Editing Zbigniew Brzezinski (section)

==Advisor to President Carter==
[[File:Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski. - NARA - 175514.tif|thumb|Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]] and National Security Council Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski (1977)]]
Carter announced his candidacy for the [[1976 United States presidential election|1976 presidential campaign]] to a skeptical media and proclaimed himself an "eager student" of Brzezinski.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Brauer |first=Carl |date=November 1, 1988 |title=Lost In Transition |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1988/11/lost-in-transition/307120/ |journal=The Atlantic |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Atlantic Media |access-date=March 27, 2014 }}</ref> Brzezinski became Carter's principal foreign policy advisor by late 1975. He became an outspoken critic of the Nixon-Kissinger over-reliance on détente, a situation preferred by the Soviet Union, favoring the [[Helsinki Accords|Helsinki process]] instead, which focused on human rights, [[international law]] and peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe. Brzezinski was considered to be the Democrats' response to [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] [[Henry Kissinger]].<ref>John Maclean, "Advisers Key to Foreign Policy Views", ''The Boston Evening Globe'' (October 5, 1976)</ref> Carter engaged his incumbent opponent for the presidency, [[Gerald Ford]], in foreign policy debates by contrasting the Trilateral vision with Ford's détente.<ref>{{cite book|last=Vaughan |first=Patrick G. |editor-first=Leopoldo| editor-last=Nuti |title=The Crisis of Détente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year=2008 |pages=11–25 |chapter=Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Helsinki Final Act |isbn=978-0-415-46051-4}}</ref>

After his victory in 1976, Carter made Brzezinski [[National Security Advisor (United States)|National Security Advisor]]. Earlier that year, major labor riots broke out in Poland, laying the foundations for [[Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity]]. Brzezinski began by emphasizing the "Basket III" human rights in the [[Helsinki Accords|Helsinki Final Act]], which inspired [[Charter 77]] in [[Czechoslovakia]] shortly thereafter.<ref>Michael Getler, "Dissidents Challenge Prague – Tension Builds Following Demand for Freedom and Democracy", ''The Washington Post'' (January 21, 1977).</ref>

Brzezinski assisted with writing parts of Carter's inaugural address, and this served his purpose of sending a positive message to Soviet dissidents.<ref>Zbigniew Brzezinski, ''Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–1981'' (New York, 1983), p. 123.</ref> The Soviet Union and Western European leaders both complained that this kind of rhetoric ran against the "code of détente" that Nixon and Kissinger had established.<ref>Seyom Brown, ''Faces of Power'' (New York, 1983), p. 539.</ref><ref>"Giscard, Schmidt on Détente", ''The Washington Post'' (July 19, 1977).</ref> Brzezinski ran up against members of his own [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic Party]] who disagreed with this interpretation of détente, including Secretary of State [[Cyrus Vance]]. Vance argued for less emphasis on human rights in order to gain Soviet agreement to [[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]] (SALT), whereas Brzezinski favored doing both at the same time. Brzezinski then ordered [[Radio Free Europe]] transmitters to increase the power and area of their broadcasts, a provocative reversal of Nixon-Kissinger policies.<ref>David Binder, "Carter Requests Funds for Big Increase in Broadcasts to Soviet Bloc", ''The New York Times'' (March 23, 1977).</ref> West German chancellor [[Helmut Schmidt]] objected to Brzezinski's agenda, even calling for the removal of Radio Free Europe from German soil.<ref>Brzezinski, ''Power and Principle'', p. 293.</ref>

The State Department was alarmed by Brzezinski's support for dissidents in East Germany and objected to his suggestion that Carter's first overseas visit be to Poland. He visited [[Warsaw]] and met with [[Cardinal (Catholicism)|Cardinal]] [[Stefan Wyszynski]] (against the objection of the U.S. Ambassador to Poland), recognizing the [[Roman Catholic Church]] as the legitimate opposition to communist rule in Poland.<ref>David A. Andelman, "Brzezinski and Mrs. Carter Hold Discussion with Polish Cardinal", ''The New York Times'' (December 29, 1977).</ref>

By 1978, Brzezinski and Vance were more and more at odds over the direction of Carter's foreign policy. Vance sought to continue the style of détente engineered by Nixon-Kissinger, with a focus on [[arms control]]. Brzezinski believed that détente emboldened the Soviets in Angola and the Middle East, and so he argued for increased military strength and an emphasis on human rights. Vance, the State Department, and the media criticized Brzezinski publicly as seeking to revive the Cold War.  Brzezinski advised Carter in 1978 to engage the People's Republic of China and traveled to Beijing to lay the groundwork for the normalization of relations between the two countries. This also resulted in the severing of ties with the United States' longtime anti-Communist ally the Republic of China (Taiwan).<ref>Kevin V.  Mulcahy, "The secretary of State and the national security adviser: Foreign policymaking in the Carter and Reagan administrations." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 16.2 (1986): 280-299.</ref><ref>Jerel A. Rosati, "Continuity and change in the foreign policy beliefs of political leaders: Addressing the controversy over the Carter administration." ''Political Psychology'' (1988): 471-505.</ref>

Brzezinski's influence over President Carter persuaded the latter to, despite the misgivings of his own Department of State, also pursue a more belligerent policy towards Cuba with regards to its role in Africa, which he perceived to be part of a wider Soviet plot to destabilise and dominate the continent. Carter denounced the Cuban government's support of the regime of [[Mengistu Haile Mariam]] in Ethiopia during the [[Ogaden War]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Basosi |first=Duccio |date=2 July 2024 |title='Something that apparently troubles the Cubans significantly': Jimmy Carter's attempt to pressure Cuba 'out of Africa' through the Non-Aligned Movement, 1977-78 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2023.2269869#abstract |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |language=en |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=359–377 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2023.2269869 |issn=1468-2745 |access-date=11 February 2025 |via=Taylor and Francis Online|hdl=10278/5045962 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

<div class="toccolours" style="float:right;width:175px;margin:10px;padding:10px">For historical background on this period of history, see:
* [[Iranian Revolution]];
* [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]]; and
* [[Solidarity (Polish trade union)|Solidarity]].
</div>
1979 saw two major strategically important events: the overthrow of U.S. ally the [[Mohammad Reza Pahlavi|Shah of Iran]], and the [[Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]]. The [[Iranian Revolution]] precipitated the [[Iran hostage crisis]], which would last for the rest of Carter's presidency. Brzezinski anticipated the Soviet invasion, and, with the support of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China, he created a strategy to undermine the Soviet presence. Using this atmosphere of insecurity, Brzezinski led the United States toward a new arms buildup and the development of the [[Rapid Deployment Forces]]—policies that are both more generally associated with Reagan's presidency now.{{Citation needed|date=May 2017}}

In 1979, the Soviets intervened in the [[Yemenite War of 1979|Second Yemenite War]]. The Soviet backing of [[South Yemen]] constituted a "smaller shock", in tandem with tensions that were rising due to the Iranian Revolution. This played a role in shifting Carter's viewpoint on the Soviet Union to a more assertive one, a shift that finalized with the Soviet-Afghan War.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Jimmy Carter and the Second Yemenite War: A Smaller Shock of 1979? {{!}} Wilson Center|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jimmy-carter-and-second-yemenite-war-smaller-shock-1979|access-date=November 21, 2021|website=www.wilsoncenter.org|date=June 28, 2021 |language=en}}</ref>

Brzezinski constantly urged either the restoration of the Shah of Iran to power or a military takeover, whatever the short-term costs in terms of values.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Vaïsse|first=Justin|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1041140127|title=Zbigniew Brzezinski : America's grand strategist|date=2018|translator-first=Catherine | translator-last=Porter|isbn=978-0-674-91950-1|publisher=Harvard University Press |location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|oclc=1041140127}}</ref>

On November 9, 1979, Brzezinski was awakened at 3&nbsp;am by a phone call with a startling message: The Soviets had just launched 250 nuclear weapons at the United States. Minutes later, Brzezinski received another call: The early-warning system actually showed 2,000 missiles heading toward the United States.<ref name="3am1979">{{cite web |title=The 3 A.M. Phone Call |url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb371/ |date=March 1, 2012 |work=National Security Archive |publisher=[[George Washington University]] |access-date=February 11, 2017}}</ref> As Brzezinski prepared to phone President Jimmy Carter to plan a full-scale response, he received a third call: It was a false alarm. An early warning training tape generating indications of a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack had somehow transferred to the actual early warning network, which triggered an all-too-real scramble.<ref name="3am1979" />

Brzezinski, acting under a lame duck Carter presidency—but encouraged that Solidarity in Poland had vindicated his style of engagement with Eastern Europe—took a hard-line stance against what seemed like an imminent Soviet invasion of Poland. He even made a midnight phone call to [[Pope John Paul II]] (whose visit to Poland in 1979 had foreshadowed the emergence of Solidarity) warning him in advance. The U.S. stance was a significant change from previous reactions to Soviet repression in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.{{Citation needed|date=May 2017}}

Brzezinski developed the [[Carter Doctrine]], which committed the U.S. to use military force in defense of the [[Persian Gulf]].<ref name=WashPoObit /> In 1981 President Carter presented Brzezinski with the [[Presidential Medal of Freedom]].