Editing Spanish–American War (section)

==Path to war==
===Cuban struggle for independence===
{{Main|Cuban War of Independence}}
[[File:La fallera de l'oncle Sam.JPG|thumb|A [[Spaniards|Spanish]] propaganda drawing published in ''[[La Campana de Gràcia]]'' (1896) by [[:ca:Manuel Moliné i Muns|Manuel Moliné]] criticizing U.S. behavior regarding Cuba. Upper text (in old [[Catalan language|Catalan]]) reads: "Uncle Sam's craving", and below: "To keep the island so it won't get lost".]]

The first serious bid for Cuban independence was the Ten Years' War, which erupted in 1868 and was subdued by the authorities a decade later. Neither the fighting nor the reforms in the [[Pact of Zanjón]] (February 1878) quelled the desire of some revolutionaries for wider autonomy and, ultimately, independence. One such revolutionary, José Martí, continued to promote Cuban financial and political freedom in exile. In early 1895, after years of organizing, Martí launched a three-pronged invasion of the island.<ref name="books.google.com">{{Harvnb|Trask|1996|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2f0Gf0DQfmUC&pg=PA2 2–3]}}</ref>

The plan called for one group from [[Santo Domingo]] in the [[Dominican Republic]] led by [[Máximo Gómez]], one group from [[Costa Rica]] led by [[Antonio Maceo Grajales]], and another from the United States (preemptively thwarted by U.S. officials in Florida) to land in different places on the island and provoke an uprising. While their call for revolution, the ''grito de Baire'', was successful, the result was not the grand show of force Martí had expected. With a quick victory effectively lost, the revolutionaries settled in to fight a protracted guerrilla campaign.<ref name="books.google.com"/>

Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, the architect of Spain's Restoration constitution and the prime minister at the time, ordered General [[Arsenio Martínez-Campos]], a distinguished veteran of the war against the previous uprising in Cuba, to quell the revolt. Campos's reluctance to accept his new assignment and his method of containing the revolt to the province of [[Oriente Province|Oriente]] earned him criticism in the Spanish press.<ref name="online">Jonathan Krohn, "Review of Tone, John Lawrence, ''War and Genocide in Cuba 1895–1898''. "H-War, H-Net Reviews." May 2008. [http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14509 online] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120065526/http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=14509 |date=January 20, 2013 }}</ref>
The mounting pressure forced Cánovas to replace General Campos with General [[Valeriano Weyler]], a soldier who had experience in quelling rebellions in overseas provinces and the Spanish metropole. Weyler deprived the insurgency of weaponry, supplies, and assistance by ordering the residents of some Cuban districts to move to [[Reconcentration policy|reconcentration areas]] near the military headquarters.<ref name="online"/> This strategy was effective in slowing the spread of rebellion. In the United States, this fueled the fire of anti-Spanish propaganda.<ref>{{Harvnb|Trask|1996|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2f0Gf0DQfmUC&pg=PA8 8–10]}}; {{Harvnb|Carr|1982|pp=379–88}}.</ref> In a political speech, President [[William McKinley]] used this to ram Spanish actions against armed rebels. He even said this "was not civilized warfare" but "extermination".<ref name="Annual Message">{{cite web|url=http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29538|title= First Annual Message |first1=William |last1=McKinley |date=December 6, 1897|website=The American Presidency Project |access-date=February 26, 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130430225437/http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29538|archive-date=April 30, 2013|url-status=live|df=mdy-all}}</ref><ref>{{citation|author=James Ford Rhodes|title=The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations 1897–1909|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=em-5IEHHTAUC|year=2007|publisher=Read Books|isbn=978-1406734645|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=em&pg=PA44 44]}}, citing an annual message delivered December 6, 1897, from {{citation|author=French Ensor Chadwick|title=The relations of the United States and Spain: diplomacy|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ozGTAAAAIAAJ|year=1968|publisher=Russell & Russell|isbn=9780846212300|access-date=August 18, 2020|archive-date=September 23, 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230923144106/https://books.google.com/books?id=ozGTAAAAIAAJ|url-status=live}}</ref>

===Spanish attitude===

Spain depended on Cuba for prestige and trade, and used it as a training ground for its army. [[Spanish Prime Minister]] Antonio Cánovas del Castillo announced that "the Spanish nation is disposed to sacrifice to the last peseta of its treasure and to the last drop of blood of the last Spaniard before consenting that anyone snatch from it even one piece of its territory".<ref>Quoted in {{Harvnb|Trask|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2f0Gf0DQfmUC&pg=PA6 6]}}</ref> He had long dominated and stabilized Spanish politics. He was assassinated in 1897 by Italian anarchist [[Michele Angiolillo]],<ref>[https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1897/08/22/100431439.pdf "Angiolillo Died Bravely"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201012054753/https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1897/08/22/100431439.pdf |date=October 12, 2020 }}, August 22, 1897, The New York Times.</ref> leaving a Spanish political system that was not stable and could not risk a blow to its prestige.<ref>Octavio Ruiz, "Spain on the Threshold of a New Century: Society and Politics before and after the Disaster of 1898", ''Mediterranean Historical Review'' (June 1998), Vol. 13 Issue 1/2, pp. 7–27</ref>

===US response===
{{Further|Presidency of William McKinley}}
The eruption of the Cuban revolt, Weyler's measures, and the popular fury these events whipped up proved to be a boon to the newspaper industry in New York City. [[Joseph Pulitzer]] of the ''[[New York World]]'' and [[William Randolph Hearst]] of the ''[[New York Journal]]'' recognized the potential for great headlines and stories that would sell copies. Both papers denounced Spain but had little influence outside New York. American opinion generally saw Spain as a hopelessly backward power that was unable to deal fairly with Cuba. American Catholics were divided before the war began but supported it enthusiastically once it started.<ref>Scott Wright, "The Northwestern Chronicle and the Spanish–American War: American Catholic Attitudes Regarding the 'Splendid Little War,'" ''American Catholic Studies'' 116#4 (2005): 55–68.</ref><ref>However, three Catholic newspapers were critical of the war after it began. Benjamin Wetzel, "A Church Divided: Roman Catholicism, Americanization, and the Spanish–American War." ''Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era'' 14#3 (2015): 348–66.</ref>

The U.S. had important economic interests that were being harmed by the prolonged conflict and deepening uncertainty about Cuba's future. Shipping firms that had relied heavily on trade with Cuba now suffered losses as the conflict continued unresolved.<ref>Trade with Cuba had dropped by more than two thirds from a high of US$100 million. {{Harvnb|Offner|2004|p=51}}.</ref> These firms pressed Congress and McKinley to seek an end to the revolt. Other American business concerns, specifically those who had invested in Cuban sugar, looked to the Spanish to restore order.<ref>David M. Pletcher, ''The Diplomacy of Trade and Investment: American Economic Expansion in the Hemisphere, 1865–1900'' (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998).</ref> Stability, not war, was the goal of both interests. How stability would be achieved would depend largely on the ability of Spain and the U.S. to work out their issues diplomatically.

[[File:Judge-2-6-1897.jpg|thumb|An American cartoon published in ''[[Judge (magazine)|Judge]]'', February 6, 1897: [[Columbia (name)|Columbia]] (representing the American people) reaches out to the oppressed Cuba (the caption under the chained child reads "Spain's 16th century methods") while [[Uncle Sam]] (representing the U.S. government) sits blindfolded, refusing to see the atrocities or use his guns to intervene (cartoon by [[Grant E. Hamilton]]).]]

Lieutenant Commander Charles Train, in 1894, in his preparatory notes in an outlook of an armed conflict between Spain and the United States, wrote that Cuba was entirely dependent on the outside world for food supplies, coal, and maritime supplies and that Spain would not be able to resupply a naval expeditionary force locally.<ref name="auto1">{{cite web|url=https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/pre-war-planning/plan-of-operations-a-5.html|title=Plan Of Operations Against Spain Prepared By Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train (1894)|publisher=Naval History and Heritage Command|accessdate=November 7, 2021|archive-date=November 7, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107014014/https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/pre-war-planning/plan-of-operations-a-5.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

While tension increased among the Cubans and Spanish government, popular support of intervention began to spring up in the United States. Many Americans likened the Cuban revolt to the American Revolution, and they viewed the Spanish government as a tyrannical oppressor. Historian Louis Pérez notes that "The proposition of war in behalf of Cuban independence took hold immediately and held on thereafter. Such was the sense of the public mood." Many poems and songs were written in the United States to express support of the "Cuba Libre" movement.<ref>{{cite book|author=Louis A. Pérez Jr.|title=The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OVFV4qclY-YC&pg=PA24|year=2000|page=24|publisher=Univ of North Carolina Press |access-date=February 13, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170102151229/https://books.google.com/books?id=OVFV4qclY-YC&pg=PA24|archive-date=January 2, 2017|url-status=live|df=mdy-all|isbn=978-0807866979}}</ref> At the same time, many [[African Americans]], facing growing racial discrimination and increasing retardation of their civil rights, wanted to take part in the war. They saw it as a way to advance the cause of equality, service to country hopefully helping to gain political and public respect amongst the wider population.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Russell|first1=Timothy Dale|title=African Americans and the Spanish–American War and Philippine Insurrection. Military Participation, Recognition and Memory 1898–1904|date=2013|publisher=University of California, Riverside|location=Riverside, CA|page=8|edition=First. Published dissertation|url=http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6n09f9g0#page-8|access-date=3 September 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170903075627/http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6n09f9g0#page-8|archive-date=September 3, 2017|url-status=live|df=mdy-all}}</ref>
[[File:USS Maine entering Havana harbor HD-SN-99-01929.JPEG|thumb|The battleship Maine entering [[Havana Harbor|Havana Bay]].]]
President McKinley, well aware of the political complexity surrounding the conflict, wanted to end the revolt peacefully. He began to negotiate with the Spanish government, hoping that the talks would dampen yellow journalism in the United States and soften support for war with Spain. An attempt was made to negotiate a peace before McKinley took office. However, the Spanish refused to take part in the negotiations. In 1897 McKinley appointed [[Stewart L. Woodford]] as the new minister to Spain, who again offered to negotiate a peace. In October 1897, the Spanish government refused the United States' offer to negotiate between the Spanish and the Cubans, but promised the U.S. it would give the Cubans more autonomy.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Politics, reform, and expansion, 1890–1900.|last=Faulkner|first=Harold|publisher=Harper|year=1963|location=New York|pages=231}}</ref> However, with the election of a more liberal Spanish government in November, Spain began to change its policies in Cuba. First, the new Spanish government told the United States that it was willing to offer a change in the Reconcentration policies if the Cuban rebels agreed to a cessation of hostilities. This time the rebels refused the terms in hopes that continued conflict would lead to U.S. intervention and the creation of an independent Cuba.<ref name=":0" /> The liberal Spanish government also recalled the Spanish Governor-General Valeriano Weyler from Cuba. This action alarmed many Cubans loyal to Spain.<ref name=":1">{{Cite book|title=War and Genocide in Cuba, 1895–1898|last=Tone|first=John|publisher=University of North Carolina Press|year=2006|location=Chapel Hill|page=239}}</ref>

The Cubans loyal to Weyler began planning large demonstrations to take place when the next Governor General, [[Ramón Blanco, 1st Marquess of Peña Plata|Ramón Blanco]], arrived in Cuba. U.S. consul Fitzhugh Lee learned of these plans and sent a request to the U.S. State Department to send a U.S. warship to Cuba.<ref name=":1" /> This request led to the [[armored cruiser]] {{USS|Maine|1889|6}} being sent to Cuba. While ''Maine'' was docked in Havana harbor, a spontaneous explosion sank the ship. The sinking of ''Maine'' was blamed on the Spanish and made the possibility of a negotiated peace very slim.{{sfn|Pérez|1998|p=58}} Throughout the negotiation process, the major European powers, especially Britain, France, and Russia, generally supported the American position and urged Spain to give in.<ref>{{Harvnb|Offner|1992|pp=54–69}}</ref> Spain repeatedly promised specific reforms that would pacify Cuba but failed to deliver; American patience ran out.<ref>{{Harvnb|Offner|1992|pp=86–110}}</ref>

===USS ''Maine'' dispatch to Havana and loss===
{{Further|USS Maine (1889)}}
{{multiple image|align=right|direction=horizontal|total_width=600|image1=USSMaine.jpg|alt1=|width1=|caption1=The sunken {{USS|Maine|ACR-1|6}} in [[Havana harbor]]|image2=18980216 Blown Up By Spain - USS Maine - The Evening Times (Washington, D.C.).jpg|alt2=|width2=|caption2=Though publication of a [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] investigation report would take a month, this [[Washington D.C.]] newspaper<ref name=EverningTimes_18980216>{{cite news|title=Blown Up By Spain / Every Evidence That the Maine Was Torpedoed / Cap't Sigsbee's Statement / Two Hundred Fifty American Sailors the Food of Sharks / Lieuts. Jenkins and Merritt Dead|url=https://newspaperarchive.com/the-evening-times-feb-16-1898-p-1/|work=The Evening Times|date=February 16, 1898|location=Washington, D.C., U.S.|page=1|access-date=September 2, 2020|archive-date=October 12, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201012054755/https://newspaperarchive.com/the-evening-times-feb-16-1898-p-1/|url-status=live}}</ref> was among those asserting within one day that the explosion was not accidental.}}
McKinley sent [[USS Maine (1889)|USS ''Maine'']] to [[Havana]] to ensure the safety of American citizens and interests, and to underscore the urgent need for reform. Naval forces were moved in position to attack simultaneously on several fronts if the war was not avoided. As ''Maine'' left Florida, a large part of the [[North Atlantic Squadron]] was moved to Key West and the [[Gulf of Mexico]]. Others were also moved just off the shore of Lisbon, and others were moved to [[Hong Kong]].<ref name=offner2004p56>{{Harvnb|Offner|2004|p=56}}</ref>

At 9:40 P.M. on February 15, 1898, ''Maine'' sank in [[Havana Harbor]] after suffering a massive explosion. More than 3/4 of the ship's crew of 355 sailors, officers and Marines died as a result of the explosion. Of the 94 survivors only 16 were uninjured.<ref>{{cite web | author = US Surgeon General | year = 1896 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=J9QEAAAAYAAJ&pg=RA2-PA173 | title = Annual report of the Surgeon General of the US Navy 1898 | page = 173 | work = Bureau of Medicine and Surgery | publisher = US Navy Department | access-date =2 October 2011 }}</ref> In total, 260<ref name="history.navy.mil">{{cite web|url=https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/disasters-and-phenomena/destruction-of-uss-maine.html|title=The Destruction of USS Maine|publisher=Naval History and Heritage Command|access-date=July 27, 2021|archive-date=December 18, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201218041515/https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/disasters-and-phenomena/destruction-of-uss-maine.html|url-status=dead}}</ref> servicemen were killed in the initial explosion, and six more died shortly thereafter from injuries,<ref name="history.navy.mil"/> marking the greatest loss of life for the American military in a single day since the [[Battle of the Little Bighorn|defeat at Little Bighorn]] 21 years earlier.<ref name=Scott-Arch>Where total U.S. casualties were 268 dead, 55 severely wounded-six of whom died shortly thereafter from their wounds. {{cite book |last1=Scott |first1=Douglas D. |first2=Richard A. |last2=Fox |first3=Melissa A. |last3=Connor |first4=Dick |last4=Harmon |year=2013 |orig-year=1989 |title=Archaeological Perspectives on the Battle of the Little Bighorn |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iSUA23jOi1sC&pg=PA244 |location=Norman |publisher=University of Oklahoma Press |isbn=978-0-8061-3292-1 |access-date=July 27, 2021 |archive-date=September 23, 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230923144102/https://books.google.com/books?id=iSUA23jOi1sC&pg=PA244 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|244}}

While McKinley urged patience and did not declare that Spain had caused the explosion, the deaths of hundreds of American<ref>{{Cite book|title=[[The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898]]|last=Thomas|first=Evan |publisher=Little, Brown and Co.|year=2010|pages=48}}</ref> sailors held the public's attention. McKinley asked Congress to appropriate $50&nbsp;million for defense, and Congress unanimously obliged. Most American leaders believed that the cause of the explosion was unknown. Still, public attention was now riveted on the situation and Spain could not find a diplomatic solution to avoid war. Spain appealed to the European powers, most of whom advised it to accept U.S. conditions for Cuba in order to avoid war.{{sfn|Keenan|2001|p=[https://archive.org/details/encyclopediaofsp00keen/page/372 <!-- quote="european powers". --> 372]}} Germany urged a united European stand against the United States but took no action.{{sfn|Tucker|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8V3vZxOmHssC&pg=PA614 614]}}

The U.S. Navy's investigation, made public on March 28, concluded that the ship's powder magazines were ignited when an external explosion was set off under the ship's hull. This report poured fuel on popular indignation in the U.S., making war virtually inevitable.<ref name=offner2004p57>{{Harvnb|Offner|2004|p=57}}. For a minority view that downplays the role of public opinion and asserts that McKinley feared the Cubans would win their insurgency before the U.S. could intervene, see Louis A. Pérez, "The Meaning of the Maine: Causation and the Historiography of the Spanish–American War", ''The Pacific Historical Review,'' Vol. 58, No. 3 (August 1989), pp. 293–322.</ref> Spain's investigation came to the opposite conclusion: the explosion originated within the ship. Other investigations in later years came to various contradictory conclusions, but had no bearing on the coming of the war. In 1974, Admiral [[Hyman George Rickover]] had his staff look at the documents and decided there was an internal explosion.<ref name=fisher2010 /> A study commissioned by ''[[National Geographic]]'' magazine in 1999, using AME computer modeling, reported: "By examining the bottom plating of the ship and how it bent and folded, AME concluded that the destruction could have been caused by a mine."<ref name=fisher2010>{{cite web|url=https://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/Maine.1898.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20091104112359/https://loc.gov/law/help/usconlaw/pdf/Maine.1898.pdf|archivedate=November 4, 2009|title=Destruction of the Maine (1898) |date=August 4, 2009|last=Fisher|first=Louis|publisher=The Law Library of Congress|page=5}} (source includes a summary of other studies)</ref>

===Declaring war===
{{Main|Propaganda of the Spanish–American War}}
[[File:Mapa ilustrado del Reino de España y sus posesiones para la Guardia Civil.jpg|thumb|Illustrated map published by the [[Guardia Civil]] showing the Kingdom of Spain and its remaining colonial possessions in 1895 ([[Caroline Islands|Caroline]] and [[Mariana Islands]], as well as [[Spanish Sahara]], [[Spanish Morocco|Morocco]], [[Spanish Guinea|Guinea]] and [[Guam]] are not included.)]]
[[File:Cuban soldiers, 1898.jpg|thumb|Cuban insurgent soldiers, who had already been fighting for [[Cuban War of Independence|Independence]] against Spain since 1895.]]
After ''Maine'' was destroyed, New York City newspaper publishers Hearst and Pulitzer decided that the Spanish were to blame, and they publicized this theory as fact in their papers.<ref>Evan Thomas, ''The war lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the rush to empire, 1898'' (Little, Brown, 2010) pp. 4–5, 209.</ref> Even prior to the explosion, both had published sensationalistic accounts of "atrocities" committed by the Spanish in Cuba; headlines such as "Spanish Murderers" were commonplace in their newspapers. Following the explosion, this tone escalated with the headline "Remember The Maine, To Hell with Spain!", quickly appearing.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/cuba/map_04.html|title=CBSNews.com|website=www.cbsnews.com|access-date=July 27, 2021|archive-date=July 27, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210727085410/http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/cuba/map_04.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url = https://www.usni.org/remember-maine-hell-spain|title = 'Remember the Maine, to Hell with Spain!'|date = October 23, 2020|access-date = July 27, 2021|archive-date = July 27, 2021|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210727085416/https://www.usni.org/remember-maine-hell-spain|url-status = live}}</ref> Their press exaggerated what was happening and how the Spanish were treating the Cuban prisoners.<ref>Ruiz, Vicki L. 2006. "Nuestra América: Latino History as United States History." ''Journal of American History''. p.?655</ref> The stories were based on factual accounts, but most of the time, the articles that were published were embellished and written with incendiary language causing emotional and often heated responses among readers. A common myth falsely states that when illustrator [[Frederic Remington]] said there was no war brewing in Cuba, Hearst responded: "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://academic2.american.edu/~wjc/wjc3/notlikely.htm|title=Not likely sent: the Remington-Hearst "telegrams"|first=W. Joseph|last=Campbell|date=August 2000|work=Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly|access-date=September 6, 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110717003655/http://academic2.american.edu/~wjc/wjc3/notlikely.htm|archive-date=July 17, 2011|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}</ref>

However, this new "[[yellow journalism]]" was uncommon outside New York City, and historians no longer consider it the major force shaping the national mood.<ref>{{harvnb|Smythe|2003|p=192}}.</ref> Public opinion nationwide did demand immediate action, overwhelming the efforts of President McKinley, [[Speaker of the United States House of Representatives|Speaker of the House]] [[Thomas Brackett Reed]], and the business community to find a negotiated solution. Wall Street, big business, high finance and Main Street businesses across the country were vocally opposed to war and demanded peace.<ref name="Pratt">{{cite journal |last=Pratt |first=Julius W. |date=May 1934 |title=American Business and the Spanish-American War |journal=The Hispanic American Historical Review |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=163–201 |doi=10.1215/00182168-14.2.163 |issn=0018-2168 |jstor=2506353 |doi-access=free}}</ref> After years of severe depression, the economic outlook for the domestic economy was suddenly bright again in 1897. However, the uncertainties of warfare posed a serious threat to full economic recovery. "War would impede the march of prosperity and put the country back many years," warned the ''New Jersey Trade Review.'' The leading railroad magazine editorialized, "From a commercial and mercenary standpoint it seems peculiarly bitter that this war should come when the country had already suffered so much and so needed rest and peace." McKinley paid close attention to the strong antiwar consensus of the business community, and strengthened his resolve to use diplomacy and negotiation rather than brute force to end the Spanish tyranny in Cuba.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|1934|pp=163–201}}. quotes on p. 168. Page 173 states: "an overwhelming preponderance of the local business interests of the country strongly desired peace."</ref> Historian Nick Kapur argues that McKinley's actions as he moved toward war were rooted not in various pressure groups but in his deeply held "Victorian" values, especially arbitration, pacifism, humanitarianism, and manly self-restraint.<ref>Nick Kapur (2011), "William McKinley's Values and the Origins of the Spanish‐American War: A Reinterpretation." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 41.1: pp. 18–38. {{JSTOR|23884754}}</ref>

A speech delivered by Republican Senator [[Redfield Proctor]] of Vermont on March 17, 1898, thoroughly analyzed the situation and greatly strengthened the pro-war cause. Proctor concluded that war was the only answer.<ref name="cubarmy">{{Harvnb|Dyal|Carpenter|Thomas|1996|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1wv5KHk2_dsC&pg=PA210 210]}}</ref> Many in the business and religious communities which had until then opposed war, switched sides, leaving McKinley and Speaker Reed almost alone in their resistance to a war.<ref>{{harvnb|Pratt|1934|pp=173–74}}.</ref><ref>{{Harvnb|Offner|1992|pp=131–35}}; Michelle Bray Davis and Rollin W. Quimby, "Senator Proctor's Cuban Speech: Speculations on a Cause of the Spanish–American War," ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' 1969 55(2): 131–41.</ref><ref>Paul T. McCartney, "Religion, the Spanish–American War, and the Idea of American Mission", ''Journal of Church and State'' 54 (Spring 2012), 257–78.</ref> On April 11, McKinley ended his resistance and asked Congress for authority to send American troops to Cuba to end the civil war there, knowing that Congress would force a war.

[[File:Spanish American War transport Seneca.jpg|thumb|upright=1.15|left|The American transport ship ''Seneca'', a chartered vessel that carried troops to Puerto Rico and Cuba]]

On April 19, while Congress was considering [[joint resolution]]s supporting Cuban independence, Republican Senator [[Henry M. Teller]] of [[Colorado]] proposed the [[Teller Amendment]] to ensure that the U.S. would not establish permanent control over Cuba after the war. The amendment, disclaiming any intention to annex Cuba, passed the Senate 42 to 35; the House concurred the same day, 311 to 6. The amended resolution demanded Spanish withdrawal and authorized the President to use as much military force as he thought necessary to help Cuba gain independence from Spain. President McKinley signed the joint resolution on April 20, 1898, and the ultimatum was sent to Spain.<ref name=stat33.738>Resolution 24, {{USStat|33|738}}</ref> In response, Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States on April 21. On the same day, the U.S. Navy began a blockade of Cuba.<ref name="trask57" />

On April 25, the U.S. Congress [[United States declaration of war upon Spain|responded in kind]], declaring that a state of war between the U.S. and Spain had ''[[de facto]]'' existed since April 21, the day the blockade of Cuba had begun.<ref name="trask57"/> It was the embodiment of the naval plan created by Lieutenant Commander Charles Train four years ago, stating once the US enacted a proclamation of war against Spain, it would mobilize its N.A. (North Atlantic) squadron to form an efficient blockade in Havana, [[Matanzas]] and [[Sagua La Grande]].<ref name="auto1"/>

The Navy was ready, but the Army was not well-prepared for the war and made radical changes in plans and quickly purchased supplies. In the spring of 1898, the strength of the [[Regular Army (United States)|U.S. Regular Army]] was just 24,593 soldiers. The Army wanted 50,000 new men but received over 220,000 through volunteers and the mobilization of [[National Guard (United States)|state National Guard units]],<ref>Graham A. Cosmas, ''An Army for Empire: The United States Army and the Spanish–American War'' (1971) ch. 3–4</ref> even gaining nearly 100,000 men on the first night after the explosion of USS ''Maine''.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Thomas|first=Evan|year=2016|title=Evan Thomas: War Lovers and American Power|journal=Military History, September 2010, 14 World History Collection}}</ref>

President McKinley issued two calls for volunteers, the first on April 23 which called for 125,000 men to enlist, followed by a second appeal for a further 75,000 volunteers.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cunningham |first=Roger D. |date=January 2005 |title="A Lot of Fine, Sturdy Black Warriors": Texas's African American "Immunes" in the Spanish-American War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30242237 |journal=Southwestern Historical Quarterly |volume=108 |issue=3 |pages=345 |jstor=30242237 }}</ref> States in the Northeast, Midwest, and the West quickly filled their volunteer quota. In response to the surplus influx of volunteers, several Northern states had their quotas increased. Contrastingly, some Southern states struggled to fulfil even the first mandated quota, namely Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gleijeses |first=Piero |date=April 1996 |title=African Americans and the War against Spain |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/23521538 |journal=North Carolina Historical Review |volume=73 |issue=2 |pages=192 |jstor=23521538 }}</ref>

The majority of states did not allow African-American men to volunteer, which impeded recruitment in Southern states, especially those with large African-American populations. Quota requirements, based on total population, were unmanageable, as they were disproportionate compared to the actual population permitted to volunteer.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |page=862 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> This was especially evident in some states, such as Kentucky and Mississippi, which accepted out-of-state volunteers to aid in meeting their quotas.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=890 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref>

This Southern apprehension towards enlistment can also be attributed to "a war weariness derived from the Confederacy's defeat in the Civil War."<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War: The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=863 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> Many in the South were still recuperating financially after their losses in the Civil War, and the upcoming war did not provide much hope for economic prosperity in the South. The prospect of a naval war gave anxiety to those in the South. The financial security of those working and living in the cotton belt relied heavily upon trade across the Atlantic, which would be disrupted by a nautical war, the prospect of which fostered a reluctance to enlist.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=McCaffrey |first=James M. |date=October 2002 |title=Texans in the Spanish-American War |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30240344 |journal=Southwestern Historical Quarterly |volume=106 |issue=2 |pages=260 |jstor=30240344 }}</ref> Potential volunteers were also not financially incentivized, with pay per month initially being $13.00, which then was then raised to $15.60 for combat pay.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Turpie |first=David C. |date=November 2014 |title=A Voluntary War The Spanish-American War, White Southern Manhood, and the Struggle to Recruit Volunteers in the South |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43918105 |journal=Journal of Southern History |volume=80 |issue=4 |pages=879 |jstor=43918105 }}</ref> It was more economically promising for most Southern men to continue in their own enterprises rather than enlist.

===Historiography===
[[File:The last stand of the Spanish Garrison.jpg|thumb|The last stand of the Spanish Garrison in Cuba by [[Murat Halstead]], 1898]]

The overwhelming consensus of observers in the 1890s, and historians ever since, is that an upsurge of humanitarian concern with the plight of the Cubans was the main motivating force that caused the war with Spain in 1898. McKinley put it succinctly in late 1897 that if Spain failed to resolve its crisis, the United States would see "a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force".<ref name="Annual Message"/> Intervention in terms of negotiating a settlement proved impossible—neither Spain nor the insurgents would agree. Louis Perez states, "Certainly the moralistic determinants of war in 1898 has<!--I have not been able to find the cited source online in order to verify this, but I'll comment here: [Sic: should be "have"], but I've left this unchanged in this direct quote from a source. This probably does not warrant a visible editorial [[WP:SIC]] comment.--> been accorded preponderant explanatory weight in the historiography."<ref>Louis A. Perez, Jr., review, in ''Journal of American History'' (Dec. 2006), p. 889. See more detail in Perez, ''The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography'' (1998) pp. 23–56.</ref> By the 1950s, however, American political scientists began attacking the war as a mistake based on idealism, arguing that a better policy would be realism. They discredited the idealism by suggesting the people were deliberately misled by propaganda and sensationalist yellow journalism. Political scientist Robert Osgood, writing in 1953, led the attack on the American decision process as a confused mix of "self-righteousness and genuine moral fervor," in the form of a "crusade" and a combination of "knight-errantry and national self- assertiveness."<ref>Perez (1998) pp. 46–47.</ref> Osgood argued:
:A war to free Cuba from Spanish despotism, corruption, and cruelty, from the filth and disease and barbarity of General 'Butcher' Weyler's reconcentration camps, from the devastation of haciendas, the extermination of families, and the outraging of women; that would be a blow for humanity and democracy.... No one could doubt it if he believed—and skepticism was not popular—the exaggerations of the Cuban ''Junta's'' propaganda and the lurid distortions and imaginative lies pervade by the "yellow sheets" of Hearst and Pulitzer at the combined rate of 2 million [newspaper copies] a day.<ref>Robert Endicott Osgood, ''Ideals and self-interest in America's foreign relations: The great transformation of the twentieth century'' (1953) p. 43.</ref>

In his ''War and Empire'',<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|title=War and Empire|last=Atwood|first=Paul|publisher=Pluto Press|year=2010|isbn=978-0745327648|location=New York|pages=98–102}}</ref> Prof. Paul Atwood of the University of Massachusetts (Boston) writes:

<blockquote>The Spanish–American War was fomented on outright lies and trumped up accusations against the intended enemy.&nbsp;... War fever in the general population never reached a critical temperature until the accidental sinking of the ''USS Maine'' was deliberately, and falsely, attributed to Spanish villainy.&nbsp;... In a cryptic message&nbsp;... Senator Lodge wrote that 'There may be an explosion any day in Cuba which would settle a great many things. We have got a battleship in the harbor of Havana, and our fleet, which overmatches anything the Spanish have, is masked at the Dry Tortugas.</blockquote>

In his autobiography,<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3335/3335-h/3335-h.htm|title=Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography|last=Roosevelt|first=Theodore|date=191|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170218032858/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/3335/3335-h/3335-h.htm|archive-date=February 18, 2017|url-status=live|df=mdy-all|via=Project Gutenberg}}</ref> Theodore Roosevelt gave his views of the origins of the war:

<blockquote>Our own direct interests were great, because of the Cuban tobacco and sugar, and especially because of Cuba's relation to the projected Isthmian [Panama] Canal. But even greater were our interests from the standpoint of humanity.&nbsp;... It was our duty, even more from the standpoint of National honor than from the standpoint of National interest, to stop the devastation and destruction. Because of these considerations I favored war.</blockquote>