Editing Utilitarianism (section)

=== Other sentient beings ===
{{further|Speciesism|Animal rights|Animal welfare|Moral patienthood}}
[[File:Peter Singer MIT Veritas.jpg|thumb|right|[[Peter Singer]]]]
In ''An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation'', Bentham wrote "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"<ref name="BenthamIntroductiontothePrinciples">An Introduction to the Principals of Morals and Legislation, Jeremy Bentham, 1789 ("printed" in 1780, "first published" in 1789, "corrected by the Author" in 1823.) See Chapter I: Of the Principle of Utility. For Bentham on animals, see Ch. XVII Note 122.</ref> Mill's distinction between [[#Higher and lower pleasures|higher and lower pleasures]] might suggest that he gave more status to humans. However, in his essay "Whewell on Moral Philosophy", Mill defends Bentham's position, calling it a "noble anticipation", and writing: "Granted that any practice causes more pain to animals than it gives pleasure to man; is that practice moral or immoral? And if, exactly in proportion as human beings raise their heads out of the slough of selfishness, they do not with one voice answer 'immoral', let the morality of the principle of utility be for ever condemned."<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Mill |first1=J. S. |title=Whewell on Moral Philosophy |url=http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-c/mill01.pdf | journal=Collected Works |volume=10 | pages = 185–87 }}</ref>

[[Henry Sidgwick]] also considers the implications of utilitarianism for nonhuman animals. He writes:<blockquote>"We have next to consider who the 'all' are, whose happiness is to be taken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former view is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill, and (I believe) by the Utilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accordance with the universality that is characteristic of their principle&nbsp;... it seems arbitrary and unreasonable to exclude from the end, as so conceived, any pleasure of any sentient being."<ref>{{cite book |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |title=Methods of Ethics |publisher=Hackett Publishing Co |edition=7th |date=1981 |page=414 |isbn=978-0-915145-28-7}}</ref></blockquote>Among contemporary utilitarian philosophers, Peter Singer is especially known for arguing that the well-being of all [[sentience|sentient]] beings ought to be given [[equal consideration of interests|equal consideration]]. Singer suggests that rights are conferred according to the level of a creature's sentience, regardless of their species. He adds that humans tend to be [[speciesism|speciesist]] (discriminatory against non-humans) in ethical matters, and argues that, in utilitarianism, speciesism cannot be justified as there is no rational distinction that can be made between the suffering of humans and the suffering of nonhuman animals; all suffering ought to be reduced. Singer writes: "The racist violates the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is the same in each case&nbsp;... Most human beings are speciesists."<ref>Peter Singer, ''Animal Liberation'', Chapter I, pp. 7–8, 2nd edition, 1990.</ref>

In John Stuart Mill's essay "On Nature"<ref>{{cite web |date=1904 |title=Mill's "On Nature" |url=http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/users/philosophy/texts/mill_on.htm |access-date=2015-08-09 |website=www.lancaster.ac.uk}}</ref> he argues that the [[wild animal suffering|welfare of wild animals]] is to be considered when making utilitarian judgments. [[Tyler Cowen]] argues that, if individual animals are carriers of utility, then we should consider limiting the predatory activity of carnivores relative to their victims: "At the very least, we should limit current subsidies to nature's carnivores."<ref name="Cowen2003">{{Cite journal |last1=Cowen |first1=T. |year=2003 |editor1-last=c. Hargrove |editor1-first=Eugene |title=Policing Nature |journal=Environmental Ethics |volume=25 |issue=2 |pages=169–182 |doi=10.5840/enviroethics200325231|bibcode=2003EnEth..25..169C }}</ref>

This view still might be contrasted with [[deep ecology]], which holds that an intrinsic value is attached to all forms of life and nature, whether currently assumed to be sentient or not. According to utilitarianism, the forms of life that are unable to experience anything akin to either enjoyment or discomfort are denied [[moral status]], because it is impossible to increase the happiness or reduce the suffering of something that cannot feel happiness or suffer. Singer writes:
<blockquote>The capacity for suffering and enjoying things is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in any meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse, on the other hand, does have an interest in not being tormented, because it will suffer if it is. If a being suffers, there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration. No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering be counted equally with the like suffering—in so far as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into account.</blockquote>

Thus, the moral value of one-celled organisms, as well as some multi-cellular organisms, and natural entities like a river, is only in the benefit they provide to sentient beings. Similarly, utilitarianism places no direct intrinsic value on [[biodiversity]], although the benefits that biodiversity brings to sentient beings may mean that, in utilitarianism, biodiversity ought to be maintained in general.

==== Digital minds ====
{{further|Artificial consciousness|Utility monster|}}
[[Nick Bostrom]] and Carl Shulman consider that, as advancements in [[artificial intelligence]] continue, it will probably be possible to engineer digital minds that require less resources and have a much higher rate and intensity of [[subjective experience]] than humans. These "super-beneficiaries" could also be unaffected by [[hedonic adaptation]]. Nick Bostrom said that we should find "paths that will enable digital minds and biological minds to coexist, in a mutually beneficial way where all of these different forms can flourish and thrive".<ref>{{Cite web |last=Fisher |first=Richard |title=The intelligent monster that you should let eat you |url=https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20201111-philosophy-of-utility-monsters-and-artificial-intelligence |access-date=2023-07-02 |website=www.bbc.com |date=13 November 2020 |language=en}}</ref>