Editing Robert McNamara (section)

====Reserve mobilization proposal====
McNamara also advised the president that by early 1966 he would have to send 100,000 more troops to South Vietnam in order to win the war, and he would need to mobilize the [[Reserve components of the United States Armed Forces|Reserves and state National Guards]] as well.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=425}} Johnson accepted the first recommendation while rejecting the latter, disregarding Bundy's warnings that sending more troops would paradoxically mean holding less leverage over South Vietnam.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=425}} To mobilize the Reserves and National Guards would mean having to call up hundreds of thousands of men from civilian life, which would inevitably disrupt the economy and put it on a war footing. Johnson rejected the scenario as it would impose too many sacrifices on ordinary Americans while threatening his chances for reelection. Because the Reserves were never called up, the Army had to send much of its manpower to Vietnam, leaving the U.S. divisions in Western Europe in a "skeletal" condition.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=550}} To make up for the shortfall, the Army had to rely upon [[Conscription in the United States|the draft]], which caused much domestic opposition, especially as the draft system offered generous exemptions for those attending university and college and lead to the burden of the fighting to fall disproportionately upon men from poorer families.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=550}} Because of the refusal to call up the Reserves, McNamara had to increase the draft call in July 1965 from 17,000 per month to 35,000 per month.{{sfn|Langguth|2000|p=383}} As most of the 18 and 19-year-old draftees had a high school diploma or less, this also led to a decline in the Army's intellectual standards, with many officers complaining that most of the draftees were not intelligent enough to be trained for technical duties or promoted up the ranks.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=550}} Throughout the war, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General [[Earle Wheeler]], pressed very strongly for the reserves and national guards to be called out, saying the war was steadily ruining the U.S. Army.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|pp=550–551}}