Editing Analytic philosophy (section)

==== Closure ====
[[File:3349839-left-hand-outstretched.jpg|thumb|140px|"Here is one hand"]]

[[Epistemic closure]] is the claim that knowledge is closed under [[Logical consequence|entailment]]; in other words epistemic closure is a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] or the [[Concept|principle]] that if a subject <math>S</math> knows <math>p</math>, and <math>S</math> knows that <math>p</math> [[Logical consequence|entails]] <math>q</math>, then <math>S</math> can thereby come to know <math>q</math>.<ref name="stanford">{{cite encyclopedia |title=The Epistemic Closure Principle |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |date=31 December 2001 |author=Luper, Steven |chapter-url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/closure-epistemic/#CloPri |chapter=Epistemic Closure}}</ref> Most [[Epistemology|epistemological]] theories involve a closure principle, and many skeptical arguments assume a closure principle. In ''Proof of An External World'', G. E. Moore uses closure in his famous anti-skeptical "[[here is one hand]]" argument. Shortly before his death, Wittgenstein wrote ''[[On Certainty]]'' in response to Moore.

While the principle of epistemic closure is generally regarded as intuitive,<ref>{{cite journal |author1=Brady, Michael |author2=Pritchard, Duncan |year=2005 |title=Epistemological Contextualism: Problems and Prospects |journal=[[The Philosophical Quarterly]] |volume=55 |issue=219 |pages=161–171 |doi=10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00393.x}}</ref> philosophers, such as [[Fred Dretske]] with [[relevant alternatives theory]] and Robert Nozick in ''[[Philosophical Explanations]]'', have argued against it.