Editing Suez Crisis (section)

====Response by Western governments====
[[File:1956-08-09 Press Parley.ogv|thumb|thumbtime=0:43|Eisenhower press conference about the crisis, 9 August]]
The operation,<ref name="autogenerated1">{{Harvnb|Varble|2003|p=88.n}}</ref> aimed at taking control of the Suez Canal, [[Gaza Strip|Gaza]], and parts of Sinai, was highly successful for the invaders from a military point of view, but was a disaster from a political point of view, resulting in international criticism and diplomatic pressure. Along with the Suez crisis, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous [[Hungarian revolution of 1956|Hungarian revolution]]. Vice-President [[Richard Nixon]] later explained: "We couldn't on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser".<ref name="BorhiContRoll">{{Cite journal |last=Borhi |first=László |year=1999 |title=Containment, Rollback, Liberation or Inaction? The United States and Hungary in the 1950s |journal=Journal of Cold War Studies |volume=1 |issue=3 |pages=67–108 |doi=10.1162/152039799316976814 |s2cid=57560214}}</ref> Beyond that, it was Eisenhower's belief that if the United States were seen to acquiesce in the attack on Egypt, that the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union.<ref>{{Harvnb|Neff|1981|p=391}}</ref>

Despite having no commercial or military interest in the area, many countries were concerned with the growing rift between Western allied nations. The Swedish ambassador to the Court of St. James's, [[Gunnar Hägglöf]] wrote in a letter to the anti-war Conservative M.P. [[Edward Boyle, Baron Boyle of Handsworth|Edward Boyle]],
{{Blockquote|I don't think there is any part of the world where the sympathies for England are greater than in Scandinavia. But Scandinavian opinion has never been more shocked by a British government's action—not even by the [[Anglo-German Naval Agreement|British-German Naval Agreement of 1935]]—than by the Suez intervention.<ref name="Adamthwaite pages 449"/>}}

When Israel refused to withdraw its troops from the Gaza Strip and [[Sharm el-Sheikh]], Eisenhower declared, "We must not allow Europe to go flat on its back for the want of oil." He sought UN-backed efforts to impose economic sanctions on Israel until it fully withdrew from Egyptian territory. Senate Majority Leader [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] and minority leader [[William Knowland]] objected to American pressure on Israel. Johnson told the Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] that he wanted him to oppose "with all its skill" any attempt to apply sanctions on Israel.<ref name=Divine/>

Dulles rebuffed Johnson's request, and informed Eisenhower of the objections made by the Senate. Eisenhower was "insistent on applying economic sanctions" to the extent of cutting off private American assistance to Israel which was estimated to be over $100&nbsp;million a year. Ultimately, the [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic Party]]-controlled [[United States Senate|Senate]] would not co-operate with Eisenhower's position on Israel. Eisenhower finally told Congress he would take the issue to the American people, saying, "America has either one voice or none, and that voice is the voice of the President – whether everybody agrees with him or not."<ref name="Divine">{{Cite book |last=Divine |first=Robert |title=Eisenhower and the Cold War |date=1981 |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |pages=64–66}}</ref> The President spoke to the nation by radio and television where he outlined Israel's refusal to withdraw, explaining his belief that the UN had "no choice but to exert pressure upon Israel".<ref name=Divine/>