Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

===Lever-action repeaters vs. single-shot breechloaders===
Two hundred or more Lakota and Cheyenne combatants are known to have been armed with Henry, Winchester, or similar lever-action repeating rifles at the battle.<ref name="Hatch 1997, p. 184" /><ref>Gallear, 2001: "the .44 rim-fire round fired from the Henry rifle is the most numerous Indian gun fired with almost as many individual guns identified as the Cavalry Springfield Model 1873 carbine."</ref> Virtually every trooper in the 7th Cavalry fought with the single-shot, breech-loading Springfield carbine and the Colt revolver.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "by the time of the Little Bighorn the U.S. Army was standardizing on the Springfield rifle and carbine [and] saw breech-loading rifles and carbines as the way forward."</ref>

Historians have asked whether the repeating rifles conferred a distinct advantage on Sitting Bull's villagers that contributed to their victory over Custer's carbine-armed soldiers.<ref>Lawson, 2008, p. 93: "The rapid fire power of the Henry repeaters was intimidating, especially to inexperienced soldiers. Their use was probably a significant cause of the confusion and panic among the soldiers so widely reported by Native American eyewitnesses."</ref>

Historian Michael L. Lawson offers a scenario based on archaeological collections at the "Henryville" site, which yielded plentiful Henry rifle cartridge casings from approximately 20 individual guns. Lawson speculates that though less powerful than the Springfield carbines, the Henry repeaters provided a barrage of fire at a critical point, driving Lieutenant James Calhoun's L Company from Calhoun Hill and Finley Ridge, forcing it to flee in disarray back to Captain Myles Keogh's I Company and leading to the disintegration of that wing of Custer's Battalion.<ref>Lawson, 2007, pp. 91–93: "[Henryville] was named in the mid-1980s by archaeologists after they discovered a large artifact collection there, which included numerous .44-caliber Henry cartridges. The number of cartridges indicated that about 20 warriors at this position were using Henry repeating rifles. These weapons were less powerful than the cavalry's Springfield rifles, especially at long range; however, they had the advantage of providing rapid fire ... The rapid fire power ... was intimidating, especially to inexperienced soldiers. Their use was probably a significant a confusion and panic among the soldiers so widely reported by Native American eyewitnesses ... Survivors of the assaults ... fled north to seek safety with Keogh's Company I ... they could react quickly enough to prevent the disintegration of their own unit."</ref>

====Model 1873 / 1884 Springfield carbine and the U.S. Army====
After exhaustive testing—including comparisons to domestic and foreign single-shot and repeating rifles—the Army Ordnance Board (whose members included officers Marcus Reno and Alfred Terry) authorized the Springfield as the official firearm for the United States Army.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "The Springfield had won out over many other American and foreign rifles, some of them repeaters, after extensive testing supervised by an army board that had included Marcus Reno and Alfred Terry."</ref><ref>Gallear, 2001: "In 1872 the Army tested a number of foreign and domestic single-shot breechloaders".</ref>

The Springfield, manufactured in a .45–70 long rifle version for the infantry and a .45–55 light carbine version for the cavalry, was judged a solid firearm that met the long-term and geostrategic requirements of the United States fighting forces.<ref>Robinson, 1995, p. xxviii: "the Model 1873 Springfield rifle, in caliber .45–70 for the infantry, and .45–55 light carbine for cavalry."</ref>
[[File:Tomahawk and sabre; or even odds.jpg|thumb|''Tomahawk and sabre; or even odds'', painting by [[Charles Schreyvogel]] (1861–1912). This kind of combat never occurred at the Battle of the Little Bighorn: none of the 7th Cavalry carried sabers on Custer's orders.]]

Historian Mark Gallear claims that U.S. government experts rejected the lever-action repeater designs, deeming them ineffective in a clash with fully equipped European armies, or in case of an outbreak of another civil conflict. Gallear's analysis dismisses the allegation that rapid depletion of ammunition in lever-action models influenced the decision in favor of the single-shot Springfield. The [[American Indian Wars|Indian Wars]] are portrayed by Gallear as a minor theatre of conflict whose contingencies were unlikely to govern the selection of standard weaponry for an emerging industrialized nation.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "The established wisdom is that the U.S. Army did not adopt lever-action multiple shot weapons during the Civil War because of the problems they would create regarding the supply of ammunition. However, I believe that by the time of the Indian Wars the Army viewed the lever-actions weapons as under-powered novelty weapons and that they were equipping their men to fight wars against European equipped enemies or to re-fight the Civil War. The Indian Wars were seen as a minor sideshow in which troops armed to fight on European battlefields would be more than a match for fighting any number of Indians."</ref>

The Springfield carbine is praised for its "superior range and stopping power" by historian James Donovan, and author Charles M. Robinson reports that the rifle could be "loaded and fired much more rapidly than its muzzle-loading predecessors, and had twice the range of repeating rifles such as the Winchester, Henry and Spencer."<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "a solid weapon with superior range and stopping power".</ref><ref>Robinson, 1995, p. xxviii</ref><ref>Gallear, 2001: "The Army saw breech-loading rifles and carbines as the way forward. They could fire a much more powerful round at longer ranges than lever-actions."</ref>

Gallear points out that lever-action rifles, after a burst of rapid discharge, still required a reloading interlude that lowered their overall rate of fire; Springfield breechloaders "in the long run, had a higher rate of fire, which was sustainable throughout a battle."<ref>Gallear, 2001</ref>

The breechloader design patent for the Springfield's Erskine S. Allin [[Single-shot#Trapdoor actions|trapdoor system]] was owned by the US government and the firearm could be easily adapted for production with existing machinery at the [[Springfield Armory]] in Massachusetts.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "The Allin System had been developed at the Government Armories to reduce the cost, but the U.S. Treasury had already been forced to pay $124,000 to inventors whose patents it infringed. The adoption of the Allin breech gave the advantages of being already familiar throughout the Army, involved no more royalties, and existing machinery at the Springfield Armory could easily be adapted to its manufacture.</ref> At time when funding for the post-war Army had been slashed, the prospect for economical production influenced the Ordnance Board member selection of the Springfield option.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 191: "Army appropriations were at an all-time low, and a key factor in the Springfield's favor was its low production cost."</ref>

====Malfunction of the Springfield carbine extractor mechanism====
Whether the reported malfunction of the Model 1873 Springfield carbine issued to the 7th Cavalry contributed to their defeat has been debated for years.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "some authorities have blamed the gun's reliability and tendency for rounds to jam in the breech for the defeat at the Little Bighorn".</ref>

That the weapon experienced jamming of the extractor is not contested, but its contribution to Custer's defeat is considered negligible. This conclusion is supported by evidence from archaeological studies performed at the battlefield, where the recovery of Springfield cartridge casing, bearing tell-tale scratch marks indicating manual extraction, were rare. The flaw in the ejector mechanism was known to the Army Ordnance Board at the time of the selection of the Model 1873 rifle and carbine, and was not considered a significant shortcoming in the overall worthiness of the shoulder arm.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "This defect was noted by the board of officers (which included Major Reno) that selected the weapon in 1872, but was not considered particularly serious at the time."</ref> With the ejector failure in US Army tests as low as 1:300, the Springfield carbine was vastly more reliable than the muzzle-loading Springfields used in the Civil War.<ref>Gallear, 2001: "A study of .45–55 cases found at the battle concludes that extractor failure amounted to less than 0.35% of some 1,751 cases tested ... the carbine was in fact more reliable than anything that had preceded it in U.S. Army service. These weapons were vastly more reliable than the muzzle-loading weapons of the Civil War, which would frequently misfire and cause the soldier to uselessly load multiple rounds on top of each other in the heat of battle."</ref><ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "Scholars have for years debated the issue of whether or not the Model 1873 Springfield carbine carried by cavalrymen, malfunctioned during the battle and [whether this] was one reason for the defeat" and "No definitive conclusion can be drawn [as to] the possible malfunction ... as being a significant cause of Custer's defeat. Writers of both pro- and anti-Custer material over the years ... have incorporated the theory into their works".</ref>

Gallear addresses the post-battle testimony concerning the copper .45–55 cartridges supplied to the troops in which an officer is said to have cleared the chambers of spent cartridges for a number of Springfield carbines.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 440: footnote, "the carbine extractor problem did exist, though it probably had little impact on the outcome of the battle. DeRudio testified that 'the men had to take their knives to extract cartridges after firing 6 to 10 rounds.' ... but 'the men' seems to have been an exaggeration. Private Daniel Newall mentioned the problem".</ref> This testimony of widespread fusing of the casings offered to the Chief of Ordnance at the Reno Court of Inquiry in 1879 conflicts with the archaeological evidence collected at the battlefield. Field data showed that possible extractor failures occurred at a rate of approximately 1:30 firings at the Custer Battlefield and at a rate of 1:37 at the Reno-Benteen Battlefield.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "The controversy results from the known failure of the carbine to [eject] the spent .45–55 caliber cartridge [casings]. The cartridge cases were made of copper, which expands when hot. That—coupled with a faulty extractor mechanism and dirt—could cause the head of the cartridge to be torn away when the block was opened, and the cartridge cylinder would then be left inside the chamber ... The casings would have to be removed manually with a pocketknife before [reloading and] firing again. This defect was noted by the board of officers (which included Major Reno) that selected the weapon in 1872, but was not considered particularly serious at the time."</ref><ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "How often did this defect [ejector failure] occur and cause the [Springfield carbines] to malfunction on June 25, 1876? According to Dr. Richard Fox in ''Archeology, History and Custer's Last Battle'' (1993), there were very few .45–55 caliber cartridge casings found during the digs on the battlefield that showed any evidence to pry or scratch marks [indicating manual extraction]. Only 3 of 88 [3.4%] found on the Custer [battalion] portion of the battlefield could possibly have been removed in an extraction jam. On the Reno-Benteen defense site [Reno Hill], 7 of 257 fit this category [2.7%]. If this was a representative number it would appear that malfunction from that source was minimal."</ref><ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "Both sides [troopers and Indians] apparently believed that some weapons malfunctioned. Indian testimony ... reported that some soldiers threw down their long guns and fought with their short guns. Could this indicate a malfunctioning [carbine] that was discarded and therefore could not have left its marked [pry scratched] casings on the field? ... No definitive conclusion can be drawn about the possible malfunction ... as being a significant cause of Custer's defeat. Writers of both pro- and anti-Custer material over the years ... have incorporated the theory into their works".</ref>

Historian Thom Hatch observes that the Model 1873 Springfield, despite the known ejector flaw, remained the standard issue shoulder arm for US troops until the early 1890s.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 124: "On a final note: the Springfield carbine remained the official cavalry firearm until the early 1890s"</ref>