Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

====Model 1873 / 1884 Springfield carbine and the U.S. Army====
After exhaustive testing—including comparisons to domestic and foreign single-shot and repeating rifles—the Army Ordnance Board (whose members included officers Marcus Reno and Alfred Terry) authorized the Springfield as the official firearm for the United States Army.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "The Springfield had won out over many other American and foreign rifles, some of them repeaters, after extensive testing supervised by an army board that had included Marcus Reno and Alfred Terry."</ref><ref>Gallear, 2001: "In 1872 the Army tested a number of foreign and domestic single-shot breechloaders".</ref>

The Springfield, manufactured in a .45–70 long rifle version for the infantry and a .45–55 light carbine version for the cavalry, was judged a solid firearm that met the long-term and geostrategic requirements of the United States fighting forces.<ref>Robinson, 1995, p. xxviii: "the Model 1873 Springfield rifle, in caliber .45–70 for the infantry, and .45–55 light carbine for cavalry."</ref>
[[File:Tomahawk and sabre; or even odds.jpg|thumb|''Tomahawk and sabre; or even odds'', painting by [[Charles Schreyvogel]] (1861–1912). This kind of combat never occurred at the Battle of the Little Bighorn: none of the 7th Cavalry carried sabers on Custer's orders.]]

Historian Mark Gallear claims that U.S. government experts rejected the lever-action repeater designs, deeming them ineffective in a clash with fully equipped European armies, or in case of an outbreak of another civil conflict. Gallear's analysis dismisses the allegation that rapid depletion of ammunition in lever-action models influenced the decision in favor of the single-shot Springfield. The [[American Indian Wars|Indian Wars]] are portrayed by Gallear as a minor theatre of conflict whose contingencies were unlikely to govern the selection of standard weaponry for an emerging industrialized nation.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "The established wisdom is that the U.S. Army did not adopt lever-action multiple shot weapons during the Civil War because of the problems they would create regarding the supply of ammunition. However, I believe that by the time of the Indian Wars the Army viewed the lever-actions weapons as under-powered novelty weapons and that they were equipping their men to fight wars against European equipped enemies or to re-fight the Civil War. The Indian Wars were seen as a minor sideshow in which troops armed to fight on European battlefields would be more than a match for fighting any number of Indians."</ref>

The Springfield carbine is praised for its "superior range and stopping power" by historian James Donovan, and author Charles M. Robinson reports that the rifle could be "loaded and fired much more rapidly than its muzzle-loading predecessors, and had twice the range of repeating rifles such as the Winchester, Henry and Spencer."<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "a solid weapon with superior range and stopping power".</ref><ref>Robinson, 1995, p. xxviii</ref><ref>Gallear, 2001: "The Army saw breech-loading rifles and carbines as the way forward. They could fire a much more powerful round at longer ranges than lever-actions."</ref>

Gallear points out that lever-action rifles, after a burst of rapid discharge, still required a reloading interlude that lowered their overall rate of fire; Springfield breechloaders "in the long run, had a higher rate of fire, which was sustainable throughout a battle."<ref>Gallear, 2001</ref>

The breechloader design patent for the Springfield's Erskine S. Allin [[Single-shot#Trapdoor actions|trapdoor system]] was owned by the US government and the firearm could be easily adapted for production with existing machinery at the [[Springfield Armory]] in Massachusetts.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "The Allin System had been developed at the Government Armories to reduce the cost, but the U.S. Treasury had already been forced to pay $124,000 to inventors whose patents it infringed. The adoption of the Allin breech gave the advantages of being already familiar throughout the Army, involved no more royalties, and existing machinery at the Springfield Armory could easily be adapted to its manufacture.</ref> At time when funding for the post-war Army had been slashed, the prospect for economical production influenced the Ordnance Board member selection of the Springfield option.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "Army appropriations were at an all-time low, and a key factor in the Springfield's favor was its low production cost."</ref>