Editing Free will (section)

=== Others ===

The philosopher [[Søren Kierkegaard]] claimed that divine omnipotence cannot be separated from divine goodness.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Jackson |first=Timothy P. |title=Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=1998 |location=Cambridge |chapter=Arminian edification: Kierkegaard on grace and free will}}</ref> As a truly omnipotent and good being, God could create beings with true freedom over God. Furthermore, God would voluntarily do so because "the greatest good... which can be done for a being, greater than anything else that one can do for it, is to be truly free."<ref>Kierkegaard, Søren. (1848) ''Journals and Papers'', vol. III. Reprinted in Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1967–78.</ref> [[Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense]] is a contemporary expansion of this theme, adding how God, free will, and [[problem of evil|evil]] are consistent.<ref>Mackie, J.L. (1955) "Evil and Omnipotence", ''Mind'', new series, vol. 64, pp. 200–12.</ref>

Some philosophers follow [[William of Ockham]] in holding that necessity and possibility are defined with respect to a given point in time and a given matrix of empirical circumstances, and so something that is merely possible from the perspective of one observer may be necessary from the perspective of an omniscient.<ref name="ockham">Ockham, William. Predestination, God's Knowledge, and Future Contingents, early 14th century, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and [[Norman Kretzmann]] 1982, Hackett, esp pp. 46–47</ref> Some philosophers follow [[Philo of Alexandria]], a philosopher known for his [[anthropocentrism]], in holding that free will is a feature of a human's [[Soul (spirit)|soul]], and thus that non-human [[animal]]s lack free will.<ref>[[H.A. Wolfson]], ''Philo'', 1947 Harvard University Press; Religious Philosophy, 1961 Harvard University Press; and "St. Augustine and the Pelagian Controversy" in Religious Philosophy</ref>