Editing European Central Bank (section)

==== Arguments in favour of independence ====
There is strong consensus among economists on the value of central bank independence from politics.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Vaitilingam|first=Romesh|date=May 13, 2019|title=Fed Appointments|url=https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/fed-appointments/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211204174401/https://www.igmchicago.org/surveys/fed-appointments/|archive-date=December 4, 2021|access-date=December 4, 2021|website=IGM Forum}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Rampell|first=Catherine|date=July 15, 2009|title=Petition for Fed Independence|url=https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/petition-for-fed-independence/|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210128110926/https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/petition-for-fed-independence/|archive-date=January 28, 2021|access-date=4 December 2021|website=NY Times}}</ref> The rationale behind are both empirical and theoretical. On the theoretical side, it's believed that time inconsistency suggests the existence of political business cycles where elected officials might take advantage of policy surprises to secure reelection. The politician up to the election will therefore be incentivized to introduce expansionary monetary policies, reducing unemployment in the short run. These effects will be most likely temporary. By contrast, in the long run, it will increase inflation, with unemployment returning to the natural rate negating the positive effect. Furthermore, the credibility of the central bank will deteriorate, making it more difficult to answer the market.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mishkin|first=Frederic|date=September 2006|title=Monetary Policy Strategy: How Did We Get Here?|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w12515.pdf|journal=|language=en|location=Cambridge, MA|pages=w12515|doi=10.3386/w12515|s2cid=154595734}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=European Central Bank.|url=https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2866/908675|title=The case for central bank independence.|date=2020|publisher=Publications Office|location=LU|doi=10.2866/908675|isbn=9789289944243}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Barro|first1=Robert|last2=Gordon|first2=David|date=February 1983|title=Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w1079.pdf|journal=|language=en|location=Cambridge, MA|pages=w1079|doi=10.3386/w1079}}</ref> Additionally, empirical work has been done that defined and measured central bank independence (CBI), looking at the relationship of CBI with inflation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Cukierman|first1=Alex|last2=Web|first2=Steven B.|last3=Neyapti|first3=Bilin|date=1992|title=Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/6.3.353|journal=The World Bank Economic Review|volume=6|issue=3|pages=353–398|doi=10.1093/wber/6.3.353|issn=0258-6770}}</ref>