Editing Theaetetus (dialogue) (section)

=== Protagoras' theory of knowledge ===
Socrates thinks that the idea that knowledge is perception must be identical in meaning, if not in actual words, to [[Protagoras]]' famous maxim "Man is the measure of all things."  

Socrates wrestles to conflate the two ideas, and stirs in for good measure a claim about [[Homer]] being the captain of a team of [[Heraclitan]] flux theorists. Socrates dictates a complete textbook of logical fallacies to the bewildered Theaetetus.  When Socrates tells the child that he (Socrates) will later be smaller ''without losing an inch'' because Theaetetus will have grown relative to him, the child complains of dizziness {{efn|155c}}. In an often quoted line, Socrates says with delight that "wonder (thaumazein) belongs to the philosopher". He admonishes the boy to be patient and bear with his questions, so that his hidden beliefs may be yanked out into the bright light of day. When Socrates sums up what they have agreed on so far, it becomes problematic that knowledge is sense perception, for Socrates raises the question that "When the same wind blows, one of us feels cold and the other not?" As a result, he introduces the idea of Heraclitean flux to act as a defense to the wind objection. Heracliteanism shows that "Nothing is in itself just one thing...Everything is in a process of coming to be". Thus as there is no fixed meaning in things, but they draw their meaning in a referential difference to other things, the wind objection can be incorporated into Theaetetus's claim that "Knowledge is sense perception". As a result, they can then continue their inquiry as to the truth of this claim. It is important to note that the Heraclitean doctrine of Flux is not the same as the Protagorean doctrine. The Protagorean is radical truth relativism whereas the Heraclitean is radical reality relativism. It serves as a supporting theory to the Protagorean interpretation of Theaetetus's claim, in order that they might fully inquire as to the validity of this premise. Socrates admits that it is unfortunate that Protagoras is dead and cannot defend his idea against people such as himself. He says that the two of them are "trampling on his orphan" {{efn|164e}} but the charge remains. Since Protagoras is dead, Socrates puts himself in the sophist's shoes and tries to do him the favor of defending his idea.{{efn|166a–168c}}  Socrates concedes that if Protagoras were still alive, he would have more to say in his own defense, and that they are now essentially mistreating "his orphan child." Putting words in the dead [[sophism|sophist's]] mouth, Socrates declares that Protagoras asserts with his maxim that all things are in [[Motion (physics)|motion]] and whatever seems to be the case, is the case for the perceiver, whether the [[individual]] or the [[Sovereign state|state]]. At the end of his speech, Socrates admits to Theodorus that Protagoras would have done a far better job of defending his own ideas.  Theodorus tells Socrates that he must be kidding, that he has come to the task with boyish vigor. Theodorus does not claim to be a disciple of Protagoras, but states that he was a friend. Socrates invites Theodorus to put up a more vigorous defense of Protagoras, as he does not want it suggested that he has used the child's timidity (of Theaetetus) to aid him in his argument against the doctrine of Protagoras.{{efn|168d}}. Socrates, not at all certain that he has not misrepresented Protagoras in making each man the measure of his own [[wisdom]], presses Theodorus on the question of whether any follower of Protagoras (himself included) would contend that nobody thinks anyone else is wrong.{{efn|170c}} Theodorus proves to be helpless against Socrates' arguments. He agrees that Protagoras concedes that those who disagree with him are correct.{{efn|171a}} In making Protagoras a complete epistemological [[relativism|relativist]], where every person's individual perceptions are his reality and his truth, both Socrates and Theodorus paint Protagoras as maintaining an absurd position.

[[File:Tenniel Astrologer.jpg|right|thumb|Socrates recounts the tale of the philosopher who was so caught up in looking at the stars that he fell into a well.]]
[[Socrates]] then proceeds to explain why [[philosophy|philosophers]] seem clumsy and stupid to the common lot of humanity. Socrates explains that philosophers are open to mockery because they are not concerned about what interests most people:  they could not care less about the scandals in their neighbor's house, the tracing of one's ancestry to [[Heracles]], and so on. In contrast, the philosopher is concerned with things that ''are'', such as beauty and knowledge, which are "truly higher up". It is here that Socrates draws the classic portrait of the absent-minded [[intellectual]] who cannot make his bed or cook a meal (175e).  Socrates adds a big bifurcation to this speech, saying that there are only two kinds of lives to be lived:  a divinely happy one, lived by righteous philosophers or a godless, miserable one, such as most people live.{{efn|176–177}} Socrates admits this was a digression that threatens to drown his original project, which was to define knowledge.  Theodorus, the old geometer, tells Socrates that he finds this sort of thing easier to follow than his earlier arguments. Socrates says that the men of flux, like Homer and Heraclitus, are really hard to talk to because you can't pin them down. When you ask them a question, he says, they pluck from their quiver a little [[aphorism]] to let fly at you, and as you try to figure that one out, they wing another one at you.  They leave nothing settled either in discourse, or in their own minds. Socrates adds that the opposite school of thought, that teaches of the "immovable whole" is just as hard to talk to.{{efn|181a,b}}  Socrates says he met the father of the idea, [[Parmenides]], when he was quite young, but does not want to get into another digression over it.{{efn|184a}}