Editing Somali Armed Forces (section)

=== Decline and collapse, 1978–1991 ===
{{See also|Somali Civil War|Isaaq genocide|Somaliland War of Independence}}
The shift in support by the Soviet Union during the [[Ogaden War]] motivated the Barre regime to seek allies elsewhere. The need for a rethink was emphasized by a [[1978 Somali coup d'état attempt|failed coup d'état]] in 1978, which appears to have been poorly organised.<ref>See Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, ''The Suicidal State in Somalia,'' 2016.</ref> Barre and his advisors eventually settled on the Soviet Union's [[Cold War]] arch-rival, the United States, which had been courting the Somali government for some time. The U.S. eventually gave extensive military support. Following the war, Barre's government began arresting government and military officials under suspicion of participation in the 1978 coup attempt.<ref name=Ahmed /><ref name="Ararep">''ARR: Arab report and record'', (Economic Features, ltd.: 1978), p.602.</ref> Most of the people who had allegedly helped plot the putsch were summarily executed.<ref name="Npmc">New People Media Centre, ''New people'', Issues 94–105, (New People Media Centre: Comboni Missionaries, 2005).</ref> However, several officials managed to escape abroad where they formed the [[Somali Salvation Democratic Front]] (SSDF), the first of various dissident groups dedicated to ousting Barre's regime by force.{{sfn|Fitzgerald|2002|p=25}} Among these opposition movements were the [[Somali Patriotic Movement]] (SPM) and Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA), a [[Gadabuursi]] group which had been formed in the northwest to counter the [[Somali National Movement]] (SNM) [[Isaaq]] militia.<ref name="Ciisa-Salwe">{{cite book |last=Ciisa-Salwe |first=Cabdisalaam M. |title=The collapse of the Somali state: the impact of the colonial legacy |year=1996 |publisher=HAAN Publishing |isbn=978-1-874209-91-1 |page=104 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GxMOAQAAMAAJ |access-date=12 November 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150415055142/http://www.google.com/books?id=GxMOAQAAMAAJ |archive-date=15 April 2015 |url-status=live  }}</ref>
[[File:Ethiopian armored vehicles captured by the Somali army.jpg|thumb|Two captured Ethiopian BTR-60 armored personnel carriers that were disabled on the battlefields near Balambale and Guldogob in 1982.]]
The armed forces continued to expand after the Ogaden War. The army expanded to 96,000 in 1980, of which combat forces made up 60,000. Thereafter the army grew to 115,000 and eventually to 123,000 by 1984–85.{{sfn|Adam|1998|p=373}}<ref>Hussein M. Adam, the chapter author, cites interviews with Colonel Abdullahi Kahim, Toronto, 1 and 3 August 1992. Kahim served as director of finance and administration in the Ministry of Defence from 1977 to 1987.</ref>

In 1981 one of three corps/sector headquarters for the ground forces was situated at [[Hargeisa]] in the northwestern [[Woqooyi Galbeed]] region ([[26th Sector|Sector 26]]). Others were believed to be at [[Galkacyo]] in the north-central [[Mudug]] region and at [[Beledweyne]] in the south-central [[Hiiraan]] region. The ground forces included seven divisions. Allocated among the divisions were three mechanized infantry brigades, ten anti-aircraft battalions, and thirteen artillery battalions.{{sfn|Nelson|1981|page=248}} The classified supplements to the [[CIA World Factbook]] for the 1980s, released thirty years later, show that the CIA estimated that the force had grown to eleven divisions by January 1984, and twelve divisions by 1986.{{sfn|Robinson|2019b|p=427}}

In 1984, the government attempted to solve the manpower shortage problem by instituting obligatory military service.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=206}} Men of eighteen to forty years of age were to be conscripted for two years. Opposition to conscription and to the campaigns against guerrilla groups resulted in widespread evasion of military service. As a result, during the late 1980s the government normally met manpower requirements by impressing men into military service. This practice alienated an increasing number of Somalis, who wanted the government to negotiate a peaceful resolution of the conflicts that were slowly destroying Somali society.
[[File:Somali soldier 1983.jpg|thumb|upright|A Somali soldier with an [[AKM]] poses for a photograph during the multinational joint-service [[Exercise Bright Star]] '85.]]
However, as the 1980s wore on, Siad Barre increasingly used clanism as a political resource.{{sfn|Compagnon|1992|p=9}} Barre filled the key positions in the army and security forces with members of three [[Darod|Darood]] clans closely related to his own ''reer'': the [[Marehan]], [[Dhulbahante]], and [[Ogaden (clan)|Ogaden]] known as the [[MOD Alliance]] .{{sfn|Compagnon|1992|p=9}}{{sfn|AfricaConfidential|1986|p=1-2}} Adam says that '..As early as 1976, when Colonel Omar Mohamed Farah was asked to train and command a tank brigade stationed in Mogadishu, he found that out of about 540 soldiers, at least 500 were from the Marehan clan. The whole tank division was headed by a Marehan officer, Umar Haji Masala.'{{sfn|Adam|1998|p=383}}<ref>Adam cites interview with Colonel Farah.</ref> Compagnon wrote in 1992: "Colonels and generals were part of the president's personal patronage network; they had to remain loyal to him and his relatives, whether they had command or were temporarily in the cabinet."{{sfn|Compagnon|1992|p=9}} As a result, by 1990 many Somalis looked upon the armed forces as Siad Barre's personal army. This perception eventually destroyed the military's reputation as a national institution. The critical posts of commander of the 2nd Tank Brigade and 2nd Artillery Brigade in Mogadishu were both held by Marehan officers, as were the posts of commander of the three reserve brigades in Hargeisa in the north.{{sfn|AfricaConfidential|1986|p=1-2}}

By 1987 the U.S. [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] estimated the army was 40,000 strong (with Ethiopian army strength estimated at the same time as 260,000).<ref name=DIA1987>{{cite web|author=Defense Intelligence Agency|title=Military Intelligence Summary, Vol IV, Part III, Africa South of the Sahara|url=https://www.dia.mil/FOIA/FOIA-Electronic-Reading-Room/FOIA-Reading-Room-Africa/FileId/39704/|date=November 1987|page=12}}</ref> The President, Mohamed Siad Barre, held the rank of Major General and acted as Minister of Defence. There were three vice-ministers of national defence. From the SNA headquarters in Mogadishu four sectors were directed: [[26th Sector|Sector 26]] at [[Hargeisa]], [[Sector 54]] at [[Garowe]], [[Sector 21]] at [[Dusa Mareb]], and [[Division 60 (Somalia)|Sector 60]] at [[Baidoa]]. Thirteen divisions, averaging 3,300 strong, were divided between the four sectors – four in the northernmost and three in each of the other sectors. The sectors were under the command of brigadiers (three) and a colonel (one). [[Mohammed Said Hersi Morgan]] has been reported as 26th Sector commander from 1986 to 1988. Barre's son, [[Maslah Mohammed Siad Barre]] was commanding the 77th Sector in Mogadishu in November 1987,{{sfn|Clarke|1992|p=27}} and later became Chief of Staff (also reported as Commander-in-Chief) of the Army.<ref>Samuel M. Makinda, 'Clan Conflict and Factionalism in Somalia,' in Paul B. Rich, ''Warlords in International Relations'' Springer, 2016, 127.</ref> Maslah may have become Commander-in-Chief in early March 1989.<ref>Samuel M. Makinda, 'Clan Conflict and Factionalism in Somalia,' in Paul B. Rich, ''Warlords in International Relations,'' Springer, 2016, 127; ''The Suicidal State in Somalia: The Rise and Fall of the Siad Barre Regime,'' By Mohamed Haji Ingiriis, p328.</ref>

Military exercises between the United States and the Siad Barre regime continued during the 1980s. After Exercise Eastern Wind ’83, the [[Los Angeles Times]] was told that "the exercise failed dismally.…The Somali army did not perform up to any standard," one diplomat said. … "The inefficiency of the Somali armed forces is legendary among foreign military men."<ref>{{cite web|last=Mitchell |first=Charles |title=U.S. Losing Interest in Military Bases in Somalia: Port, Airstrip No Longer Are Key Part of Plans for Gulf of Aden Emergency|agency=[[United Press International|UPI]]|website=[[Los Angeles Times]]|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-03-17-mn-35349-story.html |date=17 March 1985|access-date=29 December 2021}}</ref>{{sfn|Robinson|2019b|p=426, 428–9}} 'Valiant Usher '86' took place during the U.S. [[Fiscal Year]] of 1986, but actually in late 1985, and the [[24th Marine Expeditionary Unit]] participated in Exercise Eastern Wind in August 1987 in the area of Geesalay (in the vicinity of [[Cape Guardafui]]).<ref>United States Marine Corps, [http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500_4.pdf Restoring Hope in Somalia with the Unified Task Force] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130630033041/http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Restoring%20Hope%20In%20Somalia%20with%20the%20Unified%20Task%20Force%201992-1993%20PCN%2019000413500_4.pdf |date=30 June 2013 }}, 63.</ref>

By the mid-1980s, more resistance movements supported by Ethiopia's [[Derg]] administration had sprung up across the country. Barre responded by ordering punitive destruction, especially in the heavily [[Issaq]] northern regions. The northwestern administrative center of [[Hargeisa]], a [[Somali National Movement]] (SNM) stronghold, was almost totally destroyed by bombing and artillery in 1988.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=154}} The Hargeisa war memorial today is a [[MiG]] fighter-bomber aircraft that those on the ground managed to shoot down during the attacks.

Compagnon writes that:{{sfn|Compagnon|1992|p=9}}
{{quote|From the summer of 1988 onwards, there was a combination of political repression against targeted clans and private use of violence by predatory units and individuals of the former 'national' armed forces – already in the process of disintegration – who used their power to rape, kill, and loot freely. The ..distinction between private illegitimate violence and public coercion disappeared. Many former military men later joined the clan militias or the armed gangs.}}

Kapteijns writes:<ref>Lidwien Kapteijns, Clan Cleansing in Somalia: The Ruinous Legacy of 1991 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012, 2013), 96, 253.</ref> 
{{quote|By June 1989, the SNM was again mounting attacks on the major centers [in the north], cutting off transport routes and interfering with government supplies to its garrisons. Gradually, the government lost control of anything but the major towns and, by the end of December 1989, even these were besieged by the SNM.}}

U.S. Army elements conducted training with the Somali 31st Commando Brigade at [[Baledogle Airfield]] outside Mogadishu in 1989.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.usmilitariaforum.com/forums/index.php?/topic/213227-bring-backs-from-somalia-deployment/ |title=Bring-Backs From Somalia Deployment – SPOILS OF WAR |website=usmilitariaforum.com |access-date=4 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180809153238/http://www.usmilitariaforum.com/forums/index.php?%2Ftopic%2F213227-bring-backs-from-somalia-deployment%2F |archive-date=9 August 2018 |url-status=live  }}</ref>
{{multiple image|perrow = 2|total_width=300
| image1 = Somali troops.jpg
| image2 = Somalian armed forces band in 1983.JPEG
| footer = Somali troops (left) and Somali military band (right) passing in review during a ceremony of Exercise Eastern Wind '83, the amphibious landing phase of [[Exercise Bright Star]] '83.
}}
[[File:Radar installation operated by Somalian troops.JPEG|thumb|right|An aerial view of a radar installation operated by Somali troops at [[Berbera Airport]]. A [[Russian air surveillance radars|Soviet-made]] [[P-12 radar|P-12]] [[early-warning radar]] is visible at bottom center. The photo was taken during Exercise Eastern Wind '83, the amphibious landing phase of [[Exercise Bright Star]] '83.]]
As of 1 June 1989, the [[International Institute for Strategic Studies]] estimated that the Army comprised four corps and 12 division headquarters.{{sfn|IISS|1989|p=113}} The IISS noted that these formations 'were in name only; below establishment in units, men, and equipment. Brigades were of battalion size.'{{sfn|IISS|1989|p=113}} In 1989-90 six military sectors , twelve divisions, four tank brigades, 45 mechanized and infantry brigades, 4 [[commando]] brigades, one surface-to-air missile brigade, three field artillery brigades, 30 field battalions [''sic'': probably field artillery battalions], and one air defence artillery battalion were listed.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=204-5}} The armed forces declined in size from a possible high of 65,000 in early 1990 to about 10,000 later that year, due to desertions and battlefield defeats.{{sfn|Metz|1993|p=196}}

On 12–13 November 1989, a group of Hawiye officers and men belonging to the 4th Division at [[Galkayo]], in [[Mudug]], mutinied. General Barre's son, Maslah, led a force of Marehan clansmen to suppress the mutiny. Punishment was meted out to local Hawiye villages.{{sfn|Clarke|1992|p=29}} In mid-November 1989, rebel forces briefly captured Galkayo. They reportedly seized significant quantities of military equipment at the 4th Division Headquarters, including tanks, 30 mobile anti-aircraft guns and rocket launchers. However, the rebels were unable to take most of this equipment so they incinerated it. Government forces thereafter launched massive reprisals against civilians within the 21st, 54th, [[Division 60 (Somalia)|60th]] and 77th military sectors. The impacted towns and villages included Gowlalo, Dagaari, [[Sadeh Higlo]], [[Banderadley]], Galinsor, Wargalo, Do'ol, Halimo, Go'ondalay and Galkayo.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/s/somalia/somalia909.pdf |title=Human Rights Watch |publisher=Human Rights Watch |access-date=4 April 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160317223515/https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/s/somalia/somalia909.pdf |archive-date=17 March 2016 |url-status=live  }}</ref>

By mid-1990, USC insurgents had captured most of the towns and villages surrounding Mogadishu.{{sfn|Adam|1998|p=389}} On 8 November 1990, USC forces launched attack on the government garrison at Bulo-Burte, killing the commander. From 30 December 1990, there was a major upsurge in local violence in Mogadishu, and continuous fighting between government troops and USC insurgents. The next four weeks were marked by increasing rebel gains. On 27 January 1991, Siad Barre fled the capital for [[Kismayo]], along with many of his supporters.{{sfn|Clarke|1992|p=32}} This marked the culmination of the first phase of the [[Somali Civil War|civil war]]. 
By this time the Armed Forces had dissolved, split into clan factions. On 23 January 1992, the UN Security Council imposed an [[arms embargo]] via [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 733]] to stop the flow of weapons to feuding militia groups.{{sfn|Clarke|1992|p=34}} Much military equipment was left ''in situ'', deteriorating, and was sometimes discovered and photographed by intervention forces in the early 1990s.

In May 2019, the ''[[New York Times]]'' reported that a former commander of the SNA's Fifth Brigade in northern Somalia had been found responsible for torture during the 1980s by a U.S. jury.<ref>{{cite news|title= 	Ex-Lyft and Uber Driver in Virginia Was Responsible for Torture in Somalia in '80s, Jury Finds |newspaper=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/24/us/yusuf-abdi-ali-uber-lyft.html|date=24 May 2019|last1=Hauser |first1=Christine }}</ref>

The [[United Nations]] became engaged in Somalia from early in 1991. UN personnel were withdrawn on several occasions during sporadic flare-ups of violence. A series of [[Security Council]] resolutions (733, 746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped impose a ceasefire between the two key factions, signed at the end of March 1992. 

The [[United Nations Operation in Somalia I]] was established in April 1992 and ran until its duties were assumed by the [[Unified Task Force]] (UNITAF) mission in December 1992. Following the dissolution of UNITAF in May 1993, the subsequent UN mission in Somalia was known as [[United Nations Operation in Somalia II]] (UNOSOM II).

Some of the militias that were then competing for power saw UNOSOM II's presence as a threat. Gun battles took place in Mogadishu between the warring factions and UN peacekeepers. Among these was the [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]] in October 1993, part of an unsuccessful operation by U.S. troops to apprehend [[Somali National Alliance]] faction leader [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]]. UN soldiers eventually withdrew altogether from the country on March 3, 1995, having incurred more significant casualties.<ref>See also Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, S/1995/231 (March 28, 1995).</ref>

After UNOSOM II's departure in March 1995, military clashes between local factions became shorter, generally less intense, and more localized. This was in part due to the large-scale UN military intervention that had helped to curb the intense fighting between the major factions, who then began to focus on consolidating gains that they had made. The local peace and reconciliation initiatives that had been undertaken in the south-central part of the country between 1993 and 1995 also generally had a positive impact.<ref name="Interpeace613">Interpeace, '[http://www.interpeace.org/publications/somali-region/60-a-history-of-mediation-in-somalia-since-1988-english/file The search for peace: A history of mediation in Somalia since 1988],' Interpeace, May 2009, 13–14. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140222044942/http://www.interpeace.org/publications/somali-region/60-a-history-of-mediation-in-somalia-since-1988-english/file |date=February 22, 2014 }}</ref>