Editing Tumu Crisis (section)

==Crisis==
===Mongol invasion===
[[File:MongolArcher.jpg|thumb|left|A Mongol horseman. Miniature from the 15th–16th century.]]
In July 1449, Esen launched a large-scale invasion of China, with the Mongols advancing in three directions. [[Taisun Khan|Toghtoa Bukha Khan]] and the Uriankhai attacked the [[Liaodong Peninsula]] in the east, while the second Mongol army advanced on Xuanfu and the third, led by Esen himself, advanced on Datong.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=322}} The main objective of this campaign was to capture the fortified cities of Xuanfu and Datong, which would grant the Mongols unrestricted access to the northern regions of China.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=20}}

On 20 July, news of the raid reached Beijing and the emperor responded by ordering four generals and 45,000 soldiers from the Beijing garrison to advance to Datong and Xuanfu to protect the border.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=290}} After learning on 30 July that Esen had already attacked Datong, Emperor Yingzong ordered the mobilization of the Beijing garrison. He also declared his intention to personally lead a punitive expedition without consulting his ministers.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=16}}

Emperor Yingzong was known for his love of military parades, often organized for him by Wang Zhen.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=16}} His self-confidence was further bolstered by the recent successes of the Ming troops in the [[Luchuan–Pingmian campaigns]] and in suppressing the [[Deng Maoqi rebellion|rebellion of Deng Maoqi]].{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=15}} All previous Ming emperors, except for [[Jianwen Emperor]], personally led armies into battle. Therefore, Wang Zhen used this to support the emperor's decision.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=16}}

The first to protest were Minister of War Kuang Ye ({{zhi|t=鄺埜}}) and his deputy [[Yu Qian]].{{efn|Both had long warned of the danger posed by the Mongols, but their requests for stronger defenses were consistently rejected.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=16}}}} They believed that the monarch's participation in a punitive expedition was an unacceptably risky adventure.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=16}} Other officials also attempted to dissuade the emperor from joining the campaign. Minister of Personnel Wang Zhi ({{zhi|c=王直}}) wrote a memorandum on behalf of the dissenting officials, arguing that officers were responsible for the dangers of war, and the emperor, as the head of the [[House of Zhu|imperial family]] and the empire, and the person on whom the world's attention was focused, should not expose themselves to danger. Although the emperor appreciated his concern, he remained determined to carry out his plans.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}} The last attempt to stop the emperor was made by a supervising secretary as the army was leaving the city. He threw himself in front of the emperor's [[Litter (vehicle)|palanquin]], but was unsuccessful.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}}

On 3 August, Esen's army defeated the poorly supplied Ming army from Datong at the Yanghe Pass.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} On the same day, Emperor Yingzong appointed his younger brother Zhu Qiyu, Prince of Cheng, to oversee the administration of the capital during the campaign. Zhu Qiyu was assisted by four representatives from the most influential power groups. These included Prince Consort Commander Jiao Jing ({{zhi|c=焦敬}}), who represented the imperial family; [[Jin Ying (eunuch)|Jin Ying]], the head of the Directorate of Ceremonial and the highest-ranking eunuch in the absence of Wang Zhen; Minister Wang Zhi, who led the government; and Grand Secretary Gao Gu ({{zhi|t=高穀}}). All major decisions were to be postponed until the emperor's return.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}}

Despite the deteriorating security situation, the emperor made a sudden decision without any prior preparations. This left the soldiers with only a few days, from 1 to 4 August, to get ready for the campaign.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}} The emperor was accompanied by twenty experienced generals, most of whom held noble titles, and an equal number of high-ranking officials. They were also accompanied by hundreds of lower-ranking dignitaries,{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=290}} with Wang Zhen serving as the ''de facto'' commander-in-chief.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=323}} While the number of mobilized soldiers is unknown, it is often estimated to be around half a million,{{sfnmp|1a1=Goodrich|1a2=Fang|1y=1976|1p=290|2a1=Nolan|2y=2006|2p=151|3a1=Bennett|3y=1998|3p=323}} but in reality, the actual number may have been significantly smaller.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}} Even under optimal conditions, supplying such a large army would have been challenging. The troops were hastily assembled, poorly supplied, and incompetently led, ultimately leading to disaster.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=290}}

===Ming counterattack===
The army departed from Beijing on 4 August{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} and headed towards the [[Juyong Pass]].{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} The objective was to make a swift and brief march westward, passing through Xuanfu and reaching Datong. The plan was to conduct a rapid campaign in the steppe and then return to Beijing via the southern route. This route was chosen to avoid excessive destruction in the region along the Beijing–Xuanfu–Datong road, as the army would be passing through it twice. The return journey would take them through Yuzhou and the Zijing Pass.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=323}}

From the very beginning, chaos and disarray plagued the army.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=17}} The soldiers trudged on through relentless heavy rain.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=323}} After seven days, they finally reached Xuanfu, but only after being delayed by a storm. Despite pleas from many to turn back, both in Xuanfu{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} and earlier in Juyong Pass,{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} Wang Zhen urged them to press on.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} By 12 August, some officials were already discussing the possibility of assassinating Wang Zhen and bringing the emperor back, but they lacked the courage to follow through with their plan.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}}

On 16 August, the army arrived at the corpse-strewn battlefield of Yanghe.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} Two days later, on 18 August, the emperor reached Datong. During the journey, more soldiers died from starvation due to poor supplies than from skirmishes with the enemy.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} Upon reaching Datong, Wang Zhen received reports from local commanders and information from nearby border garrisons, which convinced him that continuing the campaign into the steppe would be dangerous. As a result, the expedition was declared victorious and the army turned back on 20 August.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} The discipline of the army had already begun to deteriorate. Wang Zhen was also concerned about the impact of the army's passage on his hometown in Yuzhou (present-day [[Yu County, Hebei]]), so he insisted on returning the same way they had come.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}}

On 27 August, the returning troops arrived in Xuanfu.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} Just three days later, the Mongols launched an attack on the Ming army's rear in Xuanfu, resulting in its destruction. The Mongols then proceeded to Yao'er Gorge, where they ambushed and destroyed a newly formed rear guard of 40,000 cavalry under the command of General Zhu Yong ({{zhi|c=朱勇}}).{{sfnmp|1a1=Twitchett|1a2=Grimm|1y=1988|1p=324|2a1=Goodrich|2a2=Fang|2y=1976|2p=291}} The following day, 31 August, the Ming army set up camp at the [[Tumubao|Tumu post station]]. Despite suggestions from ministers, Wang Zhen refused to seek refuge in the nearby walled city of [[Huailai County|Huailai]], which was only 10.5&nbsp;km away. Wang Zhen's reluctance was due to his desire to keep his baggage with him.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} The army faced a lack of water in Tumu, leaving the men and horses thirsty.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}}

===Tumu debacle===
[[File:皇明九邊考宣府鎮土木之變.jpg|thumb|Map of the [[Xuanfu Garrison]] in the ''Huang Ming jiu bian kao'' ({{zhi|t=皇明九邊考}}), 1544. Location of the battle of Tumu on the map: [[File:Red circle thick.svg|15px]]]]
Esen dispatched troops to block Chinese access to the river south of their camp. By the morning of 1 September, the Mongols had surrounded the Chinese camp and offered to negotiate. Wang Zhen ignored their overtures and instead ordered the confused Ming army to advance towards the river. A battle ensued between the disorganized Ming army and the vanguard of the Mongol army, with Esen himself choosing not to participate.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} Only 20,000 Mongols were involved in the battle{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=18}} but the hungry and thirsty Ming soldiers were unable to put up much resistance.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} The Ming army suffered a swift defeat, with nearly half of its soldiers lost and a significant amount of weapons and equipment seized by the Mongols. Among the casualties were high-ranking officials,{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=324}} including two dukes, two marquises, five counts, several generals, and hundreds of officials.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}} Notable figures such as the old general [[Zhang Fu]] and Grand Secretaries Cao Nai ({{zhi|c=曹鼐}}) and Zhang Yi ({{zhi|t=張益}}) were also killed.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=325}} After reclaiming the area, Ming troops were able to gather tens of thousands of firearms, armor, and other equipment left behind by the defeated army.{{sfnp|Goodrich|Fang|1976|p=291}}

During the battle, the emperor's bodyguard attempted to remove him from the fighting, but were unsuccessful. In the chaos, one of the Ming officers killed Wang Zhen.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=18}}{{efn|Historians Denis C. Twitchett and Tilemann Grimm cautiously approach the information about Wang Zhen's killing by his own officer, stating it as "according to some reports".{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=325}}}} The emperor was then captured and taken to a Mongol camp near Xuanfu on 3 September.{{sfnp|Twitchett|Grimm|1988|p=325}} Esen decided not to kill him and instead chose to inform the Ming side of the emperor's survival before deciding on his next course of action.{{sfnp|de Heer|1986|p=18}}