Editing Suez Crisis (section)

====U.N. General Assembly Resolution 997====
[[File:Nasser and Eisenhower, 1960.jpg|thumb|Presidents Eisenhower and Nasser meeting in New York, 1960]]
On 30 October, the Security Council held a meeting, at the request of the United States, when it submitted a draft resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw its armed forces behind the established armistice lines. It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes. A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union was also rejected.<ref name="UNEFbkgr">[https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unef1backgr2.html Establishment of UNEF, Background] at UN.org</ref> On 31 October, also [[Protocol of Sèvres|as planned]], France and the UK launched an air attack against targets in Egypt, which was followed shortly by a landing of their troops at the northern end of the canal zone. Later that day, considering the grave situation created by the actions against Egypt, and with lack of unanimity among the permanent members preventing it from exercising its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 119|Resolution 119]]; it decided to call an [[emergency special session]] of the [[United Nations General Assembly|General Assembly]] for the [[First emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly|first time]], as provided in the 1950 "Uniting for Peace" [[United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377|resolution]], in order to make appropriate recommendations to end the fighting.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/>

[[File:1956-04-12 Full Scale War Looms.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=1:14|Universal Newsreel from 4 December about Dag Hammarskjöld's meeting with Nasser]]

The emergency special session was convened 1 November; the same day Nasser requested diplomatic assistance from the U.S., without requesting the same from the Soviet Union; he was at first sceptical of the efficacy of U.S. diplomatic efforts at the UN, but later gave full credit to Eisenhower's role in stopping the war.<ref name="Love557">{{Harvnb|Love|1969|pp=557–558}}</ref>

In the early hours of 2 November, the General Assembly adopted the United States' proposal for Resolution 997 (ES-I); the vote was 64 in favour and 5 opposed (Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel) with 6 abstentions.<ref>John Allphin Moore and Jerry Pubantz, ''Encyclopedia of the United Nations'' (2008) 2:399</ref> It called for an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the [[1949 Armistice Agreements#With Egypt|armistice lines]], an arms embargo, and the reopening of the Suez Canal, which was now blocked. The Secretary-General was requested to observe and report promptly on compliance to both the Security Council and General Assembly, for further action as deemed appropriate in accordance with the UN Charter.<ref name="UNEFbkgr"/>

Over the next several days, the emergency special session consequently adopted a series of enabling resolutions, which established the first [[United Nations Emergency Force]] (UNEF), on 7 November by Resolution 1001.<ref name="UNGAfschwaESSs">[https://www.un.org/ga/sessions/emergency.shtml UNGA Emergency Special Sessions]. Un.org. Retrieved on 8 September 2011.</ref> This proposal of the emergency force and the resulting cease-fire was made possible primarily through the efforts of [[Lester B. Pearson]], the [[Minister of Foreign Affairs (Canada)|Secretary of External Affairs of Canada]], and [[Dag Hammarskjöld]], the [[Secretary-General of the United Nations]]. Britain and France agreed to withdraw from Egypt within a week; Israel did not.

The role of Nehru, both as Indian Prime minister and a leader of the [[Non Aligned Movement]] was significant; the Indian historian Inder Malhotra wrote that "Now Nehru—who had tried to be even-handed between the two sides—denounced Eden and co-sponsors of the aggression vigorously. He had a powerful, if relatively silent, ally in the U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower who went to the extent of using America's clout in the [[International Monetary Fund|IMF]] to make Eden and Mollet behave".<ref name="IndExNoth"/> The Indian historian Inder Malhotra wrote about Nehru's role that: "So the Suez War ended in Britain's humiliation. Eden lost his job. Nehru achieved his objective of protecting Egypt's sovereignty and Nasser's honour".<ref name="IndExNoth">{{Cite web |last=Malhotra |first=Inder |date=2010-03-05 |title=Nothing common and there is no wealth |url=https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/nothing-common-and-there-is-no-wealth |url-access=subscription |access-date=2023-03-17 |website=The Indian Express}}</ref>

===== Condemnation of the U.N. in West Germany =====
A rare example of support for the Anglo-French actions against Egypt came from [[West Germany]]. Though his Cabinet was divided, West Germany's Chancellor [[Konrad Adenauer]] was furious with the United States for its "chumminess with the Russians" as Adenauer called the U.S. refusal to intervene in Hungary and voting with the Soviet Union at the UN Security Council. Adenauer told his Cabinet on 7 November that Nasser was a pro-Soviet force that needed to be cut down to size, and in his view the attack on Egypt was completely justified.<ref>Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 pp. 241–242.</ref>

What appalled Adenauer about the crisis was that the United States had come out against the attack on Egypt and voted with the Soviet Union at Security Council against Britain and France, which led Adenauer to fear that the United States and Soviet Union would "carve up the world" according to their own interests with no thought for the interests of European states.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242"/> Adenauer was especially worried by the fact that the American embassy in [[Bonn]] would not provide a clear answer as to what was the American policy in response to the Bulganin letters.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 244.</ref> Adenauer maintained to his Cabinet that the French had every right to invade Egypt because of Nasser's support for the FLN in Algeria, but the British were partly to blame because they "inexplicably" shut down their Suez Canal base in 1954.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 242">Schwarz, Hans-Peter ''Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, 1952–1967'' Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1995 p. 242.</ref>

Subsequently, the traditionally [[Francophile]] Adenauer drew closer to Paris.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273">{{Harvnb|Dietl|2008|p=273}}</ref> On 5–6 November 1956, he refused to cancel a planned visit to Paris, and his summit with Mollet was clearly meant to be seen as a gesture of moral support.<ref name="Dietl 2008, p. 273"/> One of Adenauer's aides, Fritz von Eckardt, commented regarding the opening ceremony in Paris where Mollet and Adenauer stood side by side that the national anthems were played "[i]n the most serious hour France had experienced since the end of the war[;] the two governments were standing shoulder by shoulder".<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/> During the summit in Paris, Mollet commented to Adenauer that a Soviet nuclear strike could destroy Paris at any moment, which added considerably to the tension and helped to draw the French and Germans closer.<ref name="Schwarz, Hans-Peter p. 244"/>