Editing Suez Crisis (section)

===== Condemnation of the U.N. in West Germany =====
A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from [[West Germany]]. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] was furious with the United States for its "chumminess with the Russians" as Adenauer called the U.S. refusal to intervene in Hungary and voting with the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council. Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pp. 241–242.</ref>

What appalled Adenauer about the crisis was that the United States had come out against the attack on Egypt and voted with the Soviet Union at Security Council against Britain and France, which led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for the interests of European states.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242"/> Adenauer was especially worried by the fact that the American embassy in [[Bonn]] would not provide a clear answer as to what was the American policy in response to the Bulganin letters.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 244.</ref> Adenauer maintained to his Cabinet that the French had every right to invade Egypt because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 242.</ref>

Subsequently, the traditionally [[Francophile]] Adenauer drew closer to Paris.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273">{{Harvnb|Dietl|2008|p=273}}</ref> On 5–6 November 1956, he refused to cancel a planned visit to Paris, and his summit with Mollet was clearly meant to be seen as a gesture of moral support.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273"/> One of Adenauer's aides, Fritz von Eckardt, commented regarding the opening ceremony in Paris where Mollet and Adenauer stood side by side that the national anthems were played "[i]n the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war[;] the two governments were standing shoulder by shoulder".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/> During the summit in Paris, Mollet commented to Adenauer that a Soviet nuclear strike could destroy Paris at any moment, which added considerably to the tension and helped to draw the French and Germans closer.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/>