Editing Fusion power (section)

== Potential military usage ==
{{Main|Nuclear proliferation}}

In some scenarios, fusion power technology could be adapted to produce materials for military purposes. A huge amount of [[tritium]] could be produced by a fusion power station; tritium is used in the trigger of hydrogen bombs and in modern [[boosted fission weapon]]s, but it can be produced in other ways. The energetic neutrons from a fusion reactor could be used to breed weapons-grade [[plutonium]] or [[uranium]] for an atomic bomb (for example by transmutation of {{chem|238|U}} to {{chem|239|Pu}}, or {{chem|232|Th}} to {{chem|233|U}}).

A study conducted in 2011 assessed three scenarios:<ref name="ProliferationRisk_Goldston" />
* Small-scale fusion station: As a result of much higher power consumption, heat dissipation and a more recognizable design compared to enrichment [[gas centrifuge]]s, this choice would be much easier to detect and therefore implausible.<ref name="ProliferationRisk_Goldston" />
* Commercial facility: The production potential is significant. But no fertile or fissile substances necessary for the production of weapon-usable materials needs to be present at a civil fusion system at all. If not shielded, detection of these materials can be done by their characteristic [[Gamma Radiation|gamma radiation]]. The underlying redesign could be detected by regular design information verification. In the (technically more feasible) case of solid breeder blanket modules, it would be necessary for incoming components to be inspected for the presence of fertile material,<ref name="ProliferationRisk_Goldston" /> otherwise plutonium for several weapons could be produced each year.<ref name="StrongNeutronSources" />
* Prioritizing weapon-grade material regardless of secrecy: The fastest way to produce weapon-usable material was seen in modifying a civil fusion power station. No weapons-compatible material is required during civil use. Even without the need for covert action, such a modification would take about two months to start production and at least an additional week to generate a significant amount. This was considered to be enough time to detect a military use and to react with diplomatic or military means. To stop the production, a military destruction of parts of the facility while leaving out the reactor would be sufficient.<ref name="ProliferationRisk_Goldston" />

Another study concluded "...large fusion reactors—even if not designed for fissile material breeding—could easily produce several hundred kg Pu per year with high weapon quality and very low source material requirements." It was emphasized that the implementation of features for intrinsic proliferation resistance might only be possible at an early phase of research and development.<ref name="StrongNeutronSources" /> The theoretical and computational tools needed for hydrogen bomb design are closely related to those needed for [[inertial confinement fusion]], but have very little in common with magnetic confinement fusion.
{| class="wikitable"
|+Neutron irradiation processes producing nuclear weapons material<ref name="s182">{{cite journal |last1=Kooyman |first1=Timothée |last2=Buiron |first2=Laurent |last3=Rimpault |first3=Gérald |year=2018 |title=A comparison of curium, neptunium and americium transmutation feasibility |url=https://cea.hal.science/cea-02421722/document |journal=Annals of Nuclear Energy |publisher=Elsevier BV |volume=112 |pages=748–758 |doi=10.1016/j.anucene.2017.09.041 |issn=0306-4549 |access-date=April 3, 2025 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2018AnNuE.112..748K }}</ref>
!Feedstock
!Product
!Usage
|-
|[[Lithium-6]]
|[[Tritium]]
|[[Boosted fission weapon|Boosted fission weapons]], [[Fusion weapon|fusion weapons]]
|-
| rowspan="2" |[[Thorium-232]]
|[[Uranium-233]]
| rowspan="3" |[[Fission weapon|Fission weapons]]
|-
|[[Uranium-235]]
|-
| rowspan="2" |[[Uranium-238]]
|[[Plutonium-239]]
|-
|[[Neptunium-237]]
| rowspan="3" |Hypothetical fission weapons
|-
|[[Americium-241]]
|[[Americium-242m]]
|-
|[[Curium-244]]
|[[Curium-245]]
|}