Editing Semiotics (section)

=== Charles Sanders Peirce ===
In the nineteenth century, [[Charles Sanders Peirce]] defined what he termed "semiotic" (which he would sometimes spell as "semeiotic") as the "quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs," which abstracts "what must be the characters of all signs used by...an intelligence capable of learning by experience,"<ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders]]. ''Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'', vol. 2: para. 227.</ref> and which is philosophical logic pursued in terms of signs and sign processes.<ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders.]] 1998 [1902]. "[http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/l75.htm Logic, Regarded As Semeiotic]," [manuscript L75] ''Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway'', edited by J. Ransdell.</ref><ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders.]] 1998 [1902]. "[http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-05.htm#m12 On the Definition of Logic]." [memoir 12]. ''Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway'', edited by J. Ransdell.</ref>

Peirce's perspective is considered as philosophical logic studied in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or artificial, and sign processes, modes of inference, and the inquiry process in general. The Peircean semiotic addresses not only the external communication mechanism, as per Saussure, but the internal representation machine, investigating sign processes, and modes of inference, as well as the whole inquiry process in general.{{cn|date=February 2025}}

Peircean semiotic is triadic, including sign, object, interpretant, as opposed to the dyadic [[Ferdinand de Saussure|Saussurian]] tradition (signifier, signified). Peircean semiotics further subdivides each of the three triadic elements into three sub-types, positing the existence of signs that are symbols; semblances ("icons"); and "indices," i.e., signs that are such through a factual connection to their objects.<ref>{{Citation |last=Atkin |first=Albert |title=Peirce's Theory of Signs |date=2023 |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/peirce-semiotics/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |access-date=2023-03-21 |edition=Spring 2023 |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |editor2-last=Nodelman |editor2-first=Uri}}</ref>

Peircean scholar and editor Max H. Fisch (1978)<ref group="lower-alpha">Max Fisch has compiled Peirce-related bibliographical supplements in 1952, 1964, 1966, 1974; was consulting editor on the 1977 microfilm of Peirce's published works and on the ''Comprehensive Bibliography'' associated with it; was among the main editors of the first five volumes of ''Writings of Charles S. Peirce'' (1981–1993); and wrote a number of published articles on Peirce, many collected in 1986 in ''Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism.'' See also [[Charles Sanders Peirce bibliography]].</ref> would claim that "semeiotic" was Peirce's own preferred rendering of Locke's σημιωτική.<ref>Fisch, Max H. (1978), "Peirce's General Theory of Signs" in ''Sight, Sound, and Sense'', ed. T. A. Sebeok. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 31–70.</ref> [[Charles W. Morris]] followed Peirce in using the term "semiotic" and in extending the discipline beyond human communication to animal learning and use of signals.

While the Saussurean semiotic is dyadic (sign/syntax, signal/semantics), the Peircean semiotic is triadic (sign, object, interpretant), being conceived as philosophical logic studied in terms of signs that are not always linguistic or artificial.

==== Peirce's list of categories ====
Peirce would aim to base his new list directly upon experience precisely as constituted by action of signs, in contrast with the list of Aristotle's categories which aimed to articulate within experience the dimension of being that is independent of experience and knowable as such, through human understanding.{{cn|date=February 2025}}

The estimative powers of animals interpret the environment as sensed to form a "meaningful world" of objects, but the objects of this world (or ''[[Umwelt]]'', in [[Jakob von Uexküll]]'s term)<ref>2001. "''Umwelt''". ''[[Semiotica]]'' 134(1). Pp. 125–135. [special issue on "Jakob von Uexküll: A paradigm for biology and semiotics," guest-edited by [[Kalevi Kull|K. Kull]].]</ref> consist exclusively of objects related to the animal as desirable (+), undesirable (–), or "safe to ignore" (0).

In contrast to this, human understanding adds to the animal ''Umwelt'' a relation of self-identity within objects which transforms objects experienced into 'things' as well as +, –, 0 objects.<ref name=":2">[[Martin Heidegger|Heidegger, Martin.]] 1962 [1927]. ''[[Being and Time]]'', translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson. New York: [[Harper (publisher)|Harper & Row]]. p. 487.</ref><ref group="lower-alpha">"The distinction between the being of existing ''Dasein'' and the Being of entities, such as Reality, which do not have the character of ''Dasein''...is nothing with which philosophy may tranquilize itself. It has long been known that ancient ontology works with 'Thing-concepts' and that there is a danger of 'reifying consciousness'. But what does this 'reifying' signify? Where does it arise? Why does Being get 'conceived' 'proximally' in terms of the present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to-hand, which indeed lies ''closer'' to us? Why does reifying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion? This is the question that the ''Umwelt/Lebenswelt'' distinction as here drawn answers to." [[Martin Heidegger]] 1962/1927:486</ref> Thus, the generically animal objective world as ''Umwelt'', becomes a species-specifically human objective world or {{Lang|de|Lebenswelt}} ({{Gloss|life-world}}), wherein linguistic communication, rooted in the biologically underdetermined {{Lang|de|Innenwelt}} ({{Gloss|inner-world}}) of humans, makes possible the further dimension of cultural organization within the otherwise merely social organization of non-human animals whose powers of observation may deal only with directly sensible instances of objectivity.{{cn|date=February 2025}}

This further point, that human culture depends upon language understood first of all not as communication, but as the biologically underdetermined aspect or feature of the human animal's ''{{Lang|de|Innenwelt}}'', was originally clearly identified by [[Thomas Sebeok|Thomas A. Sebeok]].<ref>[[Thomas Sebeok|Sebeok, Thomas A.]] 1986. "Communication, Language, and Speech. Evolutionary Considerations." Pp. 10–16 in ''I Think I Am A Verb. More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs''. New York: [[Plenum Press]]. Published lecture.

Original lecture title "The Evolution of Communication and the Origin of Language," in ''International Summer Institute for Semiotic and Structural Studies'' ''Colloquium on 'Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Communication Systems''' (June 1–3, 1984).</ref><ref>[[Thomas Sebeok|Sebeok, Thomas A]]. 2012. "[http://www.augustoponzio.com/files/12._Deely.pdf Afterword]." Pp. 365–83 in ''Semiotic Prologues'', edited by [[John Deely|J. Deely]] and [[Marcel Danesi|M. Danesi]]. Ottawa: Legas.</ref> Sebeok also played the central role in bringing Peirce's work to the center of the semiotic stage in the twentieth century,<ref group="lower-alpha">Detailed demonstration of Sebeok's role of the global emergence of semiotics is recorded in at least three recent volumes:
# ''Semiotics Seen Synchronically. The View from 2010'' (Ottawa: Legas, 2010).
# ''Semiotics Continues To Astonish. Thomas A. Sebeok and the Doctrine of Signs'' (Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter, 2011)—a 526-page assemblage of essays, vignettes, letters, pictures attesting to the depth and extent of Sebeok's promotion of semiotic understanding around the world, including his involvement with Juri Lotman and the Tartu University graduate program in semiotics (currently directed by P. Torop, M. Lotman and K. Kull).
# Sebeok's ''Semiotic Prologues'' (Ottawa: Legas, 2012)—a volume which gathers together in Part I all the "prologues" (i.e., introductions, prefaces, forewords, etc.) that Sebeok wrote for other peoples' books, then in Part 2 all the "prologues" that other people wrote for Sebeok.</ref> first with his expansion of the human use of signs (''anthroposemiosis'') to include also the generically animal sign-usage (''zoösemiosis''),<ref group="lower-alpha">See [[Thomas Sebeok|Sebeok, Thomas A]]. "Communication in Animals and Men." A review article that covers three books: Martin Lindauer, ''Communication among Social Bees'' (Harvard Books in Biology, No. 2; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961, pp. ix + 143);  Winthrop N. Kellogg, Porpoises and Sonar (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961, pp. xiv + 177); and John C. Lilly, ''Man and Dolphin'' (Garden City, New York: Doubleday), in ''Language'' 39 (1963), 448–466.</ref> then with his further expansion of semiosis to include the vegetative world (''phytosemiosis''). Such would initially be based on the work of [[Martin Krampen]],<ref>[[Martin Krampen|Krampen, Martin]]. 1981. "Phytosemiotics." ''[[Semiotica]]'' 36(3):187–209.</ref> but takes advantage of Peirce's point that an interpretant, as the third item within a sign relation, "need not be mental".<ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders]]. 1934 [1907] "A Survey of Pragmaticism." P. 473. in ''The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce'' 5, edited by [[Charles Hartshorne|C. Hartshorne]] and P. Weiss. Cambridge, MA: [[Harvard University Press]]. [originally titled "Excerpt from "Pragmatism (Editor [3])"]</ref><ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders]]. 1977 [1908]. "letter to Lady Welby 23 December 1908" [letter]. Pp. 73–86 in ''Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between C.&nbsp;S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby'', edited by C. S. Hardwick and J. Cook. Bloomington, IN: [[Indiana University Press]].</ref><ref>[[Charles Sanders Peirce|Peirce, Charles Sanders]]. 2009. "Semiosis: The Subject Matter of Semiotic Inquiry." Pp. 26–50 in ''Basics of Semiotics'' (5th ed.), edited by [[John Deely|J. Deely]]. Tartu, Estonia: [[Tartu University Press]]. See especially pp. 31,38– 41.</ref>

Peirce distinguished between the interpretant and the interpreter. The interpretant is the internal, mental representation that mediates between the object and its sign. The interpreter is the human who is creating the interpretant.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://courses.logos.it/EN/2_18.html|title=LOGOS – Multilingual Translation Portal |website=courses.logos.it |access-date=2017-03-26}}</ref> Peirce's "interpretant" notion opened the way to understanding an action of signs beyond the realm of animal life (study of phytosemiosis + zoösemiosis + anthroposemiosis = ''biosemiotics''), which was his first advance beyond Latin Age semiotics.<ref group="lower-alpha">For a summary of Peirce's contributions to semiotics, see Liszka (1996) or Atkin (2006).</ref>

Other early theorists in the field of semiotics include [[Charles W. Morris]].<ref>1971, orig. 1938, ''Writings on the general theory of signs'', Mouton, The Hague, The Netherlands</ref> Writing in 1951, [[Jozef Maria Bochenski]] surveyed the field in this way: "Closely related to mathematical logic is the so-called semiotics (Charles Morris) which is now commonly employed by mathematical logicians. Semiotics is the theory of symbols and falls in three parts;
# logical syntax, the theory of the mutual relations of symbols,
# logical semantics, the theory of the relations between the symbol and what the symbol stands for, and
# logical pragmatics, the relations between symbols, their meanings and the users of the symbols."<ref>Jozef Maria Bochenski (1956) ''Contemporary European Philosophy'', trans. Donald Nichols and Karl Ashenbrenner from 1951 edition, Berkeley, CA:  University of California, Section 25, "Mathematical Logic," Subsection F, "Semiotics," p. 259.</ref>
[[Max Black]] argued that the work of [[Bertrand Russell]] was seminal in the field.<ref>Black, Max. 1944. ''The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell'' 5. [[Library of Living Philosophers]].</ref>