Editing History of Australia (section)

===Defence policy in the 1930s===
[[File:Menzies Churchill WW21941.jpg|thumb|left|Prime Minister [[Robert Menzies]] and British Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] in 1941]]

Until the late 1930s, defence was not a significant issue for Australians. At the [[1937 Australian federal election|1937 elections]], both political parties advocated increased defence spending, in the context of increased Japanese aggression in China and Germany's aggression in Europe; however, there was a difference in opinion about how the defence spending should be allocated. The [[United Australia Party]] government emphasised co-operation with Britain in "a policy of imperial defence". The lynchpin of this was the British naval base at [[Singapore Naval Base|Singapore]] and the [[Royal Navy]] battle fleet "which, it was hoped, would use it in time of need".<ref>John Robertson (1984) ''Australia goes to War, 1939–1945''. p. 12. Doubleday, Sydney. {{ISBN|0-86824-155-5}}</ref> Defence spending in the inter-war years reflected this priority. In the period 1921–1936 totalled £40&nbsp;million on the [[Royal Australian Navy]], £20&nbsp;million on the [[Australian Army]] and £6&nbsp;million on the [[Royal Australian Air Force]] (established in 1921, the "youngest" of the three services). In 1939, the Navy, which included two heavy cruisers and four light cruisers, was the service best equipped for war.<ref>Department of Defence (Navy) (1976) ''An Outline of Australian Naval History''. p. 33 Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. {{ISBN|0-642-02255-0}}</ref>

[[File:HMAS Sydney (AWM 301473).jpg|thumb|The light cruiser {{HMAS|Sydney|1934|6}}, lost in a [[Sinking of HMAS Sydney|battle]] in the Indian Ocean, November 1941]]

Fearing Japanese intentions in the Pacific, Menzies established independent embassies in Tokyo and Washington to receive independent advice about developments.<ref name="primeministers.naa.gov.au">{{cite web|url=http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx#section1|title=Primeministers.naa.gov.au|publisher=Primeministers.naa.gov.au|access-date=14 July 2011|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131113103332/http://primeministers.naa.gov.au/primeministers/menzies/in-office.aspx|archive-date=13 November 2013}}</ref> [[Gavin Long]] argues that the [[Australian Labor Party|Labor]] opposition urged greater national self-reliance through a buildup of manufacturing and more emphasis on the Army and [[Royal Australian Air Force|RAAF]], as Chief of the General Staff, [[John Lavarack]] also advocated.<ref>Gavin Long (1952) ''To Benghazi. Australia in the War of 1939–1945''. Vol. 1. Series One; Army. pp. 22–23. Australian War Memorial, Canberra.</ref> In November 1936, Labor leader [[John Curtin]] said "The dependence of Australia upon the competence, let alone the readiness, of British statesmen to send forces to our aid is too dangerous a hazard upon which to found Australia's defence policy."<ref>John Robertson (1984) p. 12</ref> According to John Robertson, "some British leaders had also realised that their country could not fight Japan and Germany at the same time." But "this was never discussed candidly at...meeting(s) of Australian and British defence planners", such as the [[1937 Imperial Conference]].<ref>John Robertson "The Distant War: Australia and Imperial defence 1919–1914." In M. McKernan and M. Browne (1988) p. 225</ref>

By September 1939 the Australian Army numbered 3,000 regulars.<ref>John Robertson (1984) p. 17</ref> A recruiting campaign in late 1938, led by Major-General [[Thomas Blamey]] increased the reserve militia to almost 80,000.<ref>Gavin Long (1952) p. 26</ref> The first division raised for war was designated the 6th Division, of the 2nd AIF, there being 5 Militia Divisions on paper and a 1st AIF in the First World War.<ref>John Robertson (1984) p. 20. Thus Australian battalions of World War II carried the prefix 2/ to distinguish them from battalions of World War I</ref>