Editing Yalta Conference (section)

===Democratic elections===
The Big Three further agreed that democracies would be established, all liberated European and former Axis satellite countries would hold free elections and that order would be restored.<ref name="yaltareport">February 11, 1945 ''Protocol of Proceedings of Crimea Conference'', ''reprinted in'' Grenville, John Ashley Soames and Bernard Wasserstein, ''The Major International Treaties of the Twentieth Century: A History and Guide with Texts'', Taylor and Francis, 2001 {{ISBN|0-415-23798-X}}, pp. 267–77</ref> In that regard, they promised to rebuild occupied countries by processes that will allow them "to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter&nbsp;– the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live."<ref name="yaltareport"/> The resulting report stated that the three would assist occupied countries to form interim government that "pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of the Governments responsive to the will of the people" and to "facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections".<ref name="yaltareport"/>

The agreement called on signatories to "consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration". During the Yalta discussions, Molotov inserted language that weakened the implication of enforcement of the declaration.<ref name="Leffler">{{cite journal |first=Melvyn P. |last=Leffler |title=Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=11 |issue=1 |year=1986 |pages=88–123 |jstor=2538877 |doi=10.2307/2538877 |s2cid=153352217 }}</ref>

Regarding Poland, the Yalta report further stated that the provisional government should "be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot".<ref name="yaltareport"/> The agreement could not conceal the importance of acceding to the pro-Soviet short-term [[Polish Committee of National Liberation|Lublin government]] control and of eliminating language that called for supervised elections.<ref name="Leffler"/>

According to Roosevelt, "if we attempt to evade the fact that we placed somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the other two groups from which the new government is to be drawn I feel we will expose ourselves to the charges that we are attempting to go back on the Crimea decision". Roosevelt conceded that, in the words of Admiral William D. Leahy, the language of Yalta was so vague that the Soviets could "stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without ever technically breaking it".<ref>David M. Kennedy  ''The American People in World War II: Freedom from Fear'', Part Two p. 377</ref>

The final agreement stipulated that "the Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland and from Poles abroad".<ref name="yaltareport"/> The language of Yalta conceded predominance of the pro-Soviet Lublin government in a provisional government but a reorganized one.<ref name="Leffler"/>