Editing Suggestibility (section)

===Autonomy===
The intrigue of differences in individual suggestibility even crops up in the early Greek philosophers. [[Aristotle]] had an unconcerned approach:

{{blockquote|"The most intelligent minds are those that can entertain an idea without necessarily believing it."|Aristotle}}<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rock|first=Hugh|date=July 2017|title=Social Theism: How can the Liberal Idea of God Speak to a Materialist Worldview?|journal=Modern Believing|volume=58|issue=3|pages=253–263|doi=10.3828/mb.2017.19|issn=1353-1425}}</ref>

This perhaps is a more accurate echo of the experience of practicing hypnotherapists and hypnotists. When anyone is absorbed in someone else's inspiring words as they outline an idea or way of thinking, the subjective attention is held because of the logic, the aesthetic, and the relevance of the words to one's own personal experience and motivations. In these natural [[trance]] states, like those orchestrated purposefully by a hypnotherapist, the 'critical faculties' are naturally less active when there is less to be naturally critical of.

It is perhaps the "necessarily believing it" part of the Aristotelian quote above that is problematic, as this conception of suggestibility raises issues pertaining to the autonomy of attributing belief to an introduced idea, and how this comes to take place.<ref>{{Cite book|date=2001-09-01|editor-last=Eisen|editor-first=Mitchell L.|editor2-last=Quas|editor2-first=Jodi A.|editor3-last=Goodman|editor3-first=Gail S.|title=Memory and Suggestibility in the Forensic Interview|doi=10.4324/9781410602251|isbn=9781410602251}}</ref>