Editing Wassenaar Arrangement (section)

== "Wassenaar minus one" ==

During 2022 and 2023, a variety of proposals for modification to the listed items were proposed within Wassenaar, but were not accepted.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Shivakumar |first1=Sujai |last2=Wessner |first2=Charles |last3=Tomoshige |first3=Hideki |title=Toward a New Multilateral Export Control Regime |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/toward-new-multilateral-export-control-regime |language=en |date=10 January 2023 |access-date=2024-12-09}}</ref>  Several states made unilateral legislation, rather than obtaining harmonisation through the Arrangement, including:<ref>{{cite web |title=International Unilateral Export Controls—An Increased Focus on Advanced Technologies |url=https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/international-unilateral-export-controls-an-increased-focus-on-advanced-technologies |website=Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP - International Unilateral Export Controls—An Increased Focus on Advanced Technologies |access-date=2024-12-09 |language=en}}</ref>
* Spain for quantum computers containing more than 34 [[qubits]] and error rates below a certain [[controlled NOT gate]] [[Threshold theorem|error threshold]], along with restrictions for quantum computers with more qubits and higher error rates, and cryo-computing technologies
* Netherlands for equipment for manufacturing advanced-process-node semiconductors
* US for AI chips and technology, and lasers and cameras associated with some types of additive manufacture
The corresponding proposals within WA were not accepted, due to objection from the Russian delegation.<ref>{{cite web |title=US, allies explore Russia's exclusion from Wassenaar export control regime |url=https://www.worldecr.com/news/us-allies-explore-russias-exclusion-from-wassenaar-export-control-regime/ |website=WorldECR |access-date=2024-12-09}}</ref>  Only minor and editorial changes were universally accepted.  At the time, Russia faced [[International sanctions during the Russian invasion of Ukraine|international sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine]].

Consequently in mid 2024 and later, many Wassenaar nations have implemented export controls corresponding to the unliateral legislation above.  These include UK<ref>{{cite web |title=NTE 2024/06: updates to UK strategic export list |url=https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-to-exporters-202406-updates-to-uk-strategic-export-list/nte-202406-updates-to-uk-strategic-export-list |website=GOV.UK |language=en}}</ref> and Canada.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Government of Canada |first=Public Works and Government Services Canada |date=2024-06-19 |title=Canada Gazette, Part 2, Volume 158, Number 13: Order Amending the Export Control List |url=https://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p2/2024/2024-06-19/html/sor-dors112-eng.html |access-date=2024-07-07 |website=gazette.gc.ca}}</ref>  These are classified as 'country specific', although there appears to be harmonisation of these 2024 controls across many advanced economies.  The introduction of these controls caused surprise in some circles.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Sparkes |first=Matthew |date=2024-07-03 |title=Multiple nations enact mysterious export controls on quantum computers |url=https://www.newscientist.com/article/2436023-multiple-nations-enact-mysterious-export-controls-on-quantum-computers/ |access-date=2024-07-07 |website=New Scientist |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Grimm |first=Dallin |date=2024-07-06 |title=Mysterious quantum computing restrictions spread across multiple nations — UK cites national security risks and refuses to elaborate |url=https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/quantum-computing/mysterious-quantum-computing-restrictions-spread-across-multiple-nations-uk-cites-national-security-risks-and-refuses-to-elaborate |access-date=2024-07-07 |website=Tom's Hardware |language=en}}</ref>  Other nations largely harmonised their export controls over the course of 2024 and early 2025.