Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

=== Ethics ===
Due to the commitments to [[empiricism]] and [[Mathematical logic|symbolic logic]] in the early analytic period, early analytic philosophers often thought that inquiry in the ethical domain could not be made rigorous enough to merit any attention.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5lK6DTadnaQC&q=%22analytic+philosophy%22+ethics&pg=PT213|title=A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls|last=Schwartz|first=Stephen P.|year=2012|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-1-118-27172-8|language=en}}</ref> It was only with the emergence of ordinary-language philosophers that ethics started to become an acceptable area of inquiry for analytic philosophers.<ref name=":0" /> Philosophers working within the analytic tradition have gradually come to distinguish three major types of moral philosophy.

* [[Meta-ethics]], which investigates moral terms and concepts;<ref>{{Cite book|title=Key Terms in Ethics|last=Kuusela|first=Oskari|publisher=Continuum International Publishing Group|year=2011|isbn=978-1-4411-6610-4|location=London|page=61}}</ref>
* [[Normative ethics]], which examines and produces normative ethical judgments;
* [[Applied ethics]], which investigates how existing normative principles should be applied to difficult or borderline cases, often cases created by new technology or new scientific knowledge.

==== Meta-ethics ====
As well as Hume's famous [[Is–ought problem|is/ought distinction]], twentieth-century meta-ethics has two original strains.

===== ''Principia Ethica'' =====
[[File:1914 George Edward Moore (cropped).jpg|thumb|160px|G. E. Moore was an ethical non-naturalist.]]

The first is [[G. E. Moore]]'s investigation into the nature of ethical terms (e.g., good) in his ''Principia Ethica'' (1903), which  advances a kind of [[moral realism]] called [[ethical non-naturalism]] and is known for the [[Open-question argument|open question argument]] and identifying the [[naturalistic fallacy]], a major topic of investigation for analytical philosophers. According to Moore, "[[Goodness and value theory|Goodness]] is a simple, undefinable, non-natural [[Property (philosophy)|property]]."

Contemporary philosophers, such as [[Russ Shafer-Landau]] in ''[[Moral Realism: A Defence]]'', defend ethical non-naturalism.

===== Emotivism =====
The second is founded on logical positivism and its attitude that unverifiable statements are meaningless. As a result, they avoided normative ethics and instead began [[meta-ethics|meta-ethical]] investigations into the nature of moral terms, statements, and judgments.

The logical positivists opined that statements about [[Value (ethics)|value]]—including all ethical and aesthetic judgments—are [[non-cognitivism|non-cognitive]]; that is, they cannot be objectively verified or falsified. Instead, the logical positivists adopted an [[emotivism|emotivist]] theory, which was that value judgments expressed the attitude of the speaker. It is also known as the boo/hurrah theory. For example, in this view, saying, "Murder is wrong", is equivalent to saying, "Boo to murder", or saying the word "murder" with a particular tone of disapproval.

While analytic philosophers generally accepted non-cognitivism, emotivism had many deficiencies. It evolved into more sophisticated non-cognitivist theories, such as the [[expressivism]] of [[Charles Stevenson (philosopher)|Charles Stevenson]], and the [[universal prescriptivism]] of [[R. M. Hare]], which was based on J. L. Austin's philosophy of [[speech acts]].

===== Critics =====
As non-cognitivism, the is/ought distinction, and the naturalistic fallacy were questioned, analytic philosophers showed a renewed interest in the traditional questions of moral philosophy.

[[Philippa Foot]] defended [[Ethical naturalism|naturalist]] moral realism and contributed several essays attacking other theories.{{efn|Foot was the granddaughter of former US President [[Grover Cleveland]].}} Foot introduced the famous "[[trolley problem]]" into the ethical discourse.<ref name="Philippa Foot 1978">Philippa Foot, "[https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect]" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190824083120/http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ362/hallam/Readings/FootDoubleEffect.pdf|date=24 August 2019}} in ''Virtues and Vices'' (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978) (originally in the ''Oxford Review'', No. 5, 1967).</ref>

Perhaps the most influential critic was [[Elizabeth Anscombe]], whose monograph ''Intention'' was called by [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]] "the most important treatment of [[Action theory (philosophy)|action]] since Aristotle".<ref>From the cover of the 2000 Harvard University Press edition of ''Intention''.</ref> A favorite student and friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, her 1958 article "[[Modern Moral Philosophy]]" declared the "is-ought" impasse to be unproductive. [[J.O. Urmson]]'s article "On Grading" also called the is/ought distinction into question.

Australian [[J. L. Mackie]], in ''Ethics: Inventing Right And Wrong'', defended anti-realist [[error theory]]. [[Bernard Williams]] also influenced ethics by advocating a kind of [[moral relativism]] and rejecting all other theories.<ref>Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy</ref>

==== Normative ethics ====
The first half of the 20th century was marked by skepticism toward, and neglect of, normative ethics. However, contemporary normative ethics is dominated by three schools: [[consequentialism]], [[virtue ethics]], and [[deontology]].{{efn|Anscombe introduced the term "[[consequentialism]]" into the philosophical lexicon.}}

===== Consequentialism, or Utilitarianism =====

During the early 20th century, [[utilitarianism]] was the only non-skeptical type of ethics to remain popular among analytic philosophers. However, as the influence of logical positivism declined mid-century, analytic philosophers had a renewed interest in ethics. ''Utilitarianism: For and Against'' was written with [[J. J. C. Smart]] arguing for and Bernard Williams arguing against.

===== Virtue ethics =====
Anscombe, Foot, and [[Alasdair MacIntyre|Alasdair Macintyre]]'s ''After Virtue'' sparked a revival of [[Aristotle]]'s [[Virtue ethics|virtue ethical]] approach. This increased interest in virtue ethics has been dubbed the "[[Virtue ethics|aretaic turn]]" mimicking the linguistic turn.

===== Deontology =====
[[John Rawls]]'s 1971 ''[[A Theory of Justice]]'' restored interest in [[Kantian]] ethical philosophy.

==== Applied ethics ====
Since around 1970, a significant feature of analytic philosophy has been the emergence of [[applied ethics]]—an interest in the application of moral principles to specific practical issues. The philosophers following this orientation view ethics as involving humanistic values, which involve practical implications and applications in the way people interact and lead their lives socially.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions|last=Ikuenobe|first=Polycarp|publisher=Lexington Books|year=2006|isbn=978-0-7391-1131-4|location=Oxford|page=104}}</ref>

Topics of special interest for applied ethics include [[environmental ethics]], [[animal rights]], and the many challenges created by advancing [[bioethics|medical science]].<ref>Brennan, Andrew and Yeuk-Sze Lo (2002). "Environmental Ethics" [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/#2 §2] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130801143528/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-environmental/ |date=1 August 2013 }}, in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref><ref>Gruen, Lori (2003). "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-animal/ The Moral Status of Animals]," in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref><ref>See Hursthouse, Rosalind (2003). "Virtue Ethics" [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#3 §3], in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' and Donchin, Anne (2004). "[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-bioethics/ Feminist Bioethics]" in ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref> In education, applied ethics addressed themes such as punishment in schools, [[Equal opportunity|equality of educational opportunity]], and education for democracy.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Methods in Philosophy of Education|url=https://archive.org/details/methodsphilosoph00heyt|url-access=limited|last1=Heyting|first1=Frieda|last2=Lenzen|first2=Dieter|last3=White|first3=John|publisher=Routledge|year=2002|isbn=978-0-415-24260-8|location=New York|pages=[https://archive.org/details/methodsphilosoph00heyt/page/n30 18]}}</ref>