Editing Sociology of knowledge (section)

==Approaches to the sociology of knowledge==

===Émile Durkheim===
{{main|Émile Durkheim}}
[[Émile Durkheim]] (1858–1917) is credited as having been the first professor to successfully establish the field of sociology, institutionalizing a department of sociology at the University de Bordeaux in the 1890s.<ref>Calhoun, Craig, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff, Kathryn Schmidt, and Intermohan Virk. (2002). ''Classical sociological theory.'' Malden, Mass: Blackwell</ref> While his works deal with several subjects, including suicide, the family, social structures, and social [[institution]]s, a large part of his work deals with the sociology of knowledge.

While publishing short articles on the subject early in his career (for example, the essay ''De quelques formes primitives de classification'' written in 1902 with [[Marcel Mauss]]), Durkheim worked mainly out of a Kantian framework and sought to understand how logical thought concepts and categories could arise out of social life. He argued, for example, that the types of space and time were not [[A priori knowledge|''a priori'']]. Instead, the category of space depends on a society's social grouping and geographical use of space, and a group's social rhythm determines our understanding of time.<ref>Durkheim, "Conclusion", ''Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse'', Presses Universitaires de France, 5e édition, 2003 {{p.|628}}</ref> Durkheim sought to combine elements of [[rationalism]] and [[empiricism]], arguing that certain aspects of logical thought common to all humans did exist, but that they were products of collective life (thus contradicting the ''[[tabula rasa]]'' empiricist understanding whereby categories are acquired by individual experience alone), and that they were not universal ''a priori'' truths (as [[Kant]] argued) since the content of the categories differed from society to society.<ref>Durkheim, "Introduction", ''Les Formes,'' {{p.|14-17}}, and {{p.|19-22}}.</ref>

Another key element to Durkheim's theory of knowledge is his concept of {{lang | fr | représentations collectives}} ([[collective representations]]), which he outlined in 1912 in ''[[The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life]]''. {{lang | fr | Représentations collectives}} are the [[symbol]]s and images that come to represent the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a [[social collectivity | collectivity]] and are not reducible to individual constituents. They can include words, slogans, ideas, or any number of material items that can serve as a symbol, such as a cross, a rock, a temple, a feather, etc. As Durkheim elaborates, {{lang | fr | représentations collectives}} are created through intense social interaction and are products of collective activity. As such, these representations have the particular, and somewhat contradictory, aspect that they exist externally to the individual (since they are created and controlled not by the individual but by society as a whole), and yet simultaneously within each individual of the society (by virtue of that individual's participation within society).<ref>Durkheim, Emile. (1964). ''The elementary forms of the religious life''. London: Allen & Unwin.</ref>  [[Language]] is an important {{lang | fr | représentation collective}}, which, according to Durkheim, is a product of collective action. And because language is a collective action, language contains within it a history of accumulated knowledge and experience that no individual would be capable of creating alone. As Durkheim says, {{lang | fr | représentations collectives}}, and language in particular:<blockquote>"Add to that which we can learn by our own personal experience all that wisdom and science which the group has accumulated in the course of centuries. Thinking by concepts is not merely seeing reality on its most general side, but it is projecting a light upon the sensation which illuminates it, penetrates it, and transforms it."<ref>Emile Durkheim, Conclusion, Section III, [https://web.archive.org/web/20130312023652/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/41360/41360-h/41360-h.htm#Page_427 ''Elementary Forms of Religious Life''] trans. Joseph Ward Swain, p. 435.</ref></blockquote>As such, language, as a social product, literally structures and shapes our experience of reality, an idea developed by later French philosophers, such as [[Michel Foucault]].

===Karl Mannheim<!--'Relationism (Mannheim)' redirects here-->===
{{main|Karl Mannheim}}
The German political philosophers [[Karl Marx]] (1818–1883) and [[Friedrich Engels]] (1820–1895) argued in ''Die deutsche Ideologie'' (1846, ''[[The German Ideology]]'') and elsewhere that people's [[ideology|ideologies]], including their social and political beliefs and opinions, are rooted in their [[social class|class]] interests and more broadly in the social and economic circumstances in which they live:
: "It is men, who in developing their material inter-course, change, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Being is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by being." (''Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe'' 1/5)

Under the influence of this doctrine and of [[Phenomenology (philosophy)| phenomenology]], the Hungarian-born German sociologist [[Karl Mannheim]] (1893–1947) gave impetus to the growth of the sociology of knowledge with his ''Ideologie und Utopie'' (1929, translated and extended in 1936 as ''Ideology and Utopia''), although the term had been introduced five years earlier by the co-founder of the movement, the German philosopher, phenomenologist and social theorist [[Max Scheler]] (1874–1928), in ''Versuche zu einer Soziologie des Wissens'' (1924, ''Attempts at a Sociology of Knowledge'').

Mannheim feared that this interpretation could be seen to claim that all knowledge and beliefs are the products of socio-political forces since this form of [[relativism]] is self-defeating (if it is true, then it too is merely a product of socio-political forces and has no claim to truth and no persuasive force). Mannheim believed that [[relativism]] was a strange mixture of modern and ancient beliefs in that it contained within itself a belief in an absolute truth that was true for all times and places (the ancient view most often associated with [[Plato]]) and condemned other truth claims because they could not achieve this level of objectivity (an idea gleaned from Marx). Mannheim sought to escape this problem with the idea of '''relationism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->. This is the idea that certain things are true only in certain times and places (a view influenced by [[pragmatism]]) however, this does not make them less true. Mannheim felt that a stratum of free-floating intellectuals (who he claimed were only loosely anchored to the class structure of society) could most perfectly realize this form of truth by creating a "dynamic synthesis" of the ideologies of other groups.

The sociology of Mannheim is specified with particular attention to the forms of transmission of culture and knowledge. It follows the constellations of senses and options that, through the generations, are related to the transmission and reproduction of values.<ref>{{cite book | last =Rinzivillo | first =Guglielmo | title =Scienza e valori in Karl Mannheim |publisher =Armando editore | publication-place =Roma | date =2016 | isbn =978-88-6992-100-1 | oclc =968195366 | language =it | page = 132 et seq |url =https://books.google.com/books?id=fD-2DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA132 }}</ref>

===Phenomenological sociology===

[[Phenomenological sociology]] is the study of the formal structures of concrete social existence as made available in and through the analytical description of acts of intentional consciousness. The "object" of such an analysis is the meaningful lived world of everyday life: the "Lebenswelt", or [[life-world]] (Husserl:1889). The task, like that of every other phenomenological investigation, is to describe the formal structures of this object of investigation in subjective terms, as an object-constituted-in-and-for-consciousness (Gurwitsch:1964). The utilization of phenomenological methods is what makes such a description different from the "naive" subjective descriptions of the man in the street, or those of the traditional, positivist social scientist.

The leading proponent of phenomenological sociology was [[Alfred Schutz|Alfred Schütz]] (1899–1959). Schütz sought to provide a critical philosophical foundation for the interpretive sociology of [[Max Weber]] (1864-1920) through the use of phenomenological methods derived from the transcendental phenomenological investigations of [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938). Husserl's work aimed at establishing the formal structures of intentional [[consciousness]]. Schütz's work was directed at establishing the formal structures of the Life-world (Schütz:1980). Husserl's work was conducted as a transcendental phenomenology of consciousness. Schütz's work was conducted as a mundane phenomenology of the Life-world (Natanson:1974). The difference in their research projects lies in the level of analysis, the objects taken as topics of study, and the type of phenomenological reduction that is employed for the purposes of analysis. Ultimately, the two projects should{{or|date=July 2024}} be seen as complementary, with the structures of the latter dependent on the structures of the former. That is, valid phenomenological descriptions of the formal structures of the Life-world should be wholly consistent with the descriptions of the formal structures of intentional consciousness. It is from the latter that the former derives its validity and [[truth value]] (Sokolowski:2000).

The phenomenological tie-in with the sociology of knowledge stems from two key historical sources for [[Mannheim]]'s analysis: 
# Mannheim was dependent on insights derived from Husserl's phenomenological investigations, especially the theory of meaning as found in [[Logical Investigations (Husserl) | Husserl's ''Logical Investigations'']] of 1900/1901 (Husserl:2000), in the formulation of his central methodological work: "On The Interpretation of Weltanschauung" (Mannheim:1993:see fn41 & fn43) – this essay forms the centerpiece for Mannheim's method of historical understanding and is central to his conception of the sociology of knowledge as a research program.
# The concept of "Weltanschauung" employed by Mannheim has its origins in the hermeneutic philosophy of [[Wilhelm Dilthey]] (1833-1911), who relied on Husserl's theory of meaning (above) for his methodological specification of the interpretive act (Mannheim: 1993: see fn38).

It is also noteworthy that Husserl's analysis of the formal structures of consciousness, and Schütz's analysis of the formal structures of the Life-world are specifically intended to establish the foundations in consciousness for the understanding and interpretation of a social world that is subject to cultural and historical change. The phenomenological position is that although the [[facticity]] of the social world may be culturally and historically relative, the formal structures of consciousness, and the processes by which we come to know and understand this facticity are not. That is, the understanding of any actual social world is unavoidably dependent on understanding the structures and processes of consciousness that found, and constitute, any possible social world.

Alternatively, if the facticity of the social world ''and'' the structures of consciousness prove to be culturally and historically relative, then we are at an impasse in regard to any meaningful scientific understanding of the social world that is not subjective (as opposed to being objective and grounded in nature [positivism], or inter-subjective and grounded in the structures of consciousness [phenomenology]), and relative to the cultural and idealization formations of particular concrete individuals living in a particular socio-historical group.

===Michel Foucault===
{{main|Michel Foucault}}
The work of Michel Foucault made a particularly important contemporary contribution to the sociology of knowledge. ''[[Madness and Civilization]]'' (1961) postulated that conceptions of madness and what was considered "reason" or "knowledge" were themselves subject to major [[culture bias]], in this respect mirroring similar criticisms by [[Thomas Szasz]] (1920-2012), at the time the foremost critic of [[psychiatry]] and subsequently an eminent psychiatrist. Foucault and Szasz agreed that sociological processes played a major role in defining "madness" as an "illness" and in prescribing "cures". In ''[[The Birth of the Clinic]]: An Archeology of Medical Perception'' (1963), Foucault extended his critique to institutional clinical medicine, arguing for the central [[conceptual metaphor]] of [[Medical gaze|"The Gaze"]], which had implications for [[medical education]], [[Prison#Design|prison design]], and the [[carceral state]] as understood today. Concepts of [[criminal justice]] and its intersection with medicine were better developed in this work than in the contributions of Szasz and others, who confined their critique to current psychiatric practice. Foucault's ''[[The Order of Things]]'' (1966) and [[The Archaeology of Knowledge | ''The Archeology of Knowledge'']] (1969) introduced abstract notions of [[Mathesis (philosophy) | mathesis]] and taxonomia to explain the subjective 'ordering' of the [[human sciences]]. These, he claimed, had transformed 17th and 18th-century studies of "general grammar" into modern "[[linguistics]]", "[[natural history]]" into modern "[[biology]]", and "[[analysis of wealth]]" into modern "[[economics]]"—though not, claimed Foucault, without loss of meaning. Foucault believed that the 19th century transformed what knowledge was.

Foucault stated that "Man did not exist" before the 18th century. Foucault regarded notions of humanity and of [[humanism]] as inventions of [[modernity]]. Accordingly, a [[cognitive bias]] had been introduced unwittingly into science, by over-trusting the individual doctor or scientist's ability to see and state things objectively. Foucault roots this argument in the rediscovery of Kant, though his thought is significantly influenced by [[Nietzsche]] – that philosopher declaring [[God is dead | the "death of God"]] in the 19th century, and the [[anti-humanism|anti-humanists]] proposing the "death of Man" in the 20th.<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Gladden
 |first1               = Matthew E.
 |date                 = 14 March 2018
 |orig-date            = 2016
 |chapter              = A Typology of Posthumanism: A Framework for Differentiating Analytic, Synthetic, Theoretical, and Practical Posthumanisms
 |title                = Sapient Circuits and Digitalized Flesh: The Organization as Locus of Technological Posthumanization
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=jop_DwAAQBAJ
 |edition              = 2
 |publication-place    = Indianapolis, Indiana
 |publisher            = Defragmenter Media
 |page                 = 55
 |isbn                 = 9781944373221
 |access-date          = 24 July 2024
 |quote                = Antihumanism [...] claims that the binary of 'life versus death' is still meaningful – and that the human being, as such, is dead.
}} 
</ref>

In [[Discipline and Punish | ''Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison'']] (1975), Foucault concentrates on the correlation between [[knowledge]] and power. According to him, knowledge is a form of power and can conversely be used against individuals as a form of power.<ref>{{cite book|last =Foucault|first =Michel|title =Discipline and Punish|year =1975|publisher =New York: Random House|page =27}}</ref> As a result, knowledge is [[Social constructionism|socially constructed]].<ref>{{cite book|last =Foucault|first =Michel|title =Discipline and Punish|year =1975|publisher =New York: Random House|page =28}}</ref> He argues that knowledge forms discourses, which, in turn, form the dominant ideological ways of thinking that govern human lives.<ref name="foucault187">{{cite book |last=Foucault |first=Michel |title=Discipline and Punish |year=1975 |publisher=New York: Random House |page=187}}</ref> For him, social control is maintained in 'the disciplinary society' through codes of control over sexuality and the ideas/knowledge perpetuated through social institutions.<ref name="foucault138">{{cite book |last=Foucault |first=Michel |title=Discipline and Punish |year=1975 |publisher=New York: Random House |page=138}}</ref> In other words, discourses and [[ideologies]] subject us to authority and turn people into 'subjected beings', who are afraid of being punished if they sway from [[social norms]].<ref name="foucault138"/> Foucault believes that institutions overtly regulate and control our lives. Institutions such as schools reinforce the dominant ideological forms of thinking in the populace and force us into becoming obedient and docile beings.<ref name="foucault138"/> Hence, the [[dominant ideology]] that serves the interests of the ruling class, all the while appearing as 'neutral', needs to be questioned and must not go unchallenged.<ref name="foucault187"/>

===Knowledge ecology===
{{main|Knowledge ecology}}

[[Knowledge ecology]] is a concept originating from [[knowledge management]] that aims at "bridging the gap between the static data repositories of knowledge management and the dynamic, adaptive behavior of natural systems",<ref>
{{cite journal
 | last=Pór | first=G.
 | year=2000
 | title=Nurturing Systemic Wisdom through Knowledge Ecology
 | journal=The Systems Thinker
 | volume=11 | issue=8
 | pages=1–5
}}
</ref> in particular relying on the concepts of interaction and [[emergence]].
Knowledge ecology, and its related concept [[information ecology]] has been elaborated by different academics and practitioners, such as [[Thomas H. Davenport]],<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1=Davenport
 | first1=Thomas H.
 | author-link=Thomas H. Davenport
 | last2=Prusak
 | first2=Laurence
 | year=1997
 | title=Information Ecology
 | page=[https://archive.org/details/informationecolo00dave/page/288 288]
 | publisher=Oxford University Press
 | isbn=0-19-511168-0
 | url=https://archive.org/details/informationecolo00dave/page/288
 }}
</ref> [[Bonnie Nardi]],<ref>
{{cite book
 | last1=Nardi | first1=Bonnie
 | author-link=Bonnie Nardi
 | last2=O’Day | first2=V.
 | year= 1999
 | title=Information Ecology: Using Technology with Heart
 | page=288
 | publisher=MIT Press | location= Cambridge
}}
</ref> or Swidler.{{cn|date=July 2024}}

===New Sociology of Knowledge===

The New Sociology of Knowledge (a postmodern approach considering knowledge as culture by drawing upon Marxist, French structuralist, and American pragmatist traditions)<ref>Doyle McCarthy, Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge, Routledge, published October 23, 1996, {{ISBN|978-0415064972}}</ref> introduces concepts that dictate how knowledge is socialized in the modern era by new kinds of social organizations and structures.<ref>Swidler, A., Arditi, J. 1994. "The New Sociology of Knowledge". '' Annual Review of Sociology '', 20, pp. 205-329</ref><ref>McCarthy, E. Doyle. 1996. '' Knowledge as Culture: The New Sociology of Knowledge ''. New York: Routledge.</ref>

===Robert K. Merton===
{{main|Robert K. Merton}}

American sociologist [[Robert K. Merton]] (1910–2003) dedicates a section of ''[[Social Theory and Social Structure]]'' (1949; revised and expanded, 1957 and 1968) to the study of the sociology of knowledge in Part III, titled ''The Sociology of Knowledge and Mass Communications''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Merton |first=Robert K. |title=Social Theory and Social Structure |year=1957 |publisher=Glencoe, IL: Free Press}}</ref> For the news in this prospect see Guglielmo Rinzivillo, ''Robert King Merton'' Utet, Turin, 2019.

===Legitimation Code Theory===
Legitimation Code Theory (LCT) emerged{{when?|date=July 2024}} as a framework for the study of knowledge and education and is now being used to analyse a growing range of social and cultural practices across increasingly different institutional and national contexts, both within and beyond education.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.legitimationcodetheory.com/publications.html |title=Legitimation Code Theory, bibliography |access-date=2014-05-10 |archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20180712151522/http://www.legitimationcodetheory.com/publications.html |archive-date=2018-07-12 |url-status=dead }}</ref> The approach primarily builds on the work of [[Basil Bernstein]] (1924-2000) and of [[Pierre Bourdieu]] (1930-2002). It also integrates insights from sociology (including Durkheim, Marx, Weber and Foucault), [[systemic functional linguistics]], philosophy (such as [[Karl Popper]] and [[Critical realism (philosophy of perception)|critical realism]]), early cultural studies, anthropology (especially [[Mary Douglas]] and [[Ernest Gellner]]), and other approaches.<ref>Maton, K. (2014), ''Knowledge and Knowers: Towards a realist sociology of education'', London, Routledge.</ref><ref>Maton, K., Hood, S. & Shay, S. (eds) (2016) ''Knowledge-building: Educational studies in legitimation code theory''. London, Routledge.</ref>

===Southern Theory===

Southern theory is an approach to the sociology of knowledge that looks at the global production of sociological knowledge and the dominance of the [[global north]].<ref>Connell, Raeywyn (2007) [https://books.google.com/books?id=rWLyDwAAQBAJ ''Southern Theory: The Global Dynamics of Knowledge in Social Sciences''], Allen & Unwin</ref> It was first developed by Australian sociologist [[Raewyn Connell]] in her book ''Southern Theory'', and applied with colleagues
at the [[University of Sydney]] and elsewhere to a number of contexts.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Collyer |first1=Fran |title=Global patterns in the publishing of academic knowledge: Global North, global South |journal=Current Sociology |date=2018 |volume=66 |issue=1 |doi=10.1177/0011392116680020 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0011392116680020}}</ref> Southern theory offers a decolonizing perspective within the sociology of knowledge that seeks to emphasize perspectives from the [[global south]] to counter bias towards the perspectives of theorists and social scientists from the global north.