, combining the ideas of Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, and others. In 1998, the [[International Sociological Association]] listed it as the ninth most important sociological book of the 20th Century.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century/ranking-order|title=International Sociological Association Books of the XX Century|access-date=August 26, 2023 |archive-date=June 4, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230604144957/https://www.isa-sociology.org/en/about-isa/history-of-isa/books-of-the-xx-century/ranking-order|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Action theory===
Parsons' action theory can be characterized as an attempt to maintain the scientific rigour of positivism while acknowledging the necessity of the "subjective dimension" of human action incorporated in hermeneutic types of sociological theories. It is cardinal in Parsons' general theoretical and methodological view that human action must be understood in conjunction with the motivational component of the human act. Social science must consider the question of ends, purpose, and ideals in its analysis of human action. Parsons' strong reaction to behavioristic theory as well as to sheer materialistic approaches derives from the attempt of the theoretical positions to eliminate ends, purpose, and ideals as factors of analysis. Parsons, in his term papers at Amherst, was already criticizing attempts to reduce human life to psychological, biological, or materialist forces. What was essential in human life, Parsons maintained, was how the factor of culture was codified. Culture, however, was to Parsons an independent variable in that it could not be "deducted" from any other factor of the social system. That methodological intention is given the most elaborate presentation in ''The Structure of Social Action,'' which was Parsons' first basic discussion of the methodological foundation of the social sciences.

Some of the themes in ''The Structure of Social Action'' had been presented in a compelling essay two years earlier in "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory".<ref>Talcott Parsons, "The Place of Ultimate Values in Sociological Theory." In Talcott Parsons, ''The Early Essays.'' Edited by Charles Camic. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago, 1991. (The essay was originally published in 1935.)</ref>

An intense [[Alfred Schütz#Intellectual life|correspondence and dialogue between Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schutz]] serves to highlight the meaning of central concepts in ''The Structure of Social Action.''

===Relations to cybernetics and system theory===
Parsons developed his ideas during a period when systems theory and cybernetics were very much on the front burner of social and behavioral science. In using systems thinking, he postulated that the relevant systems treated in social and behavioral science were "open:" they were embedded in an environment with other systems. For social and behavioral science, the largest system is "the action system," the interrelated behaviors of human beings, embedded in a physical-organic environment.<ref>A good summary of the "action frame of reference" as it developed over time is found in Leonard Mayhew's introduction to his anthology of Parsons' major essays, Mayhew, Leonard (1982) "Introduction" in Talcott Parsons, ''Talcott Parsons on institutions and social evolution'', pp: 1–62. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.</ref>

As Parsons developed his theory, it became increasingly bound to the fields of cybernetics and system theory but also to Emerson's concept of homeostasis<ref>Alfred E. Emerson, "Homeostasis and comparison of systems" in Roy R. Grinker (ed.) ''Toward a Unified Theory of Human Behavior: An Introduction to General Systems Theory.''New York: Basic Books, 1956.</ref> and [[Ernst Mayr]]'s concept of "teleonomic processes".<ref>Ernst Mayr, "Teleological and teleonomic: A New Analysis." pp. 78–104 in Marx Wartofsky (ed.) ''Method and Metaphysics: Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences.'' Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974</ref> On the metatheoretical level, Parson attempted to balance psychologist phenomenology and idealism on the one hand and pure types of what Parsons called the utilitarian-positivistic complex, on the other hand.

The theory includes a general theory of [[Sociocultural evolution|social evolution]] and a concrete interpretation of the major drives of world history. In Parsons' theory of history and evolution, the constitutive-cognitive symbolization of the cybernetic hierarchy of action-systemic levels has, in principle, the same function as genetic information in DNA's control of biological evolution, but that factor of metasystemic control does not "determine" any outcome but defines the orientational boundaries of the real pathfinder, which is action itself. Parsons compares the constitutive level of society with [[Noam Chomsky]]'s concept of "[[deep structure]]".

As Parsons wrote, "The deep structures do not as such articulate any sentences which could convey coherent meaning. The surface structures constitute the level at which this occurs. The connecting link between them is a set of rules of transformation, to use Chomsky's own phrase."<ref>Talcott Parsons, "Action, Symbol, and Cybernetic Control." In Ino Rossi (ed.) ''Structural Sociology'' New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. p. 53.</ref> The transformative processes and entities are generally, at least on one level of empirical analysis, performed or actualized by myths and religions,<ref>Roland Robertson, "The Central Significance of 'religion' in Social Theory: Parsons as an epical theorist." In Roland Robertson and [[Bryan S. Turner (sociologist)|Bryan S. Turner]] (ed.) ''Talcott Parsons: Theorist of Modernity'' London: Sage Publications, 1991.</ref> but philosophies, art systems, or even semiotic consumer behavior can, in principle, perform that function.<ref>Victor Lidz, "Religion and Cybernetic Concepts in the Theory of Action." ''Sociological Analysis.'' vol.43.no.4.1982. pp. 287–306.</ref>

===Unified concept of social science===
Parsons' theory reflects a vision of a unified concept of social science and indeed of [[living systems]]<ref>Parsons discussed the concept of living systems many times in later life both in publications as well in his correspondence with Dupree, Lidz, Martel, and others. An important discussion of living system is in "Concrete Systems and Abstracted" Systems: Review article of Living Systems by James Grier Miller". ''Contemporary Sociology'' Vol.8. no.5. Sep. 1979. pp. 696–705.</ref> in general. His approach differs in essence from [[Niklas Luhmann#Systems theory|Niklas Luhmann's theory of social systems]] because Parsons rejects the idea that systems can be autopoietic, short of the actual action system of individual actors. Systems have immanent capacities but only as an outcome of the institutionalized processes of action-systems, which, in the final analysis, is the historical effort of individual actors. While Luhmann focused on the systemic immanence, Parsons insisted that the question of autocatalytic and homeostatic processes and the question about the actor as the ultimate "first mover" on the other hand was not mutually exclusive. Homeostatic processes might be necessary if and when they occur but action is necessitating.

It is only that perspective of the ultimate reference in action that Parsons' dictum (that higher-order cybernetic systems in history will tend to control social forms that are organized on the lower levels of the cybernetic hierarchy) should be understood. For Parsons, the highest levels of the cybernetic hierarchy as far as the general action level is concerned is what Parsons calls the constitutive part of the cultural system (the L of the L). However, within the interactional processes of the system, attention should be paid especially to the cultural-expressivistic axis (the L-G line in the AGIL). By the term ''constitutive'', Parsons generally referred to very highly codified cultural values especially religious elements (but other interpretation of the term "constitutive" is possible).<ref>The complete structure of Parsons AGIL system was scattered around in dozens of his works and not presented in any handy form. However, the most elementary key elements was presented in chapter 2 in Talcott Parsons and Gerald M. Platt, ''The American University'' Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973. To understand the AGIL system, one needs to understand that it functions (in a sense) on three major levels: the highest level is the paradigm of the human condition, the next mediative level is what he calls the general action-system and the third level is the social system. (All three levels are active in any empirical social object at any time). Another important point is that Parsons, in a sense, operates with two cultural systems: there is the cultural system of the general action level and the so-called fiduciary system as the L-function of the social system. Common sense associates both systems with the idea of "culture." However, Parsons' separation of "culture" into the two distinct levels of conceptual analysis is fundamental.</ref>

Cultural systems have an independent status from that of the normative and orientational pattern of the social system; neither system can be reduced to the other. For example, the question of the "cultural capital" of a social system as a sheer historical entity (in its function as a "fiduciary system"), is not identical to the higher cultural values of that system; that is, the cultural system is embodied with a metastructural logic that cannot be reduced to any given social system or cannot be viewed as a materialist (or behavioralist) deduction from the "necessities" of the social system (or from the "necessities" of its economy).<ref>Helmuth Staubmann, "Culture as a Subsystem of Action: Talcott Parsons and Cultural Sociology." Presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta, 2003.</ref> Within that context, culture would have an independent power of transition, not only as factors of actual sociocultural units (like [[Western culture|Western civilization]]) but also how original cultural bases would tend to "universalize" through interpenetration and spread over large numbers of social systems as with [[Classical Greece]] and [[Kingdom of Israel (united monarchy)|Ancient Israel]], where the original social bases had died but the cultural system survived as an independently "working" cultural pattern, as in the case of [[Greek philosophy]] or in the case of Christianity, as a modified derivation from its origins in Israel.<ref>Talcott Parsons, ''Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives.'' Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1966.</ref>

===General theory===
It is important to highlight that Parsons distinguished two "meanings" or modes of the term ''general theory''. He sometimes wrote about general theory as aspects of theoretical concerns of social sciences whose focus is on the most "constitutive" elements of cognitive concern for the basic theoretical systematization of a given field. Parsons would include the basic conceptual scheme for the given field, including its highest order of theoretical relations and naturally also the necessary specification of this system's axiomatic, epistemological, and methodological foundations from the point of view of logical implications.<ref>The issues were generally those that Parsons discussed in his first major work: Talcott Parsons, ''The Structure of Social Action.'' New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937.</ref><ref>For another discussion of such questions, see Rainer C. Baum and Victor Lidz, "Introduction to Meta-Theory" In Jan Loubser et al. (eds.) ''Explorations in General Theory in the Social Science: Essays in Honor of Talcott Parsons.'' New York: The Free Press, 1976</ref> All the elements would signify the quest for a general theory on the highest level of theoretical concern.

However, general theory could also refer to a more fully/operational system whose implications of the conceptual scheme were "spelled out" on lower levels of cognitive structuralization, levels standing closer to a perceived "empirical object". In his speech to the American Sociological Society in 1947, he spoke of five levels:<ref>Talcott Parsons, "The Prospects of Sociological Theory". (1948). In Talcott Parsons, ''Essays in Sociological Theory''. New York: The Free Press, 1954.</ref>
# The General Theory level, which took form primarily as a theory of social systems.
# The theory of motivation of social behavior, which especially addressed questions of the dynamics of the social system and naturally presupposed theories of motivation, personality and socialization.
# The theoretical bases of systematic comparative analysis of social structure, which would involve a study of concrete cultures in concrete systems on various levels of generalization.
# Special theories around particular empirical problem areas.
# The "fitting" of the theories to specific empirical research techniques, such as statistics, and survey techniques.

During his life, he would work on developing all five fields of theoretical concerns but pay special attention to the development on the highest "constitutive" level, as the rest of the building would stand or fall on the solidity of the highest level.<ref>For one discussion of his efforts, see Jan J. Loubser, "General Introduction" in Jan Loubser et al. (eds.) ''Explorations in General Theory in the Social Science: Essays in Honor of Talcott Parsons.'' New York: The Free Press, 1976.</ref>

Despite myths, Parsons never thought that modern societies exist in some kind of perfect harmony with their norms or that most modern societies were necessarily characterized by some high level of consensus or a "happy" institutional integration. Parsons highlighted that is almost logically impossible that there can be any "perfect fit" or perfect consensus in the basic normative structure of complex modern societies because the basic value pattern of modern societies is generally differentiated in such a way that some of the basic normative categories exist in inherent or at least potential conflict with each other. For example, freedom and equality are generally viewed as fundamental and non-negotiable values of modern societies. Each represents a kind of ultimate imperative about what the higher values of humanity. However, as Parsons emphasizes, no simple answer on the priority of freedom or equality or any simple solution on how they possibly can be mediated, if at all. Therefore, all modern societies are faced with the inherent conflict prevailing between the two values, and there is no "eternal solution" as such. There cannot be any perfect match between motivational pattern, normative solutions, and the prevailing value pattern in any modern society. Parsons also maintained that the "dispute" between "left" and "right" has something to do with the fact that they both defend ultimately "justified" human values (or ideals), which alone is indispensable as values but are always in an endless conflictual position to each other.

Parsons always maintained that the integration of the normative pattern in society is generally problematic and that the level of integration that is reached in principle is always far from harmonious and perfect. If some "harmonious pattern" emerges, it is related to specific historical circumstances but is not a general law of the social systems.

===AGIL paradigm===
The heuristic scheme that Parsons used to analyze systems and subsystems is called the ''[[AGIL paradigm]]'' or the ''AGIL scheme''.<ref>P. McNeill, C. Townley, ''Fundamentals of Sociology'', (Hutchinson Educational, 1981)</ref> To survive or maintain equilibrium with respect to its environment, any system must to some degree:

* adapt to that environment (adaptation)
* attain its goals (goal attainment)
* integrate its components (integration), and
* maintain its latent pattern (latency pattern Maintenance), a sort of cultural template

The concepts can be abbreviated as AGIL and are called the system's functional imperatives. Parsons' AGIL model is an analytical scheme for the sake of theoretical "production", but it is not any simple "copy" or any direct historical "summary" of empirical reality. Also, the scheme itself does not explain "anything", just as the [[periodic table]] explains nothing by itself in the natural sciences. The AGIL scheme is a tool for explanations and is no better than the quality of the theories and explanation by which it is processed.

In the case of the analysis of a social action system, the AGIL paradigm, according to Parsons, yields four interrelated and interpenetrating subsystems: the behavioral systems of its members (A), the personality systems of those members (G), the social system (as such) (I), and the cultural system of that society (L). To analyze a society as a social system (the I subsystem of action), people are posited to enact roles associated with positions. The positions and roles become differentiated to some extent and, in a modern society, are associated with things such as occupational, political, judicial, and educational roles.

Considering the interrelation of these specialized roles as well as functionally differentiated [[collectivity (sociology)|collectivities]] (like firms and political parties), a society can be analyzed as a complex system of interrelated functional subsystems:

The pure AGIL model for all living systems:
* (A) Adaptation
* (G) Goal attainment
* (I) Integration
* (L) Latency (pattern maintenance)

The Social System Level:
* The economy&nbsp;— social adaptation to its action and non-action environmental systems
* The polity&nbsp;— collective goal attainment
* The societal community&nbsp;— the integration of its diverse social components
* The fiduciary system&nbsp;— processes that function to reproduce historical culture in its "direct" social embeddedness

The General Action Level:
* The behavioral organism (or system), in later versions, the foci for generalized "intelligence".
* The personality system.
* The social system.
* The cultural system. (See cultural level.)

The cultural level:
* Cognitive symbolization
* Expressive symbolization
* Evaluative symbolization (sometimes called: moral-evaluative symbolization)
* Constitutive symbolization

The Generalized Symbolic media:

Social System level:
* (A) Economic system: Money
* (G) Political system: Political power
* (I) The Societal Community: Influence
* (L) The Fiduciary system (cultural tradition): Value-commitment

Parsons elaborated upon the idea that each of these systems also developed some specialized symbolic mechanisms of interaction analogous to money in the economy, like influence in the social community. Various processes of "interchange" among the subsystems of the social system were postulated.

Parsons' use of social systems analysis based on the AGIL scheme was established in his work ''Economy and Society'' (with N. Smelser, 1956) and prevailed in all his subsequent work. However, the AGIL system existed only in a "rudimentary" form in the beginning and was gradually elaborated and expanded in the decades which followed. A brief introduction to Parsons' AGIL scheme appears in Chapter 2 of ''The American University''.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Parsons
 |first1               = Talcott
 |author-link1         = Talcott Parsons
 |last2                = Platt
 |first2               = Gerald M.
 |year                 = 1973
 |title                = The American University
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=iQ-cAAAAMAAJ
 |edition              = 2
 |publisher            = Harvard University Press
 |isbn                 = 9780674029200
 |access-date          = 10 June 2024
}} 
</ref>
There is, however, no single place in his writing in which the total AGIL system is visually displayed or explained: the complete system has to be reconstructed from multiple places in his writing. The system displayed in "The American University" has only the most basic elements and should not be mistaken for the whole system.

===Social evolutionism===
Parsons contributed to [[social evolutionism]] and [[neoevolutionism]]. He divided evolution into four sub-processes:
# differentiation, which creates functional subsystems of the main system, as discussed above;
# adaptation, in which those systems evolve into more efficient versions;
# inclusion of elements previously excluded from the given systems; 
# generalization of values, increasing the legitimization of the increasingly-complex system.

Furthermore, Parsons explored the sub-processes within three stages of evolution:
# primitive
# archaic
# modern

Parsons viewed Western civilization as the pinnacle of modern societies and the United States as the one that is most dynamically developed.

Parsons' late work focused on a new theoretical synthesis around four functions that he claimed are common to all systems of action, from the behavioral to the cultural, and a set of symbolic media that enables communication across them. His attempt to structure the world of action according to a scheme that focused on order was unacceptable for American sociologists, who were retreating from the grand pretensions of the 1960s to a more empirical, grounded approach.

===Pattern variables===
Parsons asserted that there are not two dimensions to societies (instrumental and expressive) but that there are qualitative differences between kinds of social interaction.

He observed that people can have personalized and formally detached relationships, based on the roles that they play. The ''pattern variables'' are what he called the characteristics that are associated with each kind of interaction.

An interaction can be characterized by one of the identifiers of each contrastive pair:
* affectivity&nbsp;– affective neutrality
* self-orientation&nbsp;– collectivity-orientation
* universalism&nbsp;– particularism
* ascription&nbsp;– achievement
* specificity&nbsp;– diffusity