Editing Battle of the Little Bighorn (section)

===Custer's errors===
General Terry and others claimed that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign. For instance, he refused to use a battery of Gatling guns and turned down General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry. Custer believed that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. His rapid march en route to the Little Bighorn averaged nearly {{convert|30|mi|km}} a day, so his assessment appears to have been accurate. Custer planned "to live and travel like Indians; in this manner the command will be able to go wherever the Indians can", he wrote in his ''Herald'' dispatch.<ref name="Donovan 2008">Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'', (Kindle Locations 3080–3086)</ref>

[[File:Pawnee bill wild west show c1905.jpg|thumb|''Death of Custer'', scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers c. 1905 of Sitting Bull's stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground]]

By contrast, each Gatling gun had to be hauled by four horses, and soldiers often had to drag the heavy guns by hand over obstacles. Each of the heavy, hand-cranked weapons could fire up to 350 rounds a minute, an impressive rate, but they were known to jam frequently. During the [[Black Hills Expedition]] two years earlier, a Gatling gun had turned over, rolled down a mountain, and shattered to pieces. Lieutenant William Low, commander of the artillery detachment, was said to have almost wept when he learned he had been excluded from the strike force.<ref name="Donovan 2008" />

Custer believed that the 7th Cavalry could handle any Indian force and that the addition of the four companies of the 2nd would not alter the outcome. When offered the 2nd Cavalry, he reportedly replied that the 7th "could handle anything."<ref>Connell, Evan S. (1997). ''Son of the Morning Star''. New York: HarperPerennial, p. 257.</ref> There is evidence that Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. By dividing his forces, Custer could have caused the defeat of the entire column, had it not been for Benteen's and Reno's linking up to make a desperate yet successful stand on the bluff above the southern end of the camp.<ref>Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Location 5758)</ref>

The historian James Donovan believed that Custer's dividing his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) can be attributed to his inadequate reconnaissance; he also ignored the warnings of his Crow scouts and Charley Reynolds.<ref>Donovan (2008). ''A Terrible Glory'' (Kindle Location 3697)</ref> By the time the battle began, Custer had already divided his forces into three battalions of differing sizes, of which he kept the largest. His men were widely scattered and unable to support each other.<ref>Goodrich, Thomas (1984). ''Scalp Dance: Indian Warfare on the High Plains, 1865–1879''. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, p. 233.</ref><ref>Wert, Jeffry D. (1964/1996) ''Custer: The Controversial Life of George Armstrong Custer''. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 327.</ref> Wanting to prevent any escape by the combined tribes to the south, where they could disperse into different groups,<ref name="Donovan, loc 3699" /> Custer believed that an immediate attack on the south end of the camp was the best course of action.