Editing Simplicius of Cilicia (section)

=== Ontology ===
Aristotle said the universe is not located in one particular place. It cannot be localized, because outside of the spherical sky, which is surrounded and delimited by nothing, there is no reality. Simplicius disagreed with this view. He argued that, according to Aristotelian teaching, the circular motion of the celestial sphere was a local motion, that is, a change of place, and that this implied that the heavens were in one place.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 601,26–603,22.</ref> Simplicius saw the reason for Aristotle's error in the inadequacy of the Aristotelian definition of the term "place". Aristotle had defined place as the boundary between an enclosure and an enclosed. In doing so, he defined it as a two-dimensional surface. Accordingly, the uninhabited heaven could have no place. Simplicius asked whether “enclosure” meant enveloping from the outside or penetrating what was contained. Both lead to a contradiction: if the enclosure penetrates the enclosed, the place is not the limit; if the place only encloses what is contained, it is only the surface of what is contained and not the latter itself in a place, which is absurd.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 604,12–605,5.</ref> 

Simplicius opposed Aristotle's concept with his own understanding of place, that place is a space (χώρα, ''chṓra'') and a "vessel" (ὑποδοχή, ''hypodochḗ''),<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 608,4–5.</ref> or an expanded reality affecting all parts of a thing in place. It is not a hollow space and also not – as [[Proclus]] thought – an immaterial body, but material and extended. The matter of the place is not the same as that of the body that is in place; rather, they are two different kinds of matter. There is no inconsistency in this, because from Simplicius' point of view nothing stands in the way of a mutual penetration of two matters.<ref>Simplicius, ''Physics'' 623,1–19.</ref> Place is not an [[accident (philosophy)|accident]], a property of something (such as spatial extension, which a thing has as one of its properties and which is described in the [[category (philosophy)|category]] under [[quantity]]). Rather, it is itself an extended [[ousia]] ("beingness", often translated as "substance"). It plays an important role in the world order, for it is the measure that assigns each body its place and within the bodies its parts. Thus, place is not a neutral space in which objects happen to be located, but is the principle of the ordered structure of the entire cosmos and each individual thing. Place does not passively absorb things, but powerfully shapes the relationships between them.<ref>On this doctrine see Gerard Verbeke: ''Place and space according to Aristotle and Simplicios. A philosophical topology''. In: Johannes Irmscher, Reimar Müller (ed.): ''Aristotle as a philosopher of science.'' Berlin 1983, pp. 113–122, here: 118–122; Richard Sorabji: ''Introduction''. In: James O. Urmson (translator): ''Simplicius: Corollaries on Place and Time.'' London 1992, pp. 1–10, here 1–5.</ref>