Editing USS Liberty incident (section)

===Visual contact===
Official testimony combined with ''Liberty''{{'}}s deck log establish that throughout the morning of the attack, 8 June, the ship was overflown, at various times and locations, by IAF aircraft.<ref name=NSAhistory25/> The primary aircraft type was the [[Nord Noratlas]]; there were also two unidentified delta-wing jets at about 09:00 Sinai time ([[Greenwich Mean Time|GMT]]+2).<ref name=NSAhistory25/> ''Liberty'' crewmembers say that one of the Noratlas aircraft flew so close to ''Liberty'' that noise from its propellers rattled the ship's deck plating, and that the pilots and crewmembers waved to each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|p=62}}</ref> It was later reported, based on information from IDF sources, that the over-flights were coincidental, and that the aircraft were hunting for Egyptian submarines that had been spotted near the coast.

At about 05:45 Sinai time, a ship-sighting report was received at Israeli Central Coastal Command (CCC) in respect of ''Liberty'', identified by an aerial naval observer as "apparently a [[destroyer]], sailing {{convert|70|miles|disp=sqbr}} west of Gaza".<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=6–7}}</ref> The vessel's location was marked on a CCC control table, using a red marker, indicating an unidentified vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=7}}</ref> At about 06:00, the aerial naval observer, Major Uri Meretz, reported that the ship appeared to be a U.S. Navy supply ship; at about 09:00 the red marker was replaced with a green marker to indicate a neutral vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> About the same time, an Israeli jet fighter pilot reported that a ship {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish had fired at his aircraft after he tried to identify the vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> Israeli naval command dispatched two destroyers to investigate, but they were returned to their previous positions at 09:40 after doubts emerged during the pilot's debriefing.<ref name=IDFHR7/> After the naval observer's Noratlas landed and he was debriefed, the ship he saw was further identified as USS ''Liberty'', based on its "GTR-5" hull markings.<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=7–8}}</ref> USS ''Liberty''{{'s}} marker was removed from CCC's Control Table at 11:00, due to its positional information being considered out of date.<ref name="IDFHR8">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=8}}</ref>

At 11:24, the Israeli chief of naval operations received a report that Arish was being shelled from the sea.<ref name="IDFHR8"/> An inquiry into the source of the report was ordered to determine its validity.<ref name=IDFHR8/> The report came from an air support officer in Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=10}}</ref> Additionally, at 11:27 the Israeli Supreme Command head of operations received a report stating that a ship had been shelling Arish, but the shells had fallen short.<ref name=IDFHR10/> (The investigative journalist [[James Bamford]] points out that ''Liberty'' had only four [[M2 Browning|.50 caliber machine guns]] mounted on her decks and thus could not have shelled the coast.{{sfn|Bamford|2001}}) The Head of Operations ordered that the report be verified, and that it be determined whether or not Israeli Navy vessels were off the coast of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 11:45, another report arrived at Supreme Command saying two ships were approaching the Arish coast.<ref name=IDFHR10/>

[[File:Tsqd914.jpg|thumb|right|Israeli Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) in formation, c. 1967. These were the MTBs that attacked USS ''Liberty''.]]
The shelling and ship reports were passed from Supreme Command to Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR10/> The chief of naval operations took them seriously, and at 12:05 torpedo boat Division 914 was ordered to patrol in the direction of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Division 914, codenamed "Pagoda", was under the command of Commander Moshe Oren.<ref name=IDFHR10/> It consisted of three torpedo boats numbered: T-203, T-204 and T-206.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 12:15, Division 914 received orders to patrol a position {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> As Commander Oren headed toward Arish, he was informed by Naval Operations of the reported shelling of Arish and told that IAF aircraft would be dispatched to the area after the target had been detected.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was concerned that the supposed Egyptian shelling was the prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli forces. Rabin reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the area, but advised caution, as Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nearby. At 13:41, the torpedo boats detected an unknown vessel 20 miles northwest of Arish and {{convert|14|miles}} off the coast of [[Lake Bardawil|Bardawil]].<ref name="Wikimapia"/><ref name=IDFHR11>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=11}}</ref> The ship's speed was estimated on their radars.<ref name=IDFHR11/> The combat information center officer on T-204, Ensign Aharon Yifrah, reported to Oren that the target had been detected at a range of {{convert|22|miles}}, that her speed had been tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed of {{convert|30|knots}}. These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR11/>

The speed of the target was significant because it indicated that the target was a combat vessel.<ref name=IDFHR11/> Moreover, Israeli forces had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessels sailing in the area at over {{convert|20|knots}}, a speed which, at the time, could be attained only by warships. The chief of naval operations asked the torpedo boats to double-check their calculations. Yifrah twice recalculated and confirmed his assessment.<ref name="IDFHR11"/> A few minutes later, Commander Oren reported that the target, now {{convert|17|miles}} from his position, was moving at a speed of {{convert|28|knots}} on a different heading.<ref>[http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf Yerushalmi Inquiry Report] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080530071820/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |date=30 May 2008 }} p 3</ref> Bamford, however, points out that ''Liberty''{{'}}s top speed was far below 28 knots. His sources say that at the time of the attack ''Liberty'' was following her signal-intercept mission course along the northern Sinai coast, at about {{convert|5|knots}} speed.{{sfn|Bamford|2001}}

The data on the ship's speed, together with its direction, gave the impression that it was an Egyptian destroyer fleeing toward port after shelling Arish. The torpedo boats gave chase, but did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Commander Oren requested that the Israeli Air Force dispatch aircraft to intercept.<ref name=IDFHR11/> At 13:48, the chief of naval operations requested dispatch of fighter aircraft to the ship's location.<ref name=IDFHR12>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=12}}</ref>

[[File:D2 1 b.jpg|thumb|right|[[Hunt-class destroyer]] HMS ''Blean''. The Egyptian Navy had Hunt-class destroyers in 1967.]]
The IAF dispatched a flight of two [[Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] fighter jets codenamed Kursa flight which arrived at ''Liberty'' at about 14:00.<ref name="IDFHR13">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=13}}</ref> The formation leader, Captain [[Iftach Spector]], attempted to identify the ship.<ref name=IDFHR13/> He radioed to one of the torpedo boats his observation that the ship looked like a military ship with one smokestack and one mast.<ref name=IDFRRIR5>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967|p=5}}</ref> He also communicated, in effect, that the ship appeared to him like a destroyer or another type of small ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/> In a post-attack statement, the pilots said they saw no distinguishable markings or flag on the ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/>

At this point, a recorded exchange took place between a command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief air controller questioning a possible American presence. Immediately after the exchange, at 13:57, the chief air controller, Lieutenant-Colonel Shmuel Kislev, cleared the Mirages to attack.<ref name=JamesScottBookp215>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=215}}</ref>