Editing The Blitz (section)

===Battle of Britain===
{{Main|Battle of Britain}}
[[File:Pilots of No. 310 (Czechoslovak) Squadron RAF in front of Hawker Hurricane Mk I at Duxford, Cambridgeshire, 7 September 1940. CH1299.jpg|thumb|RAF pilots with one of their [[Hawker Hurricane]]s, October 1940]]

Although not specifically prepared to conduct independent strategic air operations against an opponent, the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} ''was'' expected to do this over Britain. From July until September 1940 the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} attacked Fighter Command, to gain air superiority as a prelude to invasion. This involved the bombing of [[English Channel]] convoys, ports, and RAF airfields and supporting industries. Destroying RAF Fighter Command was  thought to allow the Germans control of the skies over the invasion area. It was supposed Bomber Command, [[Coastal Command]], and the [[Royal Navy]] could not operate under conditions of German air superiority.<ref>McKee 1989, pp. 40–41.</ref>

The weakness of the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}}'s intelligence meant that their aircraft were too often unable to locate their targets, so that attacks on factories and airfields failed to achieve the desired results. British fighter aircraft production continued at a rate surpassing Germany's, during the Battle  of Britain, by 2 to 1.<ref>Faber 1977, p. 203.</ref> The British produced 10,000 aircraft in 1940, in comparison to Germany's 8,000.<ref>McKee 1989, p. 294.</ref> The replacement of pilots and aircrew was more difficult. Both the RAF and {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} struggled to replace manpower losses (though the Germans had larger reserves of trained aircrew).<ref name="Faber 1977, pp. 202–03">Faber 1977, pp. 202–03.</ref>

The circumstances hampered the Germans more than the British: Operating over home territory, British aircrew could fly again, if they survived being shot down. German crews (even if they survived) faced capture. Moreover, the Reich's bombers carried four to five crew, representing a greater loss of manpower.<ref name="Faber 1977, pp. 202–03"/> On 7 September, the Germans shifted away from the destruction of the RAF's supporting structures. German intelligence suggested Fighter Command was weakening, and that an attack on London would force it into a final battle of annihilation, while compelling the [[United Kingdom coalition government (1940–1945)|British Government]] into surrender.<ref>Price 1990, p. 12; McKee 1989, p. 225.</ref>

The decision to change strategy is sometimes claimed to have been a major mistake by OKL, argued that persisting with attacks on RAF ''airfields '' might have won air superiority for the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}}.<ref>Wood and Dempster 2003, pp. 212–13.</ref> Others argue that the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} made little impression on Fighter Command, in the last week of August and first week of September, and that the shift in strategy was not decisive.<ref>Bungay 2000, pp. 368–69.</ref> It also has been argued that it was doubtful the {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} could have won air superiority, before the "weather window" began to deteriorate (in October).<ref name="Hooton 2010, p. 80."/><ref name="Corum 1997, p. 283.">Corum 1997, p. 283.</ref>

It also was possible, if RAF losses became severe, that they could pull out to the north, wait for the German invasion, then redeploy southward again.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 283."/> Other historians argue that the outcome of the air battle was irrelevant; the massive numerical superiority of British naval forces and the inherent weakness of the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} would have made the projected German invasion, {{lang|de|[[Unternehmen Seelöwe]]}} (Operation Sea Lion), a disaster, with or without German air superiority.<ref>Corum 1997, pp. 283–84; Murray 1983, pp. 45–46.</ref>