Editing European Central Bank (section)

===Independence===
The European Central Bank (and by extension, the Eurosystem) is often considered as the "most independent central bank in the world".<ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1997/html/sp970513.en.html|title=The European Central Bank: independent and accountable|website=European Central Bank|date=13 May 1997|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite press release|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/1999/html/sp990504.en.html|title=The role of the Central Bank in the United Europe|website=European Central Bank|date=4 May 1999|language=en|access-date=5 November 2017}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Papadia|first1=Francesco|last2=Ruggiero|first2=Gian Paolo|date=1 February 1999|title=Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro|journal=Open Economies Review|language=en|volume=10|issue=1|pages=63–90|doi=10.1023/A:1008305128157|s2cid=153508547|issn=0923-7992}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB902443500523452500|title=Is the ECB Too Independent?|last=Wood|first=Geoffrey|work=The Wall Street Journal|access-date=5 November 2017|language=en-US}}</ref> In general terms, this means that the Eurosystem tasks and policies can be discussed, designed, decided and implemented in full autonomy, without pressure or need for instructions from any external body. The main justification for the ECB's independence is that such an institutional setup assists the maintenance of price stability.<ref name="Independence">{{cite web |url=http://www.ecb.int/ecb/orga/independence/html/index.en.html |title=Independence |publisher=European Central Bank |access-date=1 December 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/ecb_independent.en.html |title=Why is the ECB independent? |website=European Central Bank |date=12 January 2017 |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017|last1=Bank |first1=European Central }}</ref>

In practice, the ECB's independence is pinned by four key principles:<ref>{{cite web |url=http://transparency.eu/ecb|title=Transparency International EU – The global coalition against corruption in Brussels |website=transparency.eu |language=en |access-date=5 November 2017 |date=28 March 2017}}</ref>

* '''Operational and legal independence''': the ECB has all required competences to achieve its price stability mandate{{Citation needed|date=August 2020}} and thereby can steer monetary policy in full autonomy and by means of high level of discretion. The ECB's governing council deliberates with a high degree of secrecy, since individual voting records are not disclosed to the public (leading to suspicions that Governing Council members are voting along national lines.<ref name="Heinemann Hüfner 2003 p.">{{cite journal | last1=Heinemann | first1=Friedrich | last2=Hüfner | first2=Felix P. | title=Is the View from the Eurotower Purely European? - National Divergence and ECB Interest Rate Policy | journal=SSRN Electronic Journal | publisher=Elsevier BV | year=2003 | issn=1556-5068 | doi=10.2139/ssrn.374600 | page=| s2cid=12675305 | url=https://ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/376/1/dp0269.pdf }}</ref><ref>Jose Ramon Cancelo, Diego Varela and Jose Manuel Sanchez-Santos (2011) 'Interest rate setting at the ECB: Individual preferences and collective decision making', ''Journal of Policy Modeling'' 33(6): 804–820. [[doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2011.08.017|DOI]].</ref>) In addition to monetary policy decisions, the ECB has the right to issue legally binding regulations, within its competence and if the conditions laid down in Union law are fulfilled, it can sanction non-compliant actors if they violate legal requirements laid down in directly applicable Union regulations. The ECB's own legal personality also allows the ECB to enter into international legal agreements independently from other EU institutions, and be the party of legal proceedings. Finally, the ECB can organise its internal structure as it sees fit. 
* '''Personal independence:''' the mandate of ECB board members is purposefully very long (8 years) and Governors of national central banks have a minimum renewable term of office of five years.<ref name="Independence" /> In addition, ECB board members are vastly immune from judicial proceedings.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp4.pdf?581a2ecf674a6554f5af698f5bf54019|title=PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK|date=2007|website=European Central Bank}}</ref> Indeed, removals from the office can only be decided by the [[Court of Justice of the European Union]] (CJEU), under the request of the ECB's Governing Council or the executive board (i.e. the ECB itself). Such a decision is only possible in the event of incapacity or serious misconduct. National governors of the Eurosystem's national central banks can be dismissed under national law (with a possibility to appeal) in case they can no longer fulfil their functions or are guilty of serious misconduct.
* '''Financial independence''': the ECB is the only body within the EU whose statute guarantees budgetary independence through its own resources and income. The ECB uses its own profits generated by its monetary policy operations and cannot be technically insolvent. The ECB's financial independence reinforces its political independence. Because the ECB does not require external financing and symmetrically is prohibited from [[Monetary financing|direct monetary financing]] of public institutions, this shields it from potential pressure from public authorities.
*'''Political independence''': The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the member states may not seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the NCBs in the performance of their tasks. Symmetrically, EU institutions and national governments are bound by the treaties to respect the ECB's independence. It is the latter which is the subject of much debate.