Editing Suez Crisis (section)

== Aftermath ==
[[File:Suez Crisis aftermath.ogv|thumb|1957 newsreels about the aftermath of the crisis]]

The conflict resulted in a military victory for the Coalition,<ref name="Tal"/><ref>{{Cite book |last=Mart |first=Michelle |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=siDi1WTHjOUC&pg=PA159 |title=Eye on Israel: How America Came to View the Jewish State as an Ally |date=2006-02-09 |publisher=SUNY Press |isbn=978-0-7914-6687-2 |page=159}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Stewart|2013|p=133}}</ref> but a political victory for Egypt.<ref name="Tal">{{Harvnb|Tal|2001|p=203}}</ref> Egypt maintained control of the canal.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Why Was The Suez Crisis So Important? |url=https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/why-was-the-suez-crisis-so-important |website=[[Imperial War Museums]] |language=en}}</ref>

In retirement, Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister at the time, maintained that the military response had prevented a much larger war in the Middle East. In the context of the [[Egyptian–Czechoslovak arms deal|massive armament of Egypt via Czechoslovakia]], Israel had been expecting an Egyptian invasion in either March or April 1957, as well as a Soviet invasion of Syria.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=493}}</ref> The crisis may also have hastened [[decolonisation]], as many of the remaining British and French colonies gained independence over the next few years. Some argued that the imposed ending to the Crisis led to over-hasty [[Decolonisation of Africa|decolonisation in Africa]], increasing the chance of civil wars and military dictatorships in newly independent countries.<ref name="news.bbc.co.uk">{{Cite news |date=30 October 2006 |title=Suez: The 'betrayal' of Eden |url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6085264.stm |access-date=2023-03-17 |work=BBC |language=en-GB}}</ref>

The fight over the canal also laid the groundwork for the [[Six-Day War]] in 1967 due to the lack of a peace settlement following the 1956 war and rising of tensions between Egypt and Israel.<ref name="novaonline.nvcc.edu">{{Cite web |last=Evans |first=C. T. |date=2010 |title=Suez Canal Crisis |url=https://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/his135/Events/Suez56.htm |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=North Virginia Community College |type=undergraduate course assignment}}{{Bsn|date=July 2023}}</ref> Additionally, the Soviet Union was able to avoid most repercussions from its concurrent violent suppression of the [[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|rebellion in Hungary]], and were able to present an image at the United Nations as a defender of small powers against [[imperialism]].<ref>Delauche, Frederic ''Illustrated History of Europe: A Unique Guide to Europe's Common Heritage'' (1992) p. 357</ref>

As a direct result of the Crisis and in order to prevent further Soviet expansion in the region, Eisenhower asked Congress on 5 January 1957 for authorisation to use military force if requested by any Middle Eastern nation to check aggression and, secondly, to set aside $200&nbsp;million to help Middle Eastern countries that desired aid from the United States. Congress granted both requests and this policy became known as the [[Eisenhower Doctrine]].<ref name="novaonline.nvcc.edu"/>

The Soviet Union made major gains with regards to influence in the Middle East.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 173">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=173}}</ref> As American historian [[John Lewis Gaddis]] wrote:
{{Blockquote|When the British-French-Israeli invasion forced them to choose, Eisenhower and Dulles came down, with instant decisiveness, on the side of the Egyptians. They preferred alignment with Arab nationalism, even if it meant alienating pro-Israeli constituencies on the eve of a [[1956 United States presidential election|presidential election]] in the United States, even if it meant throwing the [[NATO]] alliance into its most divisive crisis yet, even if it meant risking whatever was left of the Anglo-American '[[Special Relationship|special relationship]]', even if it meant voting ''with'' the Soviet Union in the United Nations Security Council at a time when the Russians, themselves, were invading Hungary and crushing—far more brutally than anything that happened in Egypt—[[Hungarian Revolution of 1956|a rebellion]] against their own authority there. The fact that the Eisenhower administration itself applied crushing economic pressure to the British and French to disengage from Suez, and that it subsequently forced an Israeli pull-back from the Sinai as well—all of this, one might thought<!--did Gaddis really write this, or was something omitted?-->, would won the United States the lasting gratitude of Nasser, the Egyptians and the Arab world. Instead, the Americans lost influence in the Middle East as a result of Suez, while the Russians gained it.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 173"/>}}

[[File:Statue of de Lesseps.jpg|thumb|Statue of [[Ferdinand de Lesseps]], a Frenchman who built the Suez Canal, being removed following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956.<ref>{{Harvnb|Kyle|2003|p=522}}</ref>]]

[[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s much publicised threat expressed through letters written by [[Nikolai Bulganin]] to begin rocket attacks on 5 November on Britain, France, and Israel if they did not withdraw from Egypt was widely believed at the time to have forced a ceasefire.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 173"/><ref name="war&peace">{{Cite book |last=Gavin |first=James Maurice |url=https://archive.org/details/warpeaceinspacea00gav_7q4/page/18/mode/2up?view=theater |title=War And Peace In The Space Age |publisher=Harper |edition=1958 |page=18 |format=hardcover |asin=B000OKLL8G |lccn=58011396 |access-date=April 3, 2015 |url-access=registration |via=Internet Archive}}</ref> Accordingly, it enhanced the prestige of the Soviet Union in Egypt, the Arab world, and the Third World, who believed the USSR was prepared to launch a [[Nuclear warfare|nuclear attack]] on Britain, France, and Israel for the sake of Egypt. Though Nasser in private admitted that it was American economic pressure that had saved him, it was Khrushchev, not Eisenhower, whom Nasser publicly thanked as Egypt's saviour and special friend. Khrushchev boasted in his memoirs:<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 173"/>
{{Blockquote|Our use of international influence to halt England, France and Israel's aggression against Egypt in 1956 was a historic turning point...Previously they had apparently thought that we were bluffing, when we openly said that the Soviet Union possessed powerful rockets. But then they saw that we really had rockets. And this had its effect.}}

Khrushchev took the view that the Suez crisis had been a great triumph for Soviet nuclear [[brinkmanship]], arguing publicly and privately that his threat to use nuclear weapons was what had saved Egypt. Khrushchev claimed in his memoirs:<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 236">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|p=236}}</ref>

{{Blockquote|The governments of England and France knew perfectly well that Eisenhower's speech condemning their aggression was just a gesture for the sake of public appearances. But when we delivered our own stern warning to the three aggressors, they knew we weren't playing games with public opinion. They took us seriously.}}

The conclusion that Khrushchev drew from the Suez crisis, which he saw as his own personal triumph, was that the use of nuclear blackmail was a very effective tool for achieving Soviet foreign policy goals.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=236–237}}</ref> Therefore, a long period of crises began, starting with the [[Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959|Berlin crisis]], beginning later in November 1958, and culminating in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.<ref>{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=236–239}}</ref> U.S. Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] perceived a [[power vacuum]] in the Middle East, and he thought the United States should fill it. His policies, which ultimately led to the [[Eisenhower Doctrine]], were based on the assumption that Nasser and other Arab leaders shared America's fear of the Soviet Union, which was emphatically not the case.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, pp. 173–174">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=173–174}}</ref>{{Efn|[[CIA]] original operative, [[Miles Copeland Jr|Miles Copeland]] later wrote: "When the dust had settled after the Suez affair, it was clear that we had made at least temporary gains on the international gameboard. Nasser emerged from it stronger and more popular than ever before, not only in Egypt but throughout the Middle East...I find it difficult to believe, but I have been told by sources in whom I have confidence that, at the UN, delegates from Third World countries were actually smiling at our delegates as they passed them in the halls. But it didn't last, because our way of capitalizing on [[Raymond A. Hare|Ray Hare]]'s suggestion that 'we must seize this opportunity to establish a strong position' was something called the 'Eisenhower Doctrine'. Ah, the Eisenhower Doctrine! Announced with the remarkable sense of timing we had come to associate with our Secretary of State, it was an offer by the US Government to commit American troops to the defence of any Middle Eastern government 'endangered by overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international Communism'. At the time, there were no Middle Eastern nations controlled by international Communism, and no nations threatened by Communist aggression. On the contrary, the Soviets were offering arms, economic aid and political support to any Middle Eastern country that would accept. The Eisenhower Doctrine infuriated those Arab states which our political action campaigns were trying to bring into line, and only stimulated the prevailing inclinations to venality among our political mercenaries."{{Sfn|Copeland|1989|pp=204–205}}}} In fact, Nasser never wanted Egypt to be aligned with one single superpower, and instead preferred the Americans and Soviets vying for his friendship.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, p. 171"/>

Nasser saw the Eisenhower Doctrine as a heavy-handed American attempt to dominate the Middle East (a region that Nasser believed he ought to dominate), {{Citation needed|date=December 2013}} and led him to ally Egypt with the Soviet Union as an effective counter-weight. It was only with the quiet abandonment of the Eisenhower Doctrine in a National Security Council review in mid-1958 that Nasser started pulling away from the Soviet Union to resume his preferred role as an opportunist who tried to use both superpowers to his advantage, playing on their animosity.<ref name="Gaddis, John Lewis, pp. 174–175">{{Harvnb|Gaddis|1998|pp=174–175}}</ref>

The American historian [[Arthur L. Herman]] said that the episode ruined the usefulness of the United Nations to support American geopolitical aims.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Herman |first=Arthur |author-link=Arthur L. Herman |date=July 31, 2006 |title=A Man, A Plan, A Canal What Nasser wrought when he seized Suez a half century ago |url=http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/484pbqjx.asp?page=2 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120106120817/http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/484pbqjx.asp?page=2 |url-status=dead |archive-date=6 January 2012 |access-date=20 June 2012 |website=The Weekly Standard}}</ref>

=== Military thought ===
{{Singlesource|section|date=August 2023}}
The great military lesson that was reinforced by the Suez War was the extent that the desert favoured highly fluid, mobile operations and the power of aerial interdiction. French aircraft destroyed Egyptian forces threatening paratroopers at Raswa and Israeli air power saved the IDF several days' worth of time. To operate in the open desert without air supremacy proved to be suicidal for the Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The Royal Marine helicopter assault at Port Said "showed promise as a technique for transporting troops into small landing zones".<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 91"/> Strategic bombing proved ineffective.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 92">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=92}}</ref>

Revise Phase II failed to achieve its aim of breaking Egyptian morale while at the same time, those civilian deaths that did occur helped to turn world opinion against the invasion and especially hurt support for the war in Britain. Egyptian urban warfare tactics at Port Said proved to be effective at slowing down the Allied advance. Finally, the war showed the importance of diplomacy. Anglo-French operations against Egypt were militarily successful, but proved to be counterproductive as opinion in both the home front in Britain and France and the world abroad, especially in the United States, was against the operation.<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 92"/>

=== Europe ===
In West Germany, the Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] was shocked by the Soviet threat of nuclear strikes against Britain and France, and even more by the quiescent American response to the Soviet threat of nuclear annihilation against two of NATO's key members. The Bulganin letters showcased Europe's dependence upon the United States for security against Soviet nuclear threats while at the same time seeming to show that the American nuclear umbrella was not as reliable as had been advertised.{{Sfn|Dietl|2008|pp=273–274}}{{npov inline|date=September 2024}}

As a result, the French became determined to acquire their own nuclear weapons rather than rely upon the Americans, while Germany became even more interested in the idea of a European "Third Force" in the Cold War. This helped to lead to the formation of the [[European Economic Community]] under the 1957 [[Treaty of Rome]], which was intended to be the foundation of the European "Third Force".{{Sfn|Dietl|2008|pp=273–274}} The European Economic Community was the precursor to the [[European Union]].

=== Egypt ===
[[File:Nasser_and_Quwatli_clasp_hands.jpg|alt=Nasser_and_Quwatli_clasp_hands|thumb|212x212px|Presidents [[Shukri al-Quwatli]] (left) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (right) clasp hands in front of jubilant crowds in [[Damascus]] days after the union of Syria and Egypt into the [[United Arab Republic]], 1958]]
With the prompt withdrawal of UK and French troops, later followed by Israeli troop withdraw, Egypt kept control of the Suez Canal.<ref name="Economist2006"/> After the fighting ended, the Egyptian Chief-of-Staff [[Abdel Hakim Amer]] accused Nasser of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result.<ref name="Kandil2012p50">{{Cite book |last=Kandil |first=Hazem |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y5ShC2rO40YC |title=Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: Egypt's Road to Revolt |date=13 November 2012 |publisher=Verso Books |isbn=978-1-8446-7962-1 |page=50 |quote=meeting on November 15 (1956) ... Amer also lashed out at Nasser, accusing him of provoking an unnecessary war and then blaming the military for the result.}}</ref> The British historian [[D. R. Thorpe]] wrote that the outcome gave Nasser "an inflated view of his own power",<ref name="Thorpe">{{Cite news |last=Thorpe |first=D. R. |author-link=D. R. Thorpe |date=1 November 2006 |title=What we failed to learn from Suez |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/3656288/What-we-failed-to-learn-from-Suez.html |access-date=5 July 2016 |work=Daily Telegraph |location=London}}</ref> thinking he had overcome the combined forces of the United Kingdom, France and Israel, failing to attribute their withdrawal to pressure from the superpowers.<ref name="Thorpe"/><ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 84">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=84}}</ref>

Nasser emerged a hero in the Arab world. American historian Derek Varble commented, "Although Egyptian forces fought with mediocre skill during the conflict, many Arabs saw Nasser as the conqueror of European colonialism and Zionism, simply because Britain, France and Israel left the Sinai and the northern Canal Zone."<ref name="Varble, Derek, p. 84"/> The historian Andrew McGregor argued that the retreat from Sinai was not a complete rout, since it preserved most of the regular army for fighting the larger enemy – Britain and France.{{Sfn|McGregor|2006|p=256}} Historian [[P. J. Vatikiotis]] described Nasser's speeches in 1956 and after as providing "superficial explanations of Egypt's military collapse in Sinai, based on some extraordinary strategy" and that "simplistic children's tales about the Egyptian air force's prowess in 1956 were linked in the myth of orderly withdrawal from Sinai. All this was necessary to construct yet another myth, that of [[Port Said]]. Inflating and magnifying odd and sporadic resistance into a [[Battle of Stalingrad|Stalingrad-like]] tenacious defense, Port Said became the spirit of Egyptian independence and dignity."<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|p=275}}</ref>

During the Nasser era, the fighting at Port Said became a symbol of Egyptian victory, linked to a global anti-colonial struggle.<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|p=277}}</ref> Of Nasser's post-Suez hubris, Thorpe wrote, "The [[Six-Day War]] against Israel in 1967 was when reality kicked in—a war that would never have taken place if the Suez crisis had had a different resolution."<ref name="Thorpe"/> Of [[Tawfiq al-Hakim]]'s writings about the 1956 and 1967 wars, Vatikiotis summarizes: "Were bluffing and histrionics in the nature of Nasser? It was bluffing that led to the crushing of Egypt in 1967, because of the mass self-deception exercised by leaders and followers alike ever since the non-existent 'Stalingrad which was Port Said' in 1956."<ref>{{Harvnb|Vatikiotis|1978|p=321}}</ref>

==== Crackdown on Egyptian Jews ====
{{Further|1956–1957 exodus and expulsions from Egypt|Jewish exodus from the Muslim world#Egypt}}
{{Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries}}

In October 1956, when the Suez Crisis erupted, Nasser brought in a set of sweeping regulations abolishing civil liberties and allowing the state to stage mass arrests without charge and strip away [[Egyptian nationality law|Egyptian citizenship]] from any group it desired; these measures were mostly directed against the [[History of the Jews in Egypt|Jews of Egypt]]. As part of its new policy, 1,000 Jews were arrested and 500 Jewish businesses were seized by the government.<ref>{{Harvnb|Laskier|1995|pp=579–580}}</ref>

A statement branding the Jews as "Zionists and enemies of the state" was read out in the mosques of Cairo and Alexandria. Jewish bank accounts were confiscated and many Jews lost their jobs. Lawyers, engineers, doctors and teachers were not allowed to work in their professions. Thousands of Jews were ordered to leave the country.<ref name="Laskier 1995, p. 581">{{Harvnb|Laskier|1995|p=581}}</ref>

They were allowed to take only one suitcase and a small sum of cash, and forced to sign declarations "donating" their property to the Egyptian government. Some 25,000 Jews, almost half of the Jewish community, left Egypt, mainly for Israel, Europe, the United States and South America. By 1957, the Jewish population of Egypt had fallen to 15,000.<ref name="JVL">{{Cite web |title=Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jewish-refugees-from-arab-countries |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=Jewish Virtual Library}}</ref>

=== Britain ===
[[File:Nasser_and_Macmillan.jpg|alt=Nasser_and_Macmillan|thumb|280x280px|Nasser and [[Harold Macmillan]], 1960]]
The political and psychological impact of the crisis had a fundamental impact on [[Politics of the United Kingdom|British politics]]. [[Anthony Eden]] was accused of misleading parliament and resigned from office on 9 January 1957. Eden had been prime minister for less than two years when he resigned, and his unsuccessful handling of the Suez Crisis eclipsed the successes he had achieved in the previous 30 years as foreign secretary in three Conservative governments.<ref>[https://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/biographies/eden.html WWII Behind Closed Doors: Stalin, the Nazis and the West . Biographies . Anthony Eden] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131216000224/http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/biographies/eden.html |date=16 December 2013}}. PBS. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref>

Eden's successor, Harold Macmillan, accelerated the process of decolonisation and sought to restore Britain's special relationship with the United States.<ref>{{Citation |title=The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 4: The Twentieth Century |date=1999 |editor-first=J. M. |editor-last=Brown |editor2-first=W. R. |editor-last2=Louis}}{{pagenumber|date=May 2024}}</ref>{{page number|date=May 2024}} He enjoyed a close friendship with Eisenhower, dating from the [[North African Campaign#Operation Torch|North African campaign]] in World War II, where General Eisenhower commanded allied invasion forces and Macmillan provided political liaison with [[Winston Churchill]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Horne|2008|p=158}}</ref> Benefiting from his personal popularity and a healthy economy, Macmillan's government increased its Parliamentary majority in the [[1959 United Kingdom general election|1959 general election]].<ref name="autogenerated449"/>

The Suez crisis, though a blow to British power in the Near East, did not mark its end. Britain intervened successfully in Jordan to put down riots that threatened the rule of King Hussein in 1958 and in 1961 deployed troops to Kuwait to successfully deter an Iraqi invasion. The latter deployment had been a response to the threats of the Iraqi dictator General [[Abd al-Karim Qasim]] that he would invade and annex Kuwait. At the same time, though British influence continued in the Middle East, Suez was a blow to British prestige in the Near East from which the country never recovered.<ref name="autogenerated449">{{Harvnb|Adamthwaite|1988|p=449}}</ref> Britain evacuated all positions [[East of Suez]] by 1971, though this was due mainly to economic factors.

Increasingly, British foreign policy thinking turned away from acting as a great imperial power. During the 1960s there was much speculation that Prime Minister [[Harold Wilson]]'s continued refusals to send British troops to the [[Vietnam War]], even as a token force, despite President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]'s persistent requests, were partially due to the Americans not supporting Britain during the Suez Crisis. [[Edward Heath]] was dismayed by the U.S. opposition to Britain during the Suez Crisis; as Prime Minister in October 1973 he refused the U.S. permission to use any of the UK's air bases to resupply during the [[Yom Kippur War]],<ref>[http://spyinggame.wordpress.com/2011/07/30/us-uk-special-relationship-06 US-UK Special Relationship 06 | Intelligence Analysis and Reporting] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120413192315/http://spyinggame.wordpress.com/2011/07/30/us-uk-special-relationship-06 |date=13 April 2012}}. Spyinggame.wordpress.com (30 July 2011). Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref> or to allow the Americans to gather intelligence from [[Akrotiri and Dhekelia|British bases in Cyprus]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=2002 |title=Dangerous liaisons: post-September 11 intelligence alliances |url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_24/ai_n28939894 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111110085303/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb137/is_3_24/ai_n28939894 |archive-date=10 November 2011 |work=Harvard International Review}}</ref>

However, the British relationship with the United States did not suffer lasting consequences from the crisis. "The Anglo-American '[[Special Relationship|special relationship]]' was revitalised immediately after the Suez Crisis", writes Risse Kappen.<ref>{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=99}}</ref> The United States wanted to restore the prestige of its closest ally and thus "The two governments...engaged in almost ritualistic reassurances that their 'special relationship' would be restored quickly". One example came with Britain's first [[Thermonuclear weapon|hydrogen bomb]] test [[Operation Grapple]] which led to the [[1958 U.S.–UK Mutual Defence Agreement]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=98}}</ref> Six years after the crisis, the Americans amazed the British by selling them state-of-the-art missile technology at a moderate cost, which became the [[UK Polaris programme]].<ref name="jstor2009841">{{Cite journal |last1=Dawson |first1=R. |last2=Rosecrance |first2=R. |date=1966 |title=Theory and Reality in the Anglo-American Alliance |journal=World Politics |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=21–51 |doi=10.2307/2009841 |jstor=2009841 |s2cid=155057300}}</ref>

The war led to the eviction of [[GCHQ]] from several of its best foreign [[signals intelligence]] collection sites, including [[Far East Combined Bureau|the new Perkar, Ceylon site]], recently developed at a cost of £2 million, equivalent to £{{Inflation|UK|2|1955}}&nbsp;million in {{Inflation/year|UK}}, and [[RAF Habbaniya]], Iraq.<ref name="aldrich-2011">{{Cite book |last=Aldrich |first=Richard J. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l9i5bt1-7HYC |title=GCHQ |date=2011 |publisher=Harper Press |isbn=978-0-0073-1266-5 |location=London |pages=160–162}}</ref>

=== France ===
Risse-Kappen argued that [[France–United States relations|Franco-American ties]] never recovered from the Suez crisis. There were various reasons for this. Previously there had already been strains in the Franco-American relationship triggered by what Paris considered U.S. betrayal of the French war effort in Indochina at [[Battle of Dien Bien Phu|Dien Bien Phu]] in 1954.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=103}}</ref> According to Risse-Kappen, this incident demonstrated the weakness of the [[NATO]] alliance by not planning and co-operating beyond the European stage. Mollet believed Eden should have delayed calling the Cabinet together until 7 November, taking the whole canal in the meantime, and then veto with the French any UN resolution on sanctions.<ref name="auto">{{Harvnb|Risse-Kappen|1997|p=84}}</ref>

From the point of view of General [[Charles de Gaulle]], the Suez events demonstrated to France that it could not rely on its allies. The British had initiated a ceasefire in the midst of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had opposed Paris politically. The damage to the ties between Paris and Washington, D.C., "culminated in President de Gaulle's 1966 decision to withdraw from the military integration of NATO".<ref name="auto"/>

The Suez war had an immense impact on French domestic politics. Much of the French Army officer corps felt that they been "betrayed" by what they considered to be the spineless politicians in Paris when they were on the verge of victory just as they believed they had been "betrayed" in Vietnam in 1954, and accordingly became more determined to win the war in Algeria, even if it meant overthrowing the [[French Fourth Republic|Fourth Republic]] to do so. The Suez crisis thus helped to set the stage for the military disillusionment with the Fourth Republic, which was to lead to the [[May 1958 crisis in France|collapse of the republic]] in 1958.<ref name="Sowerwine, Charles p. 278">Sowerwine, Charles ''France Since 1870'', London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 p. 278.</ref> According to the protocol of Sèvres agreements, France secretly transmitted parts of its [[France and weapons of mass destruction|own atomic technology]] to Israel, including a detonator.<ref>''[http://www.france5.fr/programmes/articles/histoire/734-affaire-de-suez-le-pacte-secret.php Affaire de Suez, Le Pacte Secret] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120419060224/http://www.france5.fr/programmes/articles/histoire/734-affaire-de-suez-le-pacte-secret.php |date=19 April 2012}}'', Peter Hercombe et Arnaud Hamelin, France 5/Sunset Presse/Transparence, 2006</ref>

=== Israel ===
[[File:Tiran Guns IMG 0937.JPG|thumb|An Israeli soldier stands next to an Egyptian gun that had blocked the [[Tiran Straits]].]]

The Israel Defense Forces gained confidence from the campaign.{{According to whom|date=July 2016}} The war demonstrated that Israel was capable of executing large scale military manoeuvres in addition to small night-time raids and counter-insurgency operations. [[David Ben-Gurion]], reading on 16 November that 90,000 British and French troops had been involved in the Suez affair, wrote in his diary, 'If they had only appointed a commander of ours over this force, Nasser would have been destroyed in two days.'<ref name="lrb.co.uk">{{Cite book |last=Lucas |first=W. Scott |title=Divided we Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis |date=September 1991 |publisher=Hodder |isbn=978-0-3405-3666-7}}<br />Cited in {{Cite news |last=Kyle |first=Keith |date=25 February 1993 |title=Lacking in style |url=https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v15/n04/keith-kyle/lacking-in-style |access-date=2023-03-17 |work=London Review of Books |language=en |volume=15 |issue=4 |issn=0260-9592}}</ref>

The war also had tangible benefits for Israel. The [[Straits of Tiran]], closed by Egypt since 1950,<ref name="Pierre2014"/> were re-opened. Israeli shipping could henceforth move freely through the Straits of Tiran to and from Africa and Asia. The Israelis also secured the presence of UN Peacekeepers in Sinai. Operation Kadesh bought Israel an eleven-year lull on its southern border with Egypt.<ref>{{Harvnb|Herzog|1982|p=141}}</ref>

Israel escaped the political humiliation that befell Britain and France following their swift, forced withdrawal. In addition, its stubborn refusal to withdraw without guarantees, even in defiance of the United States and United Nations, ended all Western efforts, mainly American and British ones, to impose a political settlement in the Middle East without taking Israel's security needs into consideration.<ref name="Alteras"/>

In October 1965 Eisenhower told Jewish fundraiser and Republican party supporter [[Max M. Fisher]] that he greatly regretted forcing Israel to withdraw from the Sinai peninsula; Vice-President Nixon recalled that Eisenhower expressed the same view to him on several occasions.<ref name="Alteras">{{Harvnb|Alteras|1993}}</ref>

=== Canada ===
[[Lester B. Pearson]], who would later become the [[Prime Minister of Canada]], was awarded the [[Nobel Peace Prize]] in 1957 for his efforts in creating a mandate for a United Nations Peacekeeping Force, and he is considered the father of the modern concept of [[peacekeeping]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=24 November 2004 |title=The price of a Pearson |url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-price-of-a-pearson/article747254 |access-date=30 August 2018 |work=The Globe and Mail}}</ref> The Suez Crisis contributed to the adoption of a new national [[flag of Canada]] in 1965, as the Egyptian government had objected to [[Canadian peacekeeping]] troops on the grounds that their flag at that time included a [[British ensign]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Thorner |first=Thomas |url=https://archive.org/details/countrynourished00thor |title=A Country Nourished on Self-Doubt: Documents in Post-Confederation Canadian History |date=2003 |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-5511-1548-1}}{{page number|date=May 2024}}</ref>{{page number|date=May 2024}}

=== Soviet Union ===
The Soviet Union, once outside what was considered a Western sphere of influence, was now a friend of the Arabs. Shortly after it reopened, the canal was traversed by the first [[Soviet Navy]] warships since [[World War I]]. The Soviets' burgeoning influence in the Middle East, although it was not to last, included acquiring Mediterranean bases, introducing multipurpose projects, supporting the budding [[Palestinian nationalism|Palestinian liberation movement]] and penetrating the Arab countries.<ref name="militaria.forum-xl.com">[http://militaria.forum-xl.com/viewtopic.php?f=53&t=599 MILITARIA Toon onderwerp – Suez Crisis: Operation Musketeer] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120121073530/http://militaria.forum-xl.com/viewtopic.php?f=53&t=599 |date=21 January 2012}}. Militaria.forum-xl.com. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref>{{unreliablesource|date=May 2024}}