Editing Utilitarianism (section)

===Motives, intentions, and actions===
Utilitarianism is typically taken to assess the rightness or wrongness of an action by considering just the consequences of that action. Bentham very carefully distinguishes motive from [[intention]] and says that motives are not in themselves good or bad but can be referred to as such on account of their tendency to produce pleasure or pain. He adds that, "from every kind of motive, may proceed actions that are good, others that are bad, and others that are indifferent."<ref>{{cite book |last=Bentham |first=Jeremy |title=An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation |series=Dover Philosophical Classics |publisher=Dover Publications |date=January 2009 |page=102 |isbn=978-0-486-45452-8}}</ref> Mill makes a similar point<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=John |editor-last=Robson |title=Collected Works, volume 31 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |year=1981 |page=51 |chapter=Autobiography |isbn=978-0-7100-0718-6}}</ref> and explicitly says that "motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action, though much with the worth of the agent. He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for his trouble."<ref name="Mill 1998 65">{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=Roger |editor-last=Crisp |title=Utilitarianism |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1998 |page=65 |isbn=978-0-19-875163-2}}</ref>

However, with intention the situation is more complex. In a footnote printed in the second edition of ''Utilitarianism'', Mill says: "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent wills to do."<ref name="Mill 1998 65"/> Elsewhere, he says, "Intention, and motive, are two very different things. But it is the intention, that is, the foresight of consequences, which constitutes the moral rightness or wrongness of the act."<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |editor-first=John |editor-last=Robson |title=Collected Works, volume 31 |publisher=University of Toronto Press |year=1981 |pages=252–53 |chapter=Comments upon James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind |isbn= 978-0-7100-0718-6}} and as quoted by {{cite journal |last1=Ridge |first1=Michael |year=2002 |title=Mill's Intentions and Motives |journal=Utilitas |volume=14 |pages=54–70 |doi= 10.1017/S0953820800003393|hdl=20.500.11820/deb5b261-303a-4395-9ea4-4a9367e7592b |s2cid=58918919 |url=https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/files/11822135/Mill_s_Intentions_and_Motives.pdf }}</ref>

The correct interpretation of Mill's footnote is a matter of some debate. The difficulty in interpretation centres around trying to explain why, since it is consequences that matter, intentions should play a role in the assessment of the morality of an action but motives should not. One possibility "involves supposing that the 'morality' of the act is one thing, probably to do with the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the agent, and its rightness or wrongness another."<ref name="Mill's Puzzling Footnote">{{cite journal |last1=Dancy |first1=Jonathan |year=2000 |title=Mill's Puzzling Footnote |journal=Utilitas |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=219–22 |doi= 10.1017/S095382080000279X|s2cid=145777437 }}</ref> [[Jonathan Dancy]] rejects this interpretation on the grounds that Mill is explicitly making intention relevant to an assessment of the act not to an assessment of the agent.

An interpretation given by [[Roger Crisp]] draws on a definition given by Mill in ''[[A System of Logic]]'', where he says that an "intention to produce the effect, is one thing; the effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the two together constitute the action."<ref>{{cite book |last=Mill |first=John Stuart |title=A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive |series=Classic Reprint |publisher=Forgotten Books |date=February 2011 |page=51 |isbn=978-1-4400-9082-0}}</ref> Accordingly, whilst two actions may outwardly appear to be the same they will be different actions if there is a different intention. Dancy notes that this does not explain why intentions count but motives do not.

A third interpretation is that an action might be considered a complex action consisting of several stages and it is the intention that determines which of these stages are to be considered part of the action. Although this is the interpretation favoured by Dancy, he recognizes that this might not have been Mill's own view, for Mill "would not even allow that 'p & q' expresses a complex proposition. He wrote in his ''System of Logic'' I iv. 3, of 'Caesar is dead and Brutus is alive', that 'we might as well call a street a complex house, as these two propositions a complex proposition'."<ref name="Mill's Puzzling Footnote"/>

Finally, whilst motives may not play a role in determining the morality of an action, this does not preclude utilitarians from fostering particular motives if doing so will increase overall happiness.