Editing Yom Kippur War (section)

===Israeli preparation===
[[File:Golda Meir2.jpg|thumb|Upon learning of the impending attack, [[Prime Minister of Israel]] [[Golda Meir]] made the controversial decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike.]]
Prime Minister Golda Meir, Minister of Defense [[Moshe Dayan]] and Chief of General Staff [[David Elazar]] met at 8:05&nbsp;am on the morning of Yom Kippur, six hours before the war began.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}} Elazar proposed a mobilization of the entire air force and four armored divisions, or 100,000 to 120,000 troops, while Dayan favored a mobilization of the air force and two armored divisions, or around 70,000 troops. Meir chose Elazar's proposal.{{sfnp|Gawrych|1996|p=27}} Elazar argued in favor of a pre-emptive attack against Syrian airfields at noon, Syrian missiles at 3:00&nbsp;pm, and Syrian ground forces at 5:00&nbsp;pm: 
{{blockquote|When the presentations were done, the prime minister hemmed uncertainly for a few moments but then came to a clear decision. There would be no preemptive strike. Israel might be needing American assistance soon and it was imperative that it would not be blamed for starting the war. 'If we strike first, we won't get help from anybody,' she said.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=89}}}}

Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war,<ref name="Quandt1977">{{cite book |author=William B. Quandt |title=Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976 |url=https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will |url-access=registration |date=1977 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-03469-3 |page=[https://archive.org/details/decadeofdecision00will/page/169 169] |quote=Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Israel that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war}}</ref> and on 6 October 1973, Kissinger sent a further dispatch discouraging a preemptive strike.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB98/octwar-10.pdf|title=The national security archive, declassified archival records, The October War and U.S. Policy.}}</ref><ref name=Sachar755>Sachar, Howard M. ''A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time''. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, p. 755.</ref> Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply and sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. At 10:15&nbsp;am, Meir met with American ambassador [[Kenneth Keating]] to inform him that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war and asked that American efforts be directed at preventing war.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|pp=104–105}}<ref>{{cite web |url=https://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?rid=77417&dt=1573&dl=823 |title=Government of Israel Concern about possible Syrian and Egyptian attack today |access-date=11 August 2010 |publisher=[[United States Department of State]] |date=6 October 1973}}</ref>

Kissinger urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile.{{sfnp|Quandt|2005|p=105}} According to Kissinger, had Israel struck first it would not have received "so much as a nail" in support from the United States.{{sfnp|Rabinovich|2004|p=454}}<ref>{{cite news|last1=Rabinovich|first1=Abraham|title=Three years too late, Golda Meir understood how war could have been avoided|url=http://www.timesofisrael.com/three-years-too-late-golda-meir-understood-how-war-could-have-been-avoided/|access-date=15 April 2017|work=The Times of Israel|date=12 September 2013}}</ref>