Editing Afterlife (section)

==Philosophy==
===Modern philosophy===
There is a view based on the philosophical question of [[personal identity]], termed [[open individualism]] by [[Daniel Kolak]], that concludes that individual conscious experience is illusory, and because consciousness continues after death in all conscious beings, ''you'' do not die. This position has allegedly been supported by physicists such as [[Erwin Schrödinger]] and [[Freeman Dyson]].<ref>{{cite book | last = Kolak | first = Daniel | title = I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundations for Global Ethics | url = https://archive.org/details/springer_10.1007-978-1-4020-3014-7 | publisher = Springer | year = 2005 | isbn = 978-1-4020-2999-8}}</ref>

Certain problems arise with the idea of a particular person continuing after death. [[Peter van Inwagen]], in his argument regarding resurrection, notes that the materialist must have some sort of physical continuity.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/Resurrection.doc|title=I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World to Come |author=Peter van Inwagen |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070610012631/http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-inwagen-peter/documents/Resurrection.doc |archive-date=10 June 2007}}</ref> [[John Hick]] also raises questions regarding personal identity in his book, ''Death and Eternal Life'', using an example of a person ceasing to exist in one place while an exact replica appears in another. If the replica had all the same experiences, traits, and physical appearances of the first person, we would all attribute the same identity to the second, according to Hick.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Hick|first=John|title=Death and eternal life|year=1994|publisher=Westminster/J. Knox Press|isbn=978-0-664-25509-1|pages=279–294|oclc=878755693}}</ref>

===Process philosophy===
In the [[panentheistic]] model of [[process philosophy]] and theology the writers [[Alfred North Whitehead]] and [[Charles Hartshorne]] rejected the idea that the universe was made of [[Matter|substance]], instead saying reality is composed of living experiences (occasions of experience). According to Hartshorne people do not experience subjective (or personal) immortality in the afterlife, but they do have objective immortality because their experiences live on forever in God, who contains all that was. However other process philosophers such as [[David Ray Griffin]] have written that people may have subjective experience after death.<ref>Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (Albany: State University of New York, 1984) p.&nbsp;32–36</ref><ref>David Griffin, "The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead's Philosophy," in The Modern Schoolman, LIII, November. 1975, pp.&nbsp;39–51.</ref><ref>[http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=3040&C=2598 What Is Process Theology? by Robert B. Mellert] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130109062948/http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=3040&C=2598 |date=9 January 2013 }}</ref><ref>[http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2736&C=2480 A Whiteheadian Conception of Immortality by Forrest Wood, Jr.] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111205005800/http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2736&C=2480 |date=5 December 2011 }}</ref>