Editing Battle of the Atlantic (section)

==Assessment==
It is maintained by G. H. Persall{{sfn|Pearsall|1994|p=7}} that "the Germans were close" to economically starving England, but they "failed to capitalize" on their early war successes. Others, including Blair{{sfn|Blair|1996a|p=xii}} and Alan Levine, disagree; Levine states this is "a misperception", and that "it is doubtful they ever came close" to achieving this.{{sfn|Levine|1991|p=375}}

The focus on U-boat successes, the [[Ace (military)|"aces"]] and their scores, the convoys attacked, and the ships sunk, serves to camouflage the ''Kriegsmarine''{{'s}} manifold failures. In particular, this was because most of the ships sunk by U-boats were not in convoys, but sailing alone, or having become separated from convoys.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Milner |first=Marc |date=2008-06-01 |title=The Battle That Had to Be Won |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2008/june/battle-had-be-won |access-date=2024-07-21 |website=U.S. Naval Institute |language=en}}</ref>

At no time during the campaign were supply lines to Britain interrupted;<ref>{{cite thesis |last=Francis |first=Timothy Lang |date=2001 |title=Poseidon's tribute: Maritime vulnerability, industrial mobilization and the Allied defeat of the U-boats, 1939–1945 |url=https://www.proquest.com/openview/ceb10bdb476ca4ea8d8210e459af95e1/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y  |degree= Masters|chapter= |publisher=University of Maryland, College Park |docket= |oclc= |access-date=2024-07-21}}</ref> even during the ''Bismarck'' crisis, convoys sailed as usual (although with heavier escorts). In all, during the Atlantic campaign only 10% of transatlantic convoys that sailed were attacked, and of those attacked only 10% on average of the ships were lost. Overall, more than 99% of all ships sailing to and from the British Isles during World War II did so successfully.<ref>{{Cite book |title=Decision in the Atlantic: the Allies and the longest campaign of the Second World War |date=2019 |publisher=The University Press of Kentucky |isbn=978-1-949668-00-1 |editor-last=Faulkner |editor-first=Marcus |series=New perspectives on the Second World War |location=Lexington, Kentucky, United States of America |language=en-US |editor-last2=Bell |editor-first2=Christopher M.}}</ref>

Despite their efforts, the Axis powers were unable to prevent the build-up of Allied invasion forces for the liberation of Europe. In November 1942, at the height of the Atlantic campaign, the US Navy escorted the Operation Torch invasion fleet {{convert|3,000|mi|km|abbr=on}} across the Atlantic without hindrance, or even being detected.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Patch |first=John |date=2008 |title=FORTUITOUS ENDEAVOR: Intelligence and Deception in Operation Torch |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26396965 |journal=Naval War College Review |volume=61 |issue=4 |pages=73–98 |jstor=26396965 |issn=0028-1484}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |first= Dean |last=Allard |date=2023-01-19 |title=The U.S. Navy Comes Ashore in the Med |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/1997/october/us-navy-comes-ashore-med |access-date=2024-07-21 |website=U.S. Naval Institute |language=en}}</ref> In 1943 and 1944 the Allies transported 3 million American and Allied servicemen across the Atlantic without significant loss. By 1945 the USN was [[Operation Teardrop|able to wipe out]] a wolf-pack suspected of carrying V-weapons in the mid-Atlantic, with little difficulty.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Blair |first=Clay |title=Hitler's U-Boat War The Hunted, 1942-1945 |publisher=Random House |year=2000 |language=en-US}}</ref>

Third, and [[Blockade of Germany (1939–1945)|unlike the Allies]], the Germans were never able to mount a comprehensive blockade of Britain. Nor were they able to focus their effort by targeting the most valuable cargoes, the eastbound traffic carrying war materiel. Instead they were reduced to the slow attrition of a [[tonnage war]]. To win this, the U-boat arm had to sink 300,000&nbsp;GRT per month in order to overwhelm Britain's shipbuilding capacity and reduce its merchant marine strength.

In only four out of the first 27 months of the war did Germany achieve this target, and after December 1941, when Britain was joined by the US merchant marine and ship yards the target effectively doubled. As a result, the Axis needed to sink 700,000&nbsp;GRT per month; as the massive expansion of the US shipbuilding industry took effect this target increased still further. The 700,000 ton target was achieved in only one month, November 1942; after May 1943 average sinkings dropped to less than one tenth of that figure. In addition, reports do not consistently emphasize an important distinction between GRT (tonnage in units of 100 cubic feet), which is not a weight, and displacement, which is.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Thus sinking a ship with a GRT of 1,000, destroyed 100,000 cubic feet of enclosed space, which bore no fixed relationship to the volume or tonnage of cargo it could carry.

By the end of the war the Allies had built over 38 million tons of new shipping.<ref>{{Citation |last=Smith |first=Kevin |title=Conflict Over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War |date=1996-03-07 |work= |pages= |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511523755.001 |access-date=2024-07-21 |publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511523755.001 }}</ref>

The reason for the misperception that the German blockade came close to success may be found in post-war writings by both German and British authors. [[Clay Blair|Blair]] attributes the distortion to "propagandists" who "glorified and exaggerated the successes of German submariners", while he believes Allied writers "had their own reasons for exaggerating the peril".{{sfn|Blair|1996a|p=xii}}

[[Dan van der Vat]] suggests that, unlike the US, or Canada and Britain's other dominions, which were protected by oceanic distances, Britain was at the end of the transatlantic supply route closest to German bases; for Britain it was a lifeline. It is this which led to Churchill's concerns.{{sfn|Costello|Hughes|1977|p=210}} Coupled with [[Black May (1943)#March|a series of major convoy battles]] in the space of a month, it undermined confidence in the convoy system in March 1943, to the point Britain considered abandoning it,{{sfn|Roskill|1961|p=375}} not realising the U-boat had already effectively been defeated. These were "over-pessimistic [[threat assessment]]s", Blair concludes: "At no time did the German U-boat force ever come close to winning the Battle of the Atlantic or bringing on the collapse of Great Britain".{{Sfn|Blair|1996b|p=xii}}