Editing Solipsism (section)

===Methodological===
{{Main|Methodological solipsism}}

Methodological solipsism is an [[Agnosticism|agnostic]] variant of solipsism. It exists in opposition to the strict [[Epistemology|epistemological]] requirements for "knowledge" (''e.g.'' the requirement that knowledge must be certain). It still entertains the points that [[Problem of induction|any induction is fallible]]. Methodological solipsism sometimes goes even further to say that even what we perceive as the brain is actually part of the external world, for it is only through our senses that we can see or feel the mind. Only the existence of thoughts is known for certain.

Methodological solipsists do not intend to conclude that the stronger forms of solipsism are actually true. They simply emphasize that justifications of an external world must be founded on indisputable facts about their own consciousness. The methodological solipsist believes that subjective impressions ([[empiricism]]) or innate knowledge ([[rationalism]]) are the sole possible or proper starting point for philosophical construction.<ref>{{cite book|last=Wood|first=Ledger|title=Dictionary of Philosophy|year=1962|publisher=Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, and Company|pages=295}}</ref> Often methodological solipsism is not held as a belief system, but rather used as a [[thought experiment]] to assist [[skepticism]] (''e.g.'' [[René Descartes]]' [[Cartesian skepticism]]).{{citation needed|date=April 2015}}