Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

==== Meta-ethics ====
As well as Hume's famous [[Is–ought problem|is/ought distinction]], twentieth-century meta-ethics has two original strains.

===== ''Principia Ethica'' =====
[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|160px|G. E. Moore was an ethical non-naturalist.]]

The first is [[G. E. Moore]]'s investigation into the nature of ethical terms (e.g., good) in his ''Principia Ethica'' (1903), which  advances a kind of [[moral realism]] called [[ethical non-naturalism]] and is known for the [[Open-question argument|open question argument]] and identifying the [[naturalistic fallacy]], a major topic of investigation for analytical philosophers. According to Moore, "[[Goodness and value theory|Goodness]] is a simple, undefinable, non-natural [[Property (philosophy)|property]]."

Contemporary philosophers, such as [[Russ Shafer-Landau]] in ''[[Moral Realism: A Defence]]'', defend ethical non-naturalism.

===== Emotivism =====
The second is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead began [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] investigations into the nature of moral terms, statements, and judgments.

The logical positivists opined that statements about [[Value (ethics)|value]]—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are [[non-cognitivism|non-cognitive]]; that is, they cannot be objectively verified or falsified. Instead, the logical positivists adopted an [[emotivism|emotivist]] theory, which was that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. It is also known as the boo/hurrah theory. For example, in this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.

While analytic philosophers generally accepted non-cognitivism, emotivism had many deficiencies. It evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories, such as the [[expressivism]] of [[Charles Stevenson (philosopher)|Charles Stevenson]], and the [[universal prescriptivism]] of [[R. M. Hare]], which was based on J. L. Austin's philosophy of [[speech acts]].

===== Critics =====
As non-cognitivism, the is/ought distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy were questioned, analytic philosophers showed a renewed interest in the traditional questions of moral philosophy.

[[Philippa Foot]] defended [[Ethical naturalism|naturalist]] moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories.{{efn|Foot was the granddaughter of former US President [[Grover Cleveland]].}} Foot introduced the famous "[[trolley problem]]" into the ethical discourse.<ref name="Philippa Foot 1978">Philippa Foot, "[https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect]" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190824083120/http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf|date=24 August 2019}} in ''Virtues and Vices'' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) (originally in the ''Oxford Review'', No. 5, 1967).</ref>

Perhaps the most influential critic was [[Elizabeth Anscombe]], whose monograph ''Intention'' was called by [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] "the most important treatment of [[Action theory (philosophy)|action]] since Aristotle".<ref>From the cover of the 2000 Harvard University Press edition of ''Intention''.</ref> A favorite student and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, her 1958 article "[[Modern Moral Philosophy]]" declared the "is-ought" impasse to be unproductive. [[J.O. Urmson]]'s article "On Grading" also called the is/ought distinction into question.

Australian [[J. L. Mackie]], in ''Ethics: Inventing Right And Wrong'', defended anti-realist [[error theory]]. [[Bernard Williams]] also influenced ethics by advocating a kind of [[moral relativism]] and rejecting all other theories.<ref>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</ref>