Editing Charles Sanders Peirce (section)

== Metaphysics ==
Peirce [[Classification of the sciences (Peirce)|divided]] metaphysics into (1) ontology or general metaphysics, (2) [[wikt:psychical|psychical]] or religious metaphysics, and (3) physical metaphysics.

=== Ontology ===
On the issue of universals, Peirce was a [[Scotistic realism|scholastic realist]], declaring the reality of [[Problem of universals|generals]] as early as 1868.<ref>Peirce (1868), "Nominalism versus Realism", ''Journal of Speculative Philosophy'' v. 2, n. 1, pp. [https://books.google.com/books?id=YHkqP2JHJ_IC&pg=RA1-PA57 57–61]. Reprinted (CP 6.619–624), ([http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_14/v2_14.htm ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce'', 2:144–153] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080531074944/http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_14/v2_14.htm |date=2008-05-31  }}).</ref> According to Peirce, his category he called "thirdness", the more general facts about the world, are extra-mental realities. Regarding [[Modal logic|modalities]] (possibility, necessity, etc.), he came in later years to regard himself as having wavered earlier as to just how positively real the modalities are. In his 1897 "The Logic of Relatives" he wrote:

{{Quote|I formerly defined the possible as that which in a given state of information (real or feigned) we do not know not to be true. But this definition today seems to me only a twisted phrase which, by means of two negatives, conceals an anacoluthon. We know in advance of experience that certain things are not true, because we see they are impossible.}}

Peirce retained, as useful for some purposes, the definitions in terms of information states, but insisted that the pragmaticist is committed to a strong [[modal realism]] by conceiving of objects in terms of predictive general conditional propositions about how they ''would'' behave under certain circumstances.<ref>On developments in Peirce's realism, see:
* Peirce (1897), "The Logic of Relatives", ''The Monist'' v. VII, n. 2 pp. 161–217, see [https://books.google.com/books?id=pa0LAAAAIAAJ&pg=PA206 206] (via Google). Reprinted ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 3.456–552.
* Peirce (1905), "Issues of Pragmaticism", ''The Monist'' v. XV, n. 4, pp. 481–499, see [https://archive.org/details/monist18instgoog/page/n568 495–496] (via Google). Reprinted (CP 5.438–463, see 453–457).
* Peirce (c. 1905), Letter to Signor Calderoni, ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 8.205–213, see 208.
* Lane, Robert (2007), "Peirce's Modal Shift: From Set Theory to Pragmaticism", ''Journal of the History of Philosophy'', v. 45, n. 4.</ref>

==== Continua ====
Continuity and [[synechism]] are central in Peirce's philosophy: "I did not at first suppose that it was, as I gradually came to find it, the master-Key of philosophy".<ref>Peirce (1893–1894, MS 949, p. 1)</ref>

From a mathematical point of view, he embraced [[Infinitesimal|infinitesimals]] and worked long on the mathematics of continua. He long held that the real numbers constitute a pseudo-continuum;<ref>Peirce (1903 MS), ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 6.176: "But I now define a ''pseudo-continuum'' as that which modern writers on the theory of functions call a ''continuum''. But this is fully represented by [...] the totality of real values, rational and irrational [...]."</ref> that a true continuum is the real subject matter of ''analysis situs'' ([[topology]]); and that a true continuum of instants exceeds—and within any lapse of time has room for—any [[Aleph number]] (any infinite ''multitude'' as he called it) of instants.<ref>Peirce (1902 MS) and [[Joseph Morton Ransdell|Ransdell, Joseph]], ed. (1998), "Analysis of the Methods of Mathematical Demonstration", [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-02.htm#m4 Memoir 4] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103160621/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-02.htm#m4 |date=2013-11-03  }}, Draft C, MS L75.90–102, see 99–100. (Once there, scroll down).</ref>

In 1908 Peirce wrote that he found that a true continuum might have or lack such room. Jérôme Havenel (2008): "It is on 26&nbsp;May 1908, that Peirce finally gave up his idea that in every continuum there is room for whatever collection of any multitude. From now on, there are different kinds of continua, which have different properties."<ref>See:

* Peirce (1908), "Some Amazing Mazes (Conclusion), Explanation of Curiosity the First", ''The Monist'', v. 18, n. 3, pp. 416–444, see [[iarchive:bub_gb_CqsLAAAAIAAJ_2/page/n544|463–464]]. Reprinted ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 4.594–642, see 642.
* Havenel, Jérôme (2008), "Peirce's Clarifications on Continuity", ''Transactions'' Winter 2008 pp. 68–133, see 119. [https://www.jstor.org/pss/40321237 Abstract].</ref>

=== Psychical or religious metaphysics ===
Peirce believed in God, and characterized such belief as founded in an instinct explorable in musing over the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits—and it is a belief in God not as an ''actual'' or ''existent'' being (in Peirce's sense of those words), but all the same as a ''real'' being.<ref name="Godasreal">Peirce in his 1906 "Answers to Questions concerning my Belief in God", ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 6.495, [http://users.xplornet.com/~gnox/CSPgod.htm Eprint] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080223094243/http://users.xplornet.com/~gnox/CSPgod.htm |date=February 23, 2008}}, reprinted in part as "The Concept of God" in ''Philosophical Writings of Peirce'', J. Buchler, ed., 1940, pp. 375–378: {{quote|I will also take the liberty of substituting "reality" for "existence." This is perhaps overscrupulosity; but I myself always use ''exist'' in its strict philosophical sense of "react with the other like things in the environment." Of course, in that sense, it would be fetichism to say that God "exists." The word "reality," on the contrary, is used in ordinary parlance in its correct philosophical sense. [....] I define the ''real'' as that which holds its characters on such a tenure that it makes not the slightest difference what any man or men may have ''thought'' them to be, or ever will have ''thought'' them to be, here using thought to include, imagining, opining, and willing (as long as forcible ''means'' are not used); but the real thing's characters will remain absolutely untouched.}}</ref> In "[[s:A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God|A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God]]" (1908),<ref name="NA"/> Peirce sketches, for God's reality, an argument to a hypothesis of God as the Necessary Being, a hypothesis which he describes in terms of how it would tend to develop and become compelling in musement and inquiry by a normal person who is led, by the hypothesis, to consider as being purposed the features of the worlds of ideas, brute facts, and evolving habits (for example scientific progress), such that the thought of such purposefulness will "stand or fall with the hypothesis"; meanwhile, according to Peirce, the hypothesis, in supposing an "infinitely incomprehensible" being, starts off at odds with its own nature as a purportively true conception, and so, no matter how much the hypothesis grows, it both (A) inevitably regards itself as partly true, partly vague, and as continuing to define itself without limit, and (B) inevitably has God appearing likewise vague but growing, though God as the Necessary Being is not vague or growing; but the hypothesis will hold it to be ''more'' false to say the opposite, that God is purposeless. Peirce also argued that the will is free<ref>See his [[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#MMS|"The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (1892) and "Reply to the Necessitarians" (1893)]], to both of which editor [[Paul Carus]] responded.</ref> and (see [[Synechism]]) that there is at least an attenuated kind of immortality.

=== Physical metaphysics ===
Peirce held the view, which he called [[objective idealism]], that "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws".<ref>Peirce (1891), "The Architecture of Theories",'' [[The Monist]]'' v. 1, pp. [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/161/mode/1up 161–176], see [https://archive.org/stream/monistquart01hegeuoft#page/170/mode/1up p. 170], via ''Internet Archive''. Reprinted (CP 6.7–34) and (''The Essential Peirce'', 1:285–297, see p. 293).</ref> Peirce observed that "[[George Berkeley|Berkeley]]'s metaphysical theories have at first sight an air of paradox and levity very unbecoming to a bishop".<ref>Peirce, C.S. (1871), Review: Fraser's Edition of the ''Works of George Berkeley'' in ''North American Review'' 113(October):449–472, reprinted in ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#CP|Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce]]'' v. 8, paragraphs 7–38 and in ''[[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography#W|Writings of Charles S. Peirce]]'' v. 2, pp. 462–486. ''Peirce Edition Project'' [http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_48/v2_48.htm Eprint] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180706131637/http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_48/v2_48.htm |date=2018-07-06  }}.</ref> 

Peirce asserted the reality of (1) "absolute chance" or randomness (his [[Tychism|tychist]] view), (2) "mechanical necessity" or physical laws ([[Ananke|anancist]] view), and (3) what he called the "law of love" ([[Agapism|agapist]] view), echoing his [[#Theory of categories|categories]] Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.<ref name=evolove/> He held that fortuitous variation (which he also called "sporting"), mechanical necessity, and creative love are the three modes of evolution (modes called "tychasm", "anancasm", and "agapasm")<ref>See "tychism", "tychasm", "tychasticism", and the rest, at http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html {{Webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100822160927/http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html |date=August 22, 2010}} ''Commens Digital Companion to C.S. Peirce''. https://web.archive.org/web/20111024011940/http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html</ref> of the cosmos and its parts. He found his conception of agapasm embodied in [[Lamarckism|Lamarckian evolution]]; the overall idea in any case is that of evolution tending toward an end or goal, and it could also be the evolution of a mind or a society; it is the kind of evolution which manifests workings of mind in some general sense. He said that overall he was a synechist, holding with reality of continuity,<ref name=evolove>Peirce (1893), "Evolutionary Love", ''The Monist'' v. 3, pp. 176–200. Reprinted ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', 6.278–317, ''The Essential Peirce'', 1:352–372. ''Arisbe'' [http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm Eprint] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070520131053/http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/evolove/evolove.htm |date=May 20, 2007}}</ref> especially of space, time, and law.<ref>See p. 115 in ''[[#RLT|Reasoning and the Logic of Things]]'' (Peirce's 1898 lectures).</ref>

===Some noted articles===
{{Unreferenced section|date=March 2025}}
* The ''Monist'' Metaphysical Series (1891–1893)
** The Architecture of Theories (1891)
** The Doctrine of Necessity Examined (1892)
** The Law of Mind (1892)
** Man's Glassy Essence (1892)
** Evolutionary Love (1893)
* Immortality in the Light of Synechism (1893 MS)