Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

===Gatling gun controversy===
General Alfred Terry's Dakota column included a single battery of artillery, comprising two [[3-inch ordnance rifle]]s and two [[Gatling gun]]s.{{NoteTag|: Terry's column out of Fort Abraham Lincoln included "...artillery (two Rodman and two Gatling guns)..."<ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 68</ref>}}{{NoteTag|"[Three] rapid-fire artillery pieces known as Gatling guns" were part of Terry's firepower included in the Dakota column.<ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 48</ref>}} (According to historian Evan S. Connell, the precise number of Gatlings has not been established: either two or three.){{NoteTag|"How many Gatling guns lurched across the prairie is uncertain. Probably three."<ref>Connell, 1984, p. 101</ref>}}

[[File:Mitrailleuse-gatling-p1000591.jpg|thumb|The Gatling gun, invented in 1861 by [[Richard Jordan Gatling|Richard Gatling]]. Custer declined an offer of a battery of these weapons, explaining to Terry that they would "hamper our movements". Said Custer, "The Seventh can handle anything it meets."<ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 50</ref>]]

Custer's decision to reject Terry's offer of the rapid-fire Gatlings has raised questions among historians as to why he refused them and what advantage their availability might have conferred on his forces at the Battle of the Little Bighorn.{{NoteTag|"Custer refused Terry's offer of the Gatling gun battery."<ref>Lawson, 2008, p. 50</ref><br />"Military historians have speculated whether this decision was a mistake. If Gatling guns had made it to the battlefield, they might have allowed Custer enough firepower to allow Custer's companies to survive on Last Stand Hill."<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175:</ref><br />"Since its invention during the Civil War, the Gatling gun had been used sparingly in actual battle, but there was no denying, potentially at least, an awesome weapon."<ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73</ref>}}

One factor concerned Major Marcus Reno's recent 8-day reconnaissance-in-force of the Powder-Tongue-Rosebud Rivers, June 10 to 18.<ref>Sklenar, 2000, pp. 71, 75</ref>{{NoteTag| Reno's wing "left...on June 10...accompanied by a Gatling gun and its crew..."<ref>Donovan, 2008, pp. 162–63:</ref>}} This deployment had demonstrated that artillery pieces mounted on gun carriages and hauled by horses no longer fit for cavalry mounts (so-called condemned horses) were cumbersome over mixed terrain and vulnerable to breakdowns.<ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 163: "The [Gatling gun] and its ammunition...was mostly pulled by two 'condemned' cavalry mounts [p. 176: "...drawn by four condemned horses..."] judged not fit to carry troopers, but it needed the occasional hauling by hand through some of the rougher ravines. (The gun would eventually upset and injure three men.)" and p. 175: "...Reno had taken [a Gatling gun] on his [June reconnaissance mission], and it had been nothing but trouble."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 72: On Reno's [June 10 to June 18] reconnaissance "the Gatling guns proved to be an annoying burden...they either fell apart or had to be disassembled and carried in pieces over rough terrain." And p. 79: "During the Reno scout [reconnoitering], the two guns were actually abandoned (and retrieved later) because soldiers got tired of dragging them over rough spots...[I]f Custer did not already have a fully formed negative opinion of the Gatlings on such an expedition, the experience of the Reno [reconnaissance of early June] surely convinced him."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73: "The biggest problem with the [Gatling] gun was transporting it to where it might be of some use... [in the week preceding the Battle of the Little Bighorn], the Gatling, not the mules, proved to be the biggest hindrance to the expedition."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175: "...Reno had taken one [Gatling gun] along [on his June reconnaissance], and it had been nothing but trouble." And p. 195: Custer, in comments to his officer staff before the Battle of the Little Bighorn, said that "...if hostiles could whip the Seventh [Cavalry]...they could defeat a much larger force."</ref> Custer, valuing the mobility of the 7th Cavalry and recognizing Terry's acknowledgment of the regiment as "the primary strike force" preferred to remain unencumbered by the Gatling guns.<ref>Hatch, 1997, pp. 80–81: The Gatling guns "were cumbersome and would cause delays over the traveled route. The guns were drawn by four condemned horses [and] obstacles in the terrain [would] require their unhitching and assistance of soldier to continue...Terry's own battery [of Gatling guns]—the one he had offered to Custer—[would have] a difficult time keeping up with the march of Colonel John Gibbon's infantry."</ref><ref>Lawson, 2007, p. 50: "[Custer] turned down General Terry's offer to bring the three Gatling guns, because they would slow down his movement."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 99: "Custer knew he had to move quickly to accomplish his objective. That was why he ultimately declined the offer of the Gatling guns that had proven such a bother to Reno."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 79: After the 7th Cavalry's departure up Rosebud Creek, "even Brisbin would acknowledge that everyone in Gibbon's command understood [that]...the Seventh was the primary strike force."</ref> Custer insisted that the artillery was superfluous to his success, in that the 7th Cavalry alone was sufficient to cope with any force they should encounter, informing Terry: "The 7th can handle anything it meets".<ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 99: "Thinking his regiment powerful enough to handle anything it might encounter, [Custer, in addition to declining the Gatling guns] declined the offer of four additional cavalry companies from [Gibbon's] Montana column." And p. 114: Custer told his officer staff days before the battle that he "opted against the Gatling guns...so as not to 'hamper our movements'"</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, p. 92: Custer "on the evening of 22 June...[informed his officer staff]...why he had not accepted the offers...of Gatling guns (he thought they might hamper his movements at a critical moment)."</ref><ref>Lawson, 2007 p. 50: "Custer...refused Major James Brisbin's offer to include his Second Cavalry Regiment [200 troopers], told Terry "the 7th can handle anything it meets."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. "Explaining his refusal of the Gatling gun detachment and the Second Cavalry battalion, he convolutedly reaffirmed his confidence in the Seventh's ability to defeat any number of Indians they could find."</ref> In addition to these practical concerns, a strained relationship with Major James Brisbin induced Custer's polite refusal to integrate Brisbin's Second Cavalry unit—and the Gatling guns—into his strike force, as it would disrupt any hierarchical arrangements that Custer presided over.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 24: "Brisbin argued with Terry that Custer was undermanned, and requested that his troops [which had the] Gatling guns – with Terry in command because Brisbin did not want to serve under Custer—be permitted to accompany [Custer's] column. Custer refused the assistance, and Terry abided by that."</ref><ref>Sklenar, 2000, pp. 78–79: "Apparently, Terry offered [Major James] Brisbin's battalion and Gatling gun battery to accompany the Seventh, but Custer refused these additions for several reasons. First of all, Custer and Brisbin did not get along and Custer thus would not have wanted to place Brisbin in a senior command position. Custer was on the verge of abolishing the wings led by Reno and Benteen, and the inclusion of Brisbin would have complicated the arrangement he had in mind. Also, Custer retained the conviction that the Seventh could handle any force of Indians it might encounter, and he may have reasoned that taking the Second Cavalry would leave [Colonel John] Gibbon's column susceptible to attack and defeat..."</ref><ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 80: "The offer of 3 Gatling Guns...was made to Custer by General Alfred Terry [at the] urging of Major James Brisbin, who also desired his Second Cavalry to become part of Custer's detachment. Custer respectfully declined both offers, state that the Gatlings would impede his march.</ref>

Historians have acknowledged the firepower inherent in the Gatling gun: they were capable of firing 350 .45–70 ({{convert|0.45|in|mm|disp=out}}) caliber rounds per minute. Jamming caused by black powder residue could lower that rate,<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 80: "The Gatling Guns would have brought formidable firepower into play; this rapid fire artillery could fire up to 350 rounds in 1 minute."</ref><ref>Donovan, 2008, p. 175: "Each of these heavy, hand-cranked weapons could fire up to 350 rounds a minute, an impressive rate, but they were known to jam frequently.</ref> raising questions as to their reliability under combat conditions.<ref>Hatch, 1997, pp. 80–81: "The Gatlings had major drawbacks, such as frequent jamming due to residue from black powder..."</ref><ref>Philbrick, 2010, p. 73: "Military traditionalists like to claim the gun was unreliable, but in actuality the Gatling functioned surprisingly well."</ref> Researchers have further questioned the effectiveness of the guns under the tactics that Custer was likely to face with the Lakota and Cheyenne warriors. The Gatlings, mounted high on carriages, required the battery crew to stand upright during its operation, making them easy targets for Lakota and Cheyenne sharpshooters.<ref>Hatch, 1997, p. 81: "...The [Gatling] guns were mounted on large [diameter] wheels, which meant that in order to operate them the gun crews would [necessarily] be standing upright, making them [extremely vulnerable] to Indian snipers."</ref>

Historian [[Robert M. Utley]], in a section entitled "Would Gatling Guns Have Saved Custer?" presents two judgments from Custer's contemporaries: General [[Henry J. Hunt]], expert in the tactical use of artillery in Civil War, stated that Gatlings "would probably have saved the command", whereas General [[Nelson A. Miles]], participant in the Great Sioux War declared "[Gatlings] were useless for Indian fighting."<ref>Utley, 1987, pp. 80–81</ref>