Editing Winter War (section)

=== Negotiations ===
{{Main|Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact}}
[[File:Field Kitchen before Winter War.jpg|alt=During additional refresher training, a Finnish soldier has his breakfast served into a mess kit by another soldier from a steaming field kitchen in the forests of the Karelian Isthmus. More soldiers, two of them visible, wait in line for their turn behind him. It is early October, and the snow has not yet set in.|thumb|Finnish soldiers gather breakfast from a [[field kitchen]] during "additional [[Refresher training (military)|refresher training]]" at the Karelian Isthmus, on 10 October 1939.]]

In April 1938, [[NKVD]] agent [[Boris Yartsev]] contacted Finnish Foreign Minister [[Rudolf Holsti]] and Finnish Prime Minister [[Aimo Cajander]], stating that the Soviets did not trust Germany and that war was considered possible between the two countries. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy". Finnish representatives assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev suggested that Finland cede or lease some islands in the [[Gulf of Finland]] along the seaward approaches to Leningrad, but Finland refused.<ref name="Trotter_12-13">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 12–13</ref><ref name="Turtola1999a_32-33">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 32–33</ref>

Negotiations continued throughout 1938 without results. The Finnish reception of Soviet entreaties was decidedly cool, as the violent collectivisation and purges in Stalin's Soviet Union resulted in a poor opinion of the country. Most of the Finnish communist elite in the Soviet Union had been executed during the Great Purge, further tarnishing the Soviets' image in Finland. Meanwhile, Finland was attempting to negotiate a military co-operation plan with Sweden and hoping to jointly defend Åland.<ref name="Turtola1999a_34-35">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 34–35</ref>

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]] in August 1939. It was publicly a [[non-aggression treaty]], but it included a secret protocol in which Central and Eastern European countries were divided into [[Sphere of influence|spheres of influence]]. Finland fell into the Soviet sphere. On 1 September 1939, Germany began its [[invasion of Poland]], and two days later, the United Kingdom and France declared war on Germany. On 17 September, the [[Soviet invasion of Poland]] began. After the fall of Poland, Germany and the Soviet Union exchanged occupied Polish lands to establish a new border in accordance with the provisions of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Estonia, [[Latvia]] and [[Lithuania]] were soon [[Soviet occupation of the Baltic states (1940)|forced to accept treaties]] that allowed the Soviets to establish military bases on their soil.<ref name="EP1985_6">[[#Engle&Paan1985|Engle and Paananen (1985)]], p. 6</ref> Estonia accepted the [[ultimatum]] by signing the agreement on 28 September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October. Unlike the three Baltic countries, Finland started a gradual [[mobilisation]] under the guise of "additional [[refresher training]]".<ref name= "Turtola1999a_38-41">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 38–41</ref> The Soviets had already started intensive mobilisation near the Finnish border in 1938–39.<ref name="Murphy 2021 p. 7"/> Assault troops thought to be necessary for the invasion did not begin deployment until October 1939. Operational plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November.<ref name="Ries1988_55-56">[[#Ries1988|Ries (1988)]], pp. 55–56</ref><ref name="Manninen1999a_141-148">[[#Manninen1999a|Manninen (1999a)]], pp. 141–148</ref>

On 5 October 1939, the Soviets invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow for negotiations. [[Juho Kusti Paasikivi]], the Finnish envoy to Sweden, was sent to Moscow to represent the Finnish government<ref name="Turtola1999a_38-41" /> Furthermore, the negotiations were attended by Stalin in person, signalling the seriousness of the effort.<ref name="Kotkin_960">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 960</ref> Paasikivi would later recount his surprise over the friendly atmosphere in which the delegation was received, and mentioned the pleasant manners of Stalin towards them.<ref name="Kotkin_963">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 963</ref>

The meetings began on 12 October, with Molotov's offer of a mutual assistance pact, which the Finns immediately refused. To the Finns' surprise, Molotov dropped the offer and instead proposed an exchange of territory.<ref name="Kotkin_960"/> The offer stipulated that the Finnish-Soviet border on the [[Karelian Isthmus]] be moved westward to a point only {{convert|30|km|mi|abbr=on}} east of [[Viipuri]] ({{Langx|ru|Vyborg}}) and that Finland destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. Likewise, the delegation demanded the cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as [[Rybachy Peninsula]] ({{langx|fi|Kalastajasaarento}}). The Finns would also have to lease the [[Hanko Peninsula]] for 30 years and to permit the Soviets to establish a [[military base]] there. In exchange, the Soviet Union would cede [[Repola]] and [[Porajärvi]] from [[Eastern Karelia]] (2120 square miles), an area twice the size as that of the territory demanded from Finland (1000 square miles).<ref name="Turtola1999a_38-41" /><ref name="Trotter_14-16">[[#Trotter2002|Trotter (2002)]], pp. 14–16</ref><ref name="Kotkin_962">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 962</ref>

The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government: [[Gustaf Mannerheim]] had argued for an agreement, being pessimistic of the Finnish prospects in a war against the Soviet Union.<ref name="Kotkin_970">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 970</ref> But the Finnish government was reticent in reaching an agreement out of mistrust for Stalin: there was a fear of repeated follow-up demands, which would have put the future of Finnish sovereignty in danger. There were also those, such as Foreign Minister [[Eljas Erkko]] and Prime Minister [[Aimo Cajander]], and the Finnish intelligence in general, who mistook the demands and the Soviet military build-up as a mere bluff on the part of Stalin, and were thus disinclined to reach an agreement.<ref name="Kotkin_970"/>

The Finns made two counteroffers that would cede the [[Terijoki]] area to the Soviet Union. This would have doubled the distance between Leningrad and the Finnish border, but was far less than the Soviets had demanded.<ref name="Turtola1999a_41-43">[[#Turtola1999a|Turtola (1999a)]], pp. 41–43</ref> The Finns would also cede the islands in the Gulf of Finland, but they would not agree to lease any territory to the USSR for military purposes.<ref>[[#Tanner1950|Tanner (1950)]]</ref><ref name="Kotkin_964">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 964</ref>

On the next meeting on 23 October, Stalin lessened his demands: a reduction in the amount of land demanded in Karelia; a reduction of the Hanko garrison from 5000 to 4000 men; and reducing the length of lease from 30 years to whatever date the ongoing (second world) war in Europe would end.<ref name="Kotkin_965">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 965</ref> However, this sudden change, contrary to previous statements that Soviet demands were minimalist and thus unalterable, had surprised the Finnish government, and lead them to believe more concession may be forthcoming. Thus, Paasikivi's idea of reaching some sort of compromise by offering the Soviets the island of Jussarö and the fort of Ino were refused by Helsinki.<ref name="Kotkin_963_971">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 963, 971</ref>

On 31 October, Molotov publicly announced the Soviet demands to the [[Supreme Soviet]]. This surprised the Finns, and lent credibility to Soviet claims that their demands were minimalist and thus unalterable, as it would have been impossible to reduce them without a loss of prestige after having made them public.<ref name="Kotkin_966">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 966</ref> However, the Soviet offer was eventually rejected with respect to the opinion of the public and Parliament.<ref name="Turtola1999a_41-43"/>

At the meeting on 9 November, Paasikivi announced to the attending Stalin and Molotov the Finnish refusal to accept even their reduced demands. The Soviets were visibly surprised. Finnish Foreign Minister [[Vaino Tanner]] later wrote that "the eyes of our opposite numbers opened wide". Stalin had asked "You don't even offer Ino?"<ref name="Kotkin_971">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 971</ref> This would become the final meeting: the Soviets stopped responding to further Finnish letters and on 13 November, when the Finnish delegation was recalled from Moscow, no Soviet officials came to see them off.<ref name="Kotkin_973">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 973</ref> The Finns had left under the expectation that the negotiations would continue.<ref name="talvisodanpikkujattilainen-turtola12">{{cite book |last=Turtola | first=Martti |editor1-first=Jari |editor1-last=Leskinen |editor2-first=Antti |editor2-last=Juutilainen |title=Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen |date=1999 |pages=41–43 |chapter=Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla}}</ref> Instead, the Soviet Union ramped up its military preparations.<ref name="Kotkin_975">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], p. 975</ref>

The negotiations had failed, as neither side was willing to substantially reduce their demands, nor was either side able to fully trust the other. The Finns were fearful of an encroachment on their sovereignty, while the Soviets were (claiming to be) fearful of a springboard for international enemies in Finland, in close proximity to Leningrad. No promises to the contrary managed to persuade the other.<ref name="Kotkin_961_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 961, 974</ref> Additionally, both sides had misunderstood the others position: the Finns had assumed that the Soviets had opened up on a maximalist demand, ready to be traded down smaller. The Soviets instead had stressed the minimalist nature of their demands, and were incredulous over Finnish reluctance to agree.<ref name="Kotkin_964"/> Finally, there was also Stalin's unwillingness or inability to accept that any territorial concessions on the part of Finland would have only been possible by a 4/5th majority in the Finnish parliament. He had mocked such a requirement, proposing that they count his and Molotov's votes, too.<ref name="Kotkin_974">[[#Kotkin2017|Kotkin (2017)]], pp. 974</ref>