Editing Battle of Passchendaele (section)

==Aftermath==

=== Analysis ===

{|class="wikitable floatright" style="text-align:right;"
|+German casualties{{sfn|Foerster|1956|p=96}}{{efn|German casualties were counted in ten-day periods. A discrepancy of {{nowrap|27,000 fewer}} casualties recorded in the {{lang|de|Sanitätsbericht}} could not be explained by the {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} historians.{{sfn|Foerster|1956|p=96}}}}
|-
! Date
! No.
|-
| 21–31 July||30,000
|-
| 1–10 Aug||16,000
|-
| 11–21 Aug||24,000
|-
| 21–31 Aug||12,500
|-
| 1–10 Sept||4,000
|-
|11–20 Sept||25,000
|-
| 21–30 Sept||13,500
|-
| 1–10 Oct||35,000
|-
| 11–20 Oct||12,000
|-
| 21–31 Oct||20,500
|-
| 1–10 Nov||9,500
|-
| 11–20 Nov||4,000
|-
| 21–30 Nov||4,500
|-
| 1–10 Dec||4,000
|-
| 11–31 Dec||2,500
|-
| '''Total'''||'''217,000'''
|}
In a German General Staff publication, it was written that "Germany had been brought near to certain destruction ({{lang|de|sicheren Untergang}}) by the Flanders battle of 1917".{{sfn|Edmonds|1991|p=xiii}} In his ''Memoirs'' of 1938, Lloyd George wrote, "Passchendaele was indeed one of the greatest disasters of the war&nbsp;... No soldier of any intelligence now defends this senseless campaign&nbsp;...".{{sfn|Terraine|1977|pp=xix–xx}} In 1939, G. C. Wynne wrote that the British had eventually reached Passchendaele Ridge and captured {{lang|de|Flandern I Stellung}} but beyond them were {{lang|de|Flandern II Stellung}} and {{lang|de|Flandern III Stellung}}. The German submarine bases on the coast had not been captured but the objective of diverting the Germans from the French further south, while they recovered from the Nivelle Offensive in April, had succeeded.{{sfn|Wynne|1976|pp=214–215}} In 1997, Paddy Griffith wrote that the ''bite and hold'' system kept moving until November, because the BEF had developed a workable system of offensive tactics, against which the Germans ultimately had no answer.{{sfn|Liddle|1997|p=71}} A decade later, Jack Sheldon wrote that relative casualty figures were irrelevant, because the German army could not afford the losses or to lose the initiative by being compelled to fight another defensive battle on ground of the Allies' choosing. The Third Battle of Ypres had pinned the German army to Flanders and caused unsustainable casualties.{{sfn|Sheldon|2007|pp=313–317}}

In 2018, Jonathan Boff wrote that after the war the {{lang|de|Reichsarchiv}} official historians, many of whom were former staff officers, wrote of the tactical changes after 26 September and their scrapping after the Battle of Broodseinde on 4 October, as the work of Loßberg. By blaming an individual, the rest of the German commanders were exculpated, which gave a false impression that OHL operated in a rational manner, when Ludendorff imposed another defensive scheme on 7 October. Boff wrote that this narrative was facile and that it avoided the problem faced by the Germans in late 1917. OHL had issued orders to change tactics again days before Loßberg was blamed for giving new orders to the 4th Army. Boff also doubted that all of the divisions in Flanders could act on top-down changes. The 119th Division was in the front line from 11 August to 18 October and replied that new tactics were difficult to implement due to lack of training. The tempo of British attacks and the effect of attrition meant that although six divisions were sent to the 4th Army by 10 October, they were either novice units deficient in training or veteran formations with low morale after earlier defeats; good divisions had been diluted with too many replacements. Boff wrote that the Germans consciously sought tactical changes for an operational dilemma for want of an alternative. On 2 October, Rupprecht had ordered the 4th Army HQ to avoid over-centralising command, only to find that Loßberg had issued an artillery plan detailing the deployment of individual batteries.{{sfn|Boff|2018|pp=181–182}}

At a British conference on 13 October, the Third Army (General [[Julian Byng, 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy|Julian Byng]]) scheme for an attack in mid-November was discussed. Byng wanted the operations at Ypres continued, to hold German troops in Flanders.{{sfn|Edmonds|1991|pp=345–346}} The [[Battle of Cambrai (1917)|Battle of Cambrai]] began on 20 November and the British breached the first two parts of the [[Hindenburg Line]], in the first successful mass use of [[tank]]s in a [[combined arms]] operation.{{sfn|Harris|1995|pp=124–125}} The experience of the failure to contain the British attacks at Ypres and the drastic reduction in areas of the western front that could be considered "quiet" after the tank and artillery surprise at Cambrai, left the OHL with little choice but to return to a strategy of decisive victory in 1918.{{sfn|Sheldon|2009|p=312}} On 24 October, the Austro-German 14th Army ({{lang|de|General der Infanterie}} [[Otto von Below]]), attacked the Italian Second Army on the Isonzo at the [[Battle of Caporetto]] and in 18 days, inflicted casualties of {{nowrap|650,000 men}} and {{nowrap|3,000 guns.}}{{sfn|Miles|1991|p=15}} In fear that Italy might be put out of the war, the French and British governments offered reinforcements.{{sfn|Bean|1941|pp=935–936}} British and French troops were swiftly moved from {{nowrap|10 November to 12 December}} but the diversion of resources from the BEF forced Haig to conclude the Third Battle of Ypres short of [[Westrozebeke]]; the last substantial British attack took place on 10 November.{{sfn|Bean|1941|p=936}}

===Casualties===

Various casualty figures have been published for the Third Battle of Ypres, sometimes with acrimony; the highest estimates for British and German casualties appear to be discredited but the British claim to have taken {{nowrap|24,065 prisoners}} has not been disputed.{{sfnm|1a1=McRandle|1a2=Quirk|1y=2006|1pp=667–701|2a1=Boraston|2y=1920|2p=133}} In 1940, [[C. R. M. F. Cruttwell]] recorded {{nowrap|300,000 British}} casualties and {{nowrap|400,000 German.}}{{sfn|Cruttwell|1982|p=442}} In the History of the Great War volume ''Military Operations....'' published in 1948, [[James E. Edmonds|James Edmonds]] put British casualties {{nowrap|at 244,897}} and wrote that equivalent German figures were not available, estimating German losses {{nowrap|at 400,000.}}{{sfn|Edmonds|1991|pp=360–365}}{{efn|For British losses, Edmonds used data based on figures submitted by the Adjutant-General's Department to the Allied Supreme War Council on 25 February 1918; Edmonds also showed weekly returns to GHQ, giving a slightly lower total of {{nowrap|238,313.}} Edmonds wrote that whereas the true figure for British casualties on the Somme had been approximately {{nowrap|420,000, the}} Germans had announced that the British had suffered {{nowrap|600,000 casualties,}} which was close to what Edmonds believed to be the "true" number for German Somme casualties (582,919). The Bavarian Official History had put British casualties at the Third Battle of Ypres at {{nowrap|400,000,}} which Edmonds believed raised "suspicion" that this was the number of German casualties. Edmonds wrote that the German Official Account ({{lang|de|Der Weltkrieg}}) put German 4th Army casualties (21 July – 31 December) at {{nowrap|approximately 217,000.}} Edmonds considered that 30 per cent needed to be added to German figures, to make them comparable to British casualty recording criteria, which would amount to {{nowrap|289,000 casualties.}} Edmonds wrote that this did not include units which served only briefly in the 4th Army or units that were not part of it. Edmonds wrote that German divisions had an average strength of {{nowrap|12,000 men}} and tended to be relieved after suffering about {{nowrap|4,000 casualties.}} As Crown Prince Rupprecht recorded 88 German divisions fighting in the battle and after deducting {{nowrap|15,000 German}} casualties from 15 June to 30 July, the Germans must have suffered around {{nowrap|337,000 casualties.}} The average German battalion strength dropped to {{nowrap|640 men}} despite "allowing {{nowrap|100 men}} reinforcements per battalion", suggesting {{nowrap|364,320 casualties.}} Edmonds wrote "there seems every probability that the Germans lost about 400,000".{{sfn|Terraine|2005|p=372}}{{sfn|Edmonds|1991|pp=360–365}}}} [[A. J. P. Taylor]] wrote in 1972 that no one believed Edmonds' "farcical calculations". Taylor put British wounded and killed at {{nowrap|300,000 and}} German losses at {{nowrap|200,000,}} "a proportion slightly better than the Somme".{{sfn|Taylor|1972|pp=181–182}} In 2007, Jack Sheldon wrote that although German casualties from 1 June to 10 November {{nowrap|were 217,194,}} a figure available in Volume III of the {{lang|de|Sanitätsbericht}} (Medical Report, 1934), Edmonds may not have included these data as they did not fit his case, using the phrases "creative accounting" and "cavalier handling of the facts". Sheldon wrote that the German casualties could only be brought up to {{nowrap|399,590}} by including the {{nowrap|182,396 soldiers}} who were sick or treated at regimental aid posts for "minor cuts and wounds" but ''not struck off unit strength''; Sheldon wrote "it is hard to see any merit" in doing so.{{sfn|Sheldon|2007|pp=313–315, 319}}

Leon Wolff, writing in 1958, gave German casualties as {{nowrap|270,713}} and British casualties as {{nowrap|448,688.}}{{sfn|Wolff|1958|p=259}} Wolff's British figure was refuted by [[John Terraine]] in a 1977 publication. Despite writing that {{nowrap|448,614 British}} casualties was the BEF total for the second half of 1917, Wolff had neglected to deduct {{nowrap|75,681 casualties}} for the Battle of Cambrai, given in the ''Official Statistics'' from which he quoted or "normal wastage", averaging {{nowrap|35,000 per}} month in "quiet" periods.{{sfn|Terraine|1977|pp=344–345}} In 1959, [[Cyril Falls]] estimated {{nowrap|240,000 British,}} {{nowrap|8,525 French}} and {{nowrap|260,000 German}} casualties.{{sfn|Falls|1959|p=303}} In his 1963 biography of Haig, Terraine accepted Edmonds' figure of {{nowrap|244,897 British}} casualties and agreed that German losses were at least equal to and probably greater than British, owing to the strength of British artillery and the high number of German counterattacks; he did not accept Edmonds' calculation that German losses were as high {{nowrap|as 400,000.}}{{sfn|Terraine|2005|p=372}} In his 1977 work, Terraine wrote that the German figure ought to be increased because their statistics were incomplete and because their data omitted some lightly wounded men, who would have been included under British casualty criteria, revising the German figure by twenty per cent, which made German casualties {{nowrap|260,400.}}{{sfn|Terraine|1977|pp=344–345}} Prior and Wilson, in 1997, gave British losses of {{nowrap|275,000 and}} German casualties at just {{nowrap|under 200,000.}}{{sfn|Prior|Wilson|1996|p=195}} In 1997, Heinz Hagenlücke gave {{circa|217,000 German}} casualties.{{sfn|Liddle|1997|pp=45–58}} [[Gary Sheffield (historian)|Gary Sheffield]] wrote in 2002 that [[Richard Holmes (military historian)|Richard Holmes]] guessed that both sides suffered {{nowrap|260,000 casualties,}} which seemed about right to him.{{sfn|Sheffield|2002|p=216}}

===Subsequent operations===

====Winter 1917–1918====

The area to the east and south of the ruins of Passchendaele village was held by posts, those to the east being fairly habitable, unlike the southern ones; from Passchendaele as far back as Potijze, the ground was far worse. Each brigade spent four days in the front line, four in support and four in reserve. The area was quiet apart from artillery-fire and in December the weather turned cold and snowy, which entailed a great effort to prevent [[trench foot]]. In January, spells of freezing cold were followed by warmer periods, one beginning on 15 January with torrential rain and gale-force winds, washing away plank roads and [[duckboard]] tracks.{{sfn|Boraston|Bax|1999|pp=167–168}} Conditions in the salient improved with the completion of transport routes and the refurbishment of German pillboxes. Both sides raided and the British used night machine-gun fire and artillery barrages to great effect.{{sfn|Seton Hutchinson|2005|pp=79–80}} On the evening of 3 March 1918, two companies of the 8th Division raided Teal Cottage, supported by a smoke and shrapnel barrage, killed many of the garrison and took six prisoners for one man wounded.{{sfn|Boraston|Bax|1999|p=171}} A German attack on 11 March was repulsed; after that the Germans made no more attacks, keeping up frequent artillery bombardments and machine-gun fire instead.{{sfn|Gillon|2002|pp=180–183}} When the German armies further south began the [[German spring offensive|Spring Offensive]] on 21 March 1918, "good" divisions in Flanders were sent south; the 29th Division was withdrawn on 9 April and transferred to the Lys.{{sfnm|1a1=Seton Hutchinson|1y=2005|1p=80|2a1=Gillon|2y=2002|2p=186}}

====Retreat, 1918====

{{see also|German Spring Offensive|Operation Michael|Battle of the Lys (1918)}}

On 23 March, Haig ordered Plumer to make contingency plans to shorten the line and release troops for the other armies. Worn-out divisions from the south had been sent to Flanders to recuperate closer to the coast. On 11 April, Plumer authorised a withdrawal of the southern flank of the Second Army. On 12 April, the VIII Corps HQ ordered the infantry retirement to begin that night and the 59th Division was replaced by part of the 41st Division and transferred south. The II Corps had begun to withdraw its artillery at the same time as VIII Corps, on the night of 11/12 April and ordered the 36th (Ulster) and 30th divisions to conform to the VIII Corps retirement, which was complete by 13 April, with no German interference.{{sfn|Edmonds|Davies|Maxwell-Hyslop|1995|pp=113–114, 245, 275}} On 13 April, Plumer agreed to a retirement in the south side of the salient to a line from Mt Kemmel to Voormezeele [{{cvt|2.5|mi}} south of Ypres], White Château [{{cvt|1|mi}} east of Ypres] and Pilckem Ridge.{{sfn|Edmonds|Davies|Maxwell-Hyslop|1995|pp=299–300, 319, 316, 326}} The 4th Army diary recorded that the withdrawal was discovered at {{nowrap|4:40&nbsp;a.m.}} Next day, at the [[Battle of Merckem]], the Germans attacked from Houthulst Forest, north-east of Ypres and captured Kippe but were forced out by Belgian counter-attacks, supported by the II Corps artillery. On the afternoon of 27 April, the south end of the Second Army outpost line was driven in near Voormezeele and another British outpost line was established north-east of the village.{{sfn|Edmonds|Davies|Maxwell-Hyslop|1995|pp=337–338, 342, 443}}

===Commemoration===

[[File:View from top of Tyne Cot.JPG|thumb|{{centre|Tyne Cot Commonwealth War Graves Cemetery and Memorial to the Missing}}]]
The [[Menin Gate]] Memorial to the Missing commemorates those of all Commonwealth nations (except New Zealand and Newfoundland) who died in the Ypres Salient and have no known grave. In the case of the United Kingdom only casualties before 16 August 1917 are commemorated on the memorial. United Kingdom and New Zealand servicemen who died after that date are named on the memorial at [[Tyne Cot Cemetery]]. There is a New Zealand Memorial marking where New Zealand troops fought at Gravenstafel Ridge on 4 October, located on Roeselarestraat.{{sfn|NZG|nd}} There are numerous tributes and memorials in Australia and New Zealand to Anzac soldiers who died in the battle, including plaques at the [[Christchurch]] and [[Dunedin]] railway stations. The Canadian Corps' participation in the Second Battle of Passchendaele is commemorated with the [[Passchendaele Memorial]] at site of the Crest Farm on the south-west fringe of Passchendaele village.{{sfn|Vance|1997|p=66}}

One of the newest monuments to be dedicated to the fighting contribution of a group is the [[Celtic Cross]] memorial, commemorating the Scottish contribution to the fighting in Flanders during the Great War. This memorial is on Frezenberg Ridge where the 9th (Scottish) Division and the 15th (Scottish) Division fought during the Third Battle of Ypres. The monument was dedicated by [[Linda Fabiani]], the Minister for Europe of the [[Scottish Parliament]], during the late summer of 2007, the 90th anniversary of the battle.{{sfn|SG|2007}} In July 2017 a two-day event was organised in Ypres to mark the centenary of the battle. Members of the [[British royal family]] and Prime Minister [[Theresa May]] joined the ceremonies, which started in the evening of 30 July with the service at Menin Gate, followed by ceremonies at the Market Square. On the following day, a ceremony was held at Tyne Cot cemetery, headed by the [[Charles III of the United Kingdom|Prince of Wales]].{{sfn|DT|2017}}{{sfn|DT|2017a}}