Editing Space Shuttle Columbia disaster (section)

== Flight ==

=== Space Shuttle mission ===
{{Main|STS-107}}
[[File:Crew of STS-107, official photo.jpg|thumb|alt=Seven crew members standing in orange pressure suits and holding a larger version of their mission patch.|The crew of [[STS-107]]. From left to right: [[David M. Brown|Brown]], [[Rick Husband|Husband]], [[Laurel Clark|Clark]], [[Kalpana Chawla|Chawla]], [[Michael P. Anderson|Anderson]], [[William C. McCool|McCool]], [[Ilan Ramon|Ramon]].]]
For STS-107, ''Columbia'' carried the [[SpaceHab]] Research Double Module, the Orbital Acceleration Research Experiment, and an [[Extended Duration Orbiter]] pallet.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|30}} The mission passed its pre-launch certifications and reviews, and began with the launch. The mission was originally scheduled to launch on January 11, 2001, but it was delayed thirteen times, until its launch on January 16, 2003.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=28}}

The seven-member crew of STS-107 were selected in July 2000.<ref name="caib_report" />{{Reference page|28}} The mission was commanded by [[Rick Husband]], who was a [[Colonel (United States)|colonel]] in the [[United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force]] and a [[test pilot]]. He had previously flown on [[STS-96]].<ref name="husband_bio">{{cite web
  | title = Rick Douglas Husband
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/ASTRON~2.HTM
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = August 11, 2020
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200811105612/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/ASTRON~2.HTM
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> The mission's pilot was [[William McCool]], a [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] [[Commander (United States)|commander]] who was on his first spaceflight.<ref name="mccool_bio">{{cite web
  | title = William C. McCool
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/McCool%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = July 14, 2019
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714115417/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/McCool%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> The payload commander was [[Michael P. Anderson|Michael Anderson]], a U.S. Air Force [[Lieutenant colonel (United States)|lieutenant colonel]] who had previously flown on [[STS-89]].<ref name="anderson_bio">{{cite web
  | title = Michael P. Anderson
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/anderson_biodata.htm
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = July 14, 2019
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714115417/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/anderson_biodata.htm
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> [[Kalpana Chawla]] served as the flight engineer; she had previously flown on [[STS-87]].<ref name="chawla_bio">{{cite web
  | title = Kalpana Chawla
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = May 2004
  | url = https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chawla_kalpana.pdf
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = December 29, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20211229163209/https://www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chawla_kalpana.pdf
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> [[David M. Brown|David Brown]] and [[Laurel Clark]], both [[captain (United States O-6)|Navy captains]], flew as the [[mission specialist]]s on their first spaceflights.<ref name="brown_bio">{{cite web
  | title = David M. Brown
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/Brown%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = July 14, 2019
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714115418/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/Brown%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref><ref name="clark_bio">{{cite web
  | title = Laurel Blair Salton Clark
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/Clark%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = July 14, 2019
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714115418/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/Clark%20Astronaut%20Bio%20Data.htm
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> [[Ilan Ramon]], a colonel in the [[Israeli Air Force]] and the first Israeli [[astronaut]], flew as a [[payload specialist]] on his first spaceflight.<ref name="ramon_bio">{{cite web
  | title = Ilan Ramon
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = February 2003
  | url = https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/PAYLOA~1.HTM
  | access-date = January 25, 2022
| archive-date = July 14, 2019
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190714115418/https://history.nasa.gov/columbia/Troxell/Columbia%20Web%20Site/Biographies/Crew%20Profile%20Information/Crew%20Biographies/PAYLOA%7E1.HTM
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=29}}

=== Launch and debris strike ===
[[File:STS107Launch NASA.gif|thumb|STS-107 ignition, launch and lift-off of ''Columbia''.]]
''Columbia'' was launched from the [[Kennedy Space Center Launch Complex 39A]] (LC-39A) at 10:39:00{{spaces}}am. At T+81.7{{spaces}}seconds, a piece of foam approximately {{convert|21|to|27|in|cm|sigfig=2}} long and {{convert|12|to|18|in|cm|sigfig=2}} wide broke off from the left bipod on the ET. At T+81.9{{spaces}}seconds, the foam struck the [[reinforced carbon–carbon]] (RCC) panels on ''Columbia''{{'}}s left wing at relative velocity of {{convert|625|to|840|ft/s|mph km/h|sigfig=3}}.{{r|caib_report|p=34}} The foam's low [[ballistic coefficient]] caused it to lose speed immediately after separating from the ET, and the orbiter ran into the slower foam.{{r|caib_report|p=60}} Neither the mission nor ground crew noticed the debris strike at the time.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=140}} The SRBs separated from the ET at T+2{{spaces}}minutes and 7{{spaces}}seconds, followed by the ET's separation from the orbiter at T+8{{spaces}}minutes 30{{spaces}}seconds.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=35}} The ET separation was photographed by Anderson and recorded by Brown, but they did not record the bipod with missing foam.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=148}} At T+43{{spaces}}minutes, ''Columbia'' completed its orbital insertion as planned.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=35}}

=== Flight risk management ===
[[File:Space Shuttle Columbia disaster ET208 camera.gif|thumb|Footage of the debris strike at T+81.9 seconds|alt=Video image of the Space Shuttle in flight during the debris strike.]]

After ''Columbia'' entered orbit, the NASA Intercenter Photo Working Group conducted a routine review of videos of the launch. The group's analysts did not notice the debris strike until the second day of the mission. None of the cameras that recorded the launch had a clear view of the debris striking the wing, leaving the group unable to determine the level of damage sustained by the orbiter. The group's chair contacted [[Wayne Hale]], the Shuttle Program Manager for Launch Integration, to request on-orbit pictures of ''Columbia''{{'}}s wing to assess its damage. After receiving notification of the debris strike, engineers at NASA, [[United Space Alliance]], and [[Boeing]] created the Debris Assessment Team and began working to determine the damage to the orbiter.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=140, 143}} Intercenter Photo Working Group believed that the orbiter's RCC tiles were possibly damaged; NASA program managers were less concerned over the danger caused by the debris strike.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=141}}

Boeing analysts attempted to model the damage caused to the orbiter's TPS from the foam strike. The software models predicted damage that was deeper than the thickness of the TPS tiles, indicating that the orbiter's aluminum skin would be unprotected in that area. The Debris Assessment Team dismissed this conclusion as inaccurate, because of previous instances of predictions of damage greater than the actual damage. Further modeling specific to the RCC panels used software calibrated to predict damage caused by falling ice. The software predicted only one of 15 scenarios that ice would cause damage, leading the Debris Assessment Team to conclude there was minimal damage due to the lower density of foam to ice.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=143–145}}
[[File:STS-107 crew in orbit.jpg|thumb|STS-107 crew posing for a group photo in space|alt=Seven crew members, in red or blue collared shirts, floating in microgravity.]]

To assess the possible damage to ''Columbia''{{'}}s wing, members of the Debris Assessment Team made multiple requests to get imagery of the orbiter from the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] (DoD). Imagery requests were channeled through both the [[Department of Defense Manned Space Flight Support Office|DoD Manned Space Flight Support Office]] and the [[Johnson Space Center]] Engineering Directorate.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=150–151}} Hale coordinated the request through a DoD representative at KSC. The request was relayed to the [[United States Strategic Command|U.S. Strategic Command]] (USSTRATCOM), which began identifying imaging assets that could observe the orbiter. The imagery request was soon rescinded by NASA Mission Management Team Chair [[Linda Ham]] after she investigated the origin of it. She had consulted with Flight Director Phil Engelauf and members of the Mission Management Team, who stated that they did not have a requirement for imagery of ''Columbia''. Ham did not consult with the Debris Assessment Team, and cancelled the imagery request on the basis that it had not been made through official channels.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=152–153}} Maneuvering the orbiter to allow its left wing to be imaged would have interrupted ongoing science operations, and Ham dismissed the DoD imaging capabilities as insufficient to assess damage to the orbiter.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=153–154}} Following the rejection of their imagery request, the Debris Assessment Team did not make further requests for the orbiter to be imaged.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=157}}

Throughout the flight, members of the Mission Management Team were less concerned than the Debris Assessment Team about the potential risk of a debris strike. The loss of bipod foam on STS-107 was compared to previous foam strike events, none of which caused the loss of an orbiter or crew. Ham, scheduled to work as an integration manager for [[STS-114]], was concerned with the potential delays from a foam loss event.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|pages=147–148}} Mission management also downplayed the risk of the debris strike in communications with the crew.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|161}} On January 23, flight director Steve Stich sent an e-mail to Husband and McCool to tell them about the foam strike and inform them there was no cause for concern about damage to the TPS, as foam strikes had occurred on previous flights.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=159}}
{{blockquote|During ascent at approximately 80 seconds, photo analysis shows that some debris from the area of the -Y ET Bipod Attach Point came loose and subsequently impacted the orbiter left wing, in the area of transition from Chine to Main Wing, creating a shower of smaller particles. The impact appears to be totally on the lower surface and no particles are seen to traverse over the upper surface of the wing. Experts have reviewed the high speed photography and there is no concern for RCC or tile damage. We have seen this same phenomenon on several other flights and there is absolutely no concern for entry.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=159}}}}
[[File:STS-107, final moments in cabin (Space Shuttle Columbia disaster).webm|thumb|Video taken by the crew ends four minutes before the disaster.]]
The crew were also sent a fifteen-second video of the debris strike in preparation for a press conference, but were reassured that there were no safety concerns.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=161}}

On January 26, the Debris Assessment Team concluded that there were no safety concerns from the debris strike. The team's report was critical of the Mission Management Team for asserting that there were no safety concerns before the Debris Assessment Team's investigation had been completed.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=164}} On January 29, William Readdy, the Associate Administrator for Space Flight, agreed to DoD imaging of the orbiter, but on the condition that it would not interfere with flight operations; ultimately, the orbiter was not imaged by the DoD during the flight. At a Mission Management Team on January 31, the day before ''Columbia'' reentered the atmosphere, the Launch Integration Office voiced Ham's intention to review on-board footage to view the missing foam, but concerns of crew safety were not discussed.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=166}}

=== Reentry ===
''Columbia'' was scheduled to reenter the atmosphere and land on February 1, 2003. At 3:30{{spaces}}am EST the Entry [[flight controller|Flight Control Team]] started its shift at the [[Christopher C. Kraft Jr. Mission Control Center|Mission Control Center]].{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=38}} On board the orbiter, the crew stowed loose items and prepared their equipment for reentry.<ref name="survival_report">{{cite web
  | title = Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report
  | publisher = NASA
  | date = 2008
  | url = https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf
  | id = SP-2008-565
  | access-date = February 11, 2022
| archive-date = July 25, 2021
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20210725011744/https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/298870main_SP-2008-565.pdf
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref>{{Reference page|page=1.5}}

At 45 minutes before the deorbit burn, Husband and McCool began working through the entry checklist.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.6}} At 8:10{{spaces}}am the [[Flight controller#Spacecraft communicator (CAPCOM)|Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM)]], [[Charles O. Hobaugh|Charlie Hobaugh]],<ref name="latimes_capcom">{{cite web
  | last = Hotz
  | first = Robert Lee
  | title = Decoding Columbia: A detective story
  | work = [[The Los Angeles Times]]
  | date = January 31, 2013
| url = https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-sci-shuttle21dec21-1-story.html
  | accessdate = July 24, 2023
| archive-date = June 4, 2023
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20230604152132/https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-sci-shuttle21dec21-1-story.html
  | url-status = live
  }}</ref> informed the crew that they were approved to conduct the deorbit burn. At 8:15:30{{spaces}}the crew successfully executed the deorbit burn, which lasted 2{{spaces}}minutes and 38{{spaces}}seconds. At 8:44:09{{spaces}}''Columbia'' reentered the atmosphere at an altitude of {{convert|400000|ft|km}}, a point named entry interface. The damage to the TPS on the orbiter's left wing allowed hot air to enter and begin melting the aluminum structure.{{r|caib_report|p=9}} Four and a half minutes after entry interface, a sensor began recording greater-than-normal amounts of strain on the left wing; the sensor's data was recorded to internal storage and not transmitted to the crew or ground controllers.{{r|caib_report|p=38}} The orbiter began to turn ([[Aircraft principal axes#Vertical axis (yaw)|yaw]]) to the left as a result of the increased drag on the left wing, but this was not noticed by the crew or mission control because of corrections from the orbiter's flight control system.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.8}} This was followed by sensors in the left wheel well reporting a rise in temperature.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.10}}
[[File:STS-107 Columbia entry imaged from ground.jpg|thumb|''Columbia'' at about 08:57. Debris is visible coming from the left wing (bottom). The image was taken at [[Starfire Optical Range]] at [[Kirtland Air Force Base]].|alt=Fuzzy black-and-white photo of the orbiter during reentry]]

At 8:53:46 am, ''Columbia'' crossed over the [[California]] coast; it was traveling at Mach{{spaces}}23 at an altitude of {{convert|231600|ft|km}}, and the temperature of its wings' leading edges was estimated to be {{convert|2800|F|C}}.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=38}} Soon after it entered California airspace, the orbiter shed several pieces of debris, events observed on the ground as sudden increases in brightness of the air around the orbiter. The [[List_of_NASA's_flight_control_positions#MMACS|MMACS]] officer reported that the hydraulic sensors in the left wing had readings below the sensors' minimum detection thresholds at 8:54:24{{spaces}}am. ''Columbia'' continued its reentry and traveled over [[Utah]], [[Arizona]], [[New Mexico]], and [[Texas]], where observers would report seeing signs of debris being shed.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=39}}

At 8:58:03, the orbiter's [[Flight control surfaces#Rudder and aileron trim|aileron trim]] changed from the predicted values because of the increasing drag caused by the damage to the left wing. At 8:58:21, the orbiter shed a TPS tile that would later land in [[Littlefield, Texas]]; it would become the westernmost piece of recovered debris.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.12}} The crew first received an indication of a problem at 8:58:39, when the Backup Flight Software monitor began displaying fault messages for a loss of pressure in the tires of the left landing gear. The pilot and commander then received indications that the status of the left landing gear was unknown, as different sensors reported the gear was down and locked or in the stowed position.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.13}} The drag of the left wing continued to yaw the orbiter to the left until it could no longer be corrected using aileron trim. The orbiter's [[Space Shuttle orbiter#Attitude control system|Reaction Control System]] (RCS) thrusters began firing continuously to correct its orientation.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.14}}

The loss of signal (LOS) from ''Columbia'' occurred at 8:59:32. Mission control stopped receiving information from the orbiter at this time, and Husband's last radio call of "Roger, uh{{spaces}}..." was cut off mid-transmission.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=39}}{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.14}} One of the channels in the flight control system was bypassed as the result of a failed wire, and a Master Alarm began sounding on the flight deck.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.15}} Loss of control of the orbiter is estimated to have begun several seconds later with a loss of hydraulic pressure and an uncontrolled [[Aircraft principal axes#Transverse axis (pitch)|pitch]]-up maneuver.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.16}} The orbiter began flying along a [[ballistic trajectory]], which was significantly steeper and had more drag than the previous gliding trajectory.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.17}} The orbiter, while still traveling faster than Mach 15, entered into a [[Flat spin (aviation)|flat spin]] of 30° to 40° per second. The acceleration that the crew was experiencing increased from approximately 0.8 [[g-force|g]] to 3{{spaces}}g, which would have likely caused dizziness and disorientation, but not incapacitation.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.18}} The autopilot was switched to manual control and reset to automatic mode at 9:00:03; this would have required the input of either Husband or McCool, indicating that they were still conscious and able to perform functions at the time. All hydraulic pressure was lost, and McCool's final switch configurations indicate that he had tried to restore the hydraulic systems at some time after 9:00:05.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.20}}

[[File:ColumbiaFLIR2003.gif|thumb|Breakup of the Space Shuttle Columbia as seen from an Apache helicopter FLIR camera at Fort Hood, Texas<ref name="aviationist-20140201">{{Cite news |last=Cenciotti |first=David |date=February 1, 2014 |title=Space Shuttle Columbia Disaster as seen through AH-64 Apache camera |work=The Aviationist |url=https://theaviationist.com/2014/02/01/sts-107-disaster-video/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331125749/https://theaviationist.com/2014/02/01/sts-107-disaster-video/ |archive-date=March 31, 2023 }}</ref>]]
At 9:00:18, the orbiter began a catastrophic breakup, and all on-board data recording soon ceased.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.20}} Ground observers noted a sudden increase in debris being shed, and all on-board systems lost power. By 9:00:25, the orbiter's fore and aft sections had separated from one another.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.21}} The sudden [[Jerk (physics)|jerk]] caused the crew compartment to collide with the interior wall of the fuselage, resulting in the start of depressurization of the crew compartment by 9:00:35.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.22}} The pieces of the orbiter continued to break apart into smaller pieces, and within a minute after breakup were too small to be detected by ground-based videos. A NASA report estimates that by 9:35, all crew remains and a majority of debris had hit the ground.{{r|survival_report}}{{Reference page|page=1.77}}

The loss of signal occurred at a time when the Flight Control Team expected brief communication outages as the orbiter stopped communication via the west [[tracking and data relay satellite]] (TDRS). Personnel in Mission Control were unaware of the in-flight break-up, and continued to try to reestablish contact with the orbiter.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=43}} At around 9:12:39, when ''Columbia'' would have been conducting its final maneuvers to land, a Mission Control member received a phone call concerning news coverage of the orbiter breaking up. This information was immediately passed on to the Entry Flight Director, [[LeRoy E. Cain|LeRoy Cain]], who initiated contingency procedures.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=44}} At KSC, where ''Columbia'' had been expected to land at 9:16, NASA Associate Administrator and former astronaut [[William Readdy]] also began contingency procedures after the orbiter did not land as scheduled.{{r|columbia_home|p=5}}

=== Crew survivability ===
During reentry, all seven of the STS-107 crew members were killed, but the exact time of their deaths could not be determined. The level of acceleration that they experienced during crew module breakup was not lethal.{{r|caib_report}}{{Reference page|page=77}} The first lethal event the crew experienced was the [[Uncontrolled decompression|depressurization]] of the crew module. The rate and exact time of complete depressurization could not be determined, but it occurred no later than 9:00:59 and was likely much earlier. The remains of the crew members indicated they all experienced depressurization. The astronauts' helmets have a visor that, when closed, can temporarily protect the crew member from depressurization. None of the crew members had closed their visors, one was not wearing a helmet, and three were not wearing their pressure suit gloves; this would indicate that depressurization occurred quickly before they could take protective measures. They were rendered unconscious or deceased within seconds and tissue damage was extensive enough that they could not have regained consciousness even if the cabin had regained pressurization.{{r|survival_report|p=1.24}}<ref name="lossofsignal">{{cite book|last1=Stepaniak|first1=Philip C.|url=https://www.asma.org/asma/media/asma/Travel-Publications/NASA%20Shuttle/SP-2014-616.pdf|title=Loss of Signal: Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap|last2=Lane|first2=Helen W.|last3=Davis|first3=Jeffrey R.|date=May 2014|publisher=NASA|location=Washington, DC|access-date=March 10, 2022|archive-date=March 3, 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220303191229/http://www.asma.org/asma/media/asma/Travel-Publications/NASA%20Shuttle/SP-2014-616.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref>{{Reference page|pages=89,103}}

During and after the breakup of the crew module, the crew, either unconscious or dead, experienced rotation on all three axes. The astronauts' shoulder harnesses were unable to prevent trauma to their upper bodies, as the [[Seat belt#Locking retractors|inertia reel system]] failed to retract sufficiently to secure them, leaving them only restrained by their lap belts. The helmets were not conformal to the crew members' heads, allowing head injuries to occur inside of the helmet. The neck ring of the helmet may have also acted as a fulcrum that caused spine and neck injuries. The physical trauma to the astronauts, who could not brace to prevent such injuries, also could have resulted in their deaths.{{r|survival_report|p=1.25}}{{r|lossofsignal|pp=103–105}}

The astronauts also likely suffered from significant thermal trauma. Hot gas entered the disintegrating crew module, burning the crew members, whose bodies were still somewhat protected by their ACES suits. Once the crew module fell apart, the astronauts were violently exposed to windblast and a possible shock wave, which stripped their suits from their bodies. The crews' remains were exposed to hot gas and molten metal as they fell away from the orbiter.{{r|lossofsignal|pp=106–108}}

After separation from the crew module, the bodies of the crew members entered an environment with almost no oxygen, very low atmospheric pressure, and both high temperatures caused by deceleration, and extremely low ambient temperatures.{{r|lossofsignal|p=93}} Their bodies hit the ground with lethal force.{{r|survival_report|p=1.29}}