Editing German Empire (section)

==Legacy==
The defeat and [[aftermath of the First World War]] and the penalties imposed by the [[Treaty of Versailles]] shaped the positive memory of the Empire, especially among Germans who distrusted and despised the Weimar Republic. Conservatives, liberals, socialists, nationalists, Catholics and Protestants all had their own interpretations, which led to a fractious political and social climate in Germany in the aftermath of the empire's collapse.

[[File:War Ensign of Germany 1903-1918.svg|thumb|[[Reichskriegsflagge|War flag]] of the German Empire used since 1903. In 1956, the [[Iron Cross]] was re-introduced as the symbol of the ''{{Lang|de|[[Bundeswehr]]}}'', the modern German armed forces.]]
Under Bismarck, a united German state had finally been achieved, but it remained a Prussian-dominated state and did not include German Austria as [[Pan-German]] nationalists had desired. The influence of Prussian [[militarism]], the Empire's colonial efforts and its vigorous, competitive industrial prowess all gained it the dislike and envy of other nations. The German Empire enacted a number of progressive reforms, such as Europe's first social welfare system and freedom of press. There was also a modern system for electing the federal parliament, the Reichstag, in which every adult man had one vote. This enabled the [[Social Democratic Party of Germany|Social Democrats]] and the Catholic [[Centre Party (Germany)|Centre Party]] to play considerable roles in the empire's political life despite the continued hostility of Prussian aristocrats.

The era of the German Empire is well remembered in Germany as one of great cultural and intellectual vigour. [[Thomas Mann]] published his novel ''[[Buddenbrooks]]'' in 1901. [[Theodor Mommsen]] received the [[Nobel prize for literature]] a year later for his Roman history. Painters like the groups [[Der Blaue Reiter]] and [[Die Brücke]] made a significant contribution to modern art. The [[AEG turbine factory]] in Berlin by [[Peter Behrens]] from 1909 was a milestone in classic modern architecture and an outstanding example of emerging functionalism. The social, economic, and scientific successes of this {{Lang|de|[[Gründerzeit]]}}, or founding epoch, have sometimes led the Wilhelmine era to be regarded as a [[golden age]].

In the field of economics, the "''Kaiserzeit''" laid the foundation of Germany's status as one of the world's leading economic powers. The iron and coal industries of the [[Ruhr]], the [[Saarland|Saar]] and [[Upper Silesia]] especially contributed to that process. The first motorcar was built by [[Karl Benz]] in 1886. The enormous growth of industrial production and industrial potential also led to a rapid urbanisation of Germany, which turned the Germans into a nation of city dwellers. More than 5&nbsp;million people left Germany for the [[German American|United States]] during the 19th century.<ref>"[https://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/german4.html A New Surge of Growth] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180206045546/http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/immigration/german4.html |date=6 February 2018}}". [[Library of Congress]].</ref>

===Sonderweg===
{{Main|Sonderweg}}

Many historians have emphasized the central importance of a German {{Lang|de|[[Sonderweg]]}} or "special path" (or "exceptionalism") as the root of Nazism and the German catastrophe in the 20th century. According to the 1988 historiography by [[Jürgen Kocka]], the process of nation-building from above had very grievous long-term implications. In terms of parliamentary democracy, Parliament was kept weak, the parties were fragmented, and there was a high level of mutual distrust. The Nazis built on the illiberal, anti-pluralist elements of Weimar's political culture. The Junker elites (the large landowners in the east) and senior civil servants used their great power and influence well into the twentieth century to frustrate any movement toward democracy. They played an especially negative role in the crisis of 1930–1933. Bismarck's emphasis on military force amplified the voice of the officer corps, which combined advanced modernisation of military technology with reactionary politics. The rising upper-middle-class elites, in the business, financial and professional worlds, tended to accept the values of the old traditional elites. The German Empire was for [[Hans-Ulrich Wehler]] a strange mixture of highly successful capitalist industrialisation and socio-economic modernisation on the one hand, and of surviving pre-industrial institutions, power relations and traditional cultures on the other. Wehler argues that it produced a high degree of internal tension, which led on the one hand to the suppression of socialists, Catholics and reformers, and on the other hand to a highly aggressive foreign policy. For these reasons [[Fritz Fischer (historian)|Fritz Fischer]] and his students emphasised Germany's primary guilt for causing the First World War.{{Sfnp|Kocka|1988|pp=3–16}}

Wehler, a leader of the [[Bielefeld School]] of social history, places the origins of Germany's path to disaster in the 1860s–1870s, when economic modernisation took place, but political modernisation did not happen and the old Prussian rural elite remained in firm control of the army, diplomacy and the civil service. Traditional, aristocratic, premodern society battled an emerging capitalist, bourgeois, modernising society. Recognising the importance of modernising forces in industry and the economy and in the cultural realm, Wehler argues that reactionary traditionalism dominated the political hierarchy of power in Germany, as well as social mentalities and in class relations ({{Lang|de|Klassenhabitus}}). The catastrophic German politics between 1914 and 1945 are interpreted in terms of a delayed modernisation of its political structures. At the core of Wehler's interpretation is his treatment of "the middle class" and "revolution", each of which was instrumental in shaping the 20th century. Wehler's examination of Nazi rule is shaped by his concept of "charismatic domination", which focuses heavily on Hitler.<ref>{{Harvp|Wehler|2003}}.{{Page needed|date=May 2025}} None of the series has yet been translated into English, but a partial summary appears in {{Harvp|Wehler|1985}}.{{page needed|date=May 2025}}</ref>

The historiographical concept of a German {{Lang|de|Sonderweg}} has had a turbulent history. 19th-century scholars who emphasised a separate German path to modernity saw it as a positive factor that differentiated Germany from the "western path" typified by Great Britain. They stressed the strong bureaucratic state, reforms initiated by Bismarck and other strong leaders, the Prussian service ethos, the high culture of philosophy and music, and Germany's pioneering of a social welfare state. In the 1950s, historians in [[West Germany]] argued that the {{Lang|de|Sonderweg}} led Germany to the disaster of 1933–1945. The special circumstances of German historical structures and experiences, were interpreted as preconditions that, while not directly causing National Socialism, did hamper the development of a liberal democracy and facilitate the rise of fascism. The {{Lang|de|Sonderweg}} paradigm has provided the impetus for at least three strands of research in German historiography: the "[[long 19th century]]", the history of the bourgeoisie, and comparisons with the West. After 1990, increased attention to cultural dimensions and to comparative and relational history moved German historiography to different topics, with much less attention paid to the {{Lang|de|Sonderweg}}. While some historians have abandoned the {{Lang|de|Sonderweg}} thesis, they have not provided a generally accepted alternative interpretation.{{Sfnp|Smith|2008|pp=225–240}}