Editing Samuel P. Huntington (section)

==Notable arguments==
===''The Soldier and the State''===
{{Main|The Soldier and the State}}
In ''The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations'' (1957),<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://archive.org/details/samuelp.huntingtonthesoldierandthestatethetheoryandpoliticsofcivilmilitaryrelationsbelknappress1957|title=Samuel P. Huntington The Soldier And The State ：the Theory And Politics Of Civil Military Relations Belknap Press (1957)|via=Internet Archive}}</ref> Huntington presents a general theory of civil–military relations. Huntington proposes a theory of objective civilian control, according to which the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them.

===''Political Order in Changing Societies''===
{{Main|Political Order in Changing Societies}}
In 1968, just as the United States' war in Vietnam was becoming most intense, Huntington published ''Political Order in Changing Societies'', which was a critique of the [[modernization]] theory which had affected much US policy regarding the developing world during the prior decade.

Huntington argued that as societies modernize, they become more complex and disordered. If the process of social modernization that produces this disorder is not matched by a process of political and institutional modernization—a process which produces political institutions capable of managing the stress of modernization—the result may be violence.

During the 1970s, Huntington was an advisor to governments, both democratic and dictatorial. During 1972, he met with [[Emílio Garrastazu Médici|Medici]] government representatives in Brazil; a year later he published the report "Approaches to Political Decompression", warning against the risks of a too-rapid political liberalization, proposing gradual liberalization, and a strong party state modeled upon the image of the Mexican [[Institutional Revolutionary Party]]. After a prolonged transition, Brazil became democratic during 1985.

During the 1980s, he became a valued adviser to the South African regime, which used his ideas on political order to craft its "total strategy" to reform apartheid and suppress growing resistance. He assured South Africa's rulers that increasing the repressive power of the state (which at that time included police violence, detention without trial, and torture) can be necessary to effect reform. The reform process, he told his South African audience, often requires "duplicity, deceit, faulty assumptions and purposeful blindness." He thus gave his imprimatur to his hosts' project of "reforming" apartheid rather than eliminating it.<ref>Joseph Lelyveld, Move Your Shadow (New York, 1985), pages 68–69; Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, "South Africa Since 1976: an historical perspective," in Shaun Johnson, ed., South Africa: No Turning Back (London, 1988), pages 28–29</ref>

Huntington frequently cited Brazil as a success, alluding to his role in his 1988 presidential address to the [[American Political Science Association]], commenting that political science ''played a modest role in this process''. Critics, such as British political scientist Alan Hooper, note that contemporary Brazil has an especially unstable party system, wherein the best institutionalized party, [[Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva]]'s [[Workers' Party (Brazil)|Workers' Party]], emerged in opposition to controlled transition. Moreover, Hooper claims that the lack of civil participation in contemporary Brazil results from that top-down process of political participation transitions.

===''The Third Wave''===
{{Main|The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century}}
In his 1991 book ''The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century'', Huntington made the argument that beginning with Portugal's revolution during 1974, there has been a [[Third Wave Democracy|third wave of democratization]] which describes a global trend which includes more than 60 countries throughout Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa which have undergone some form of democratic transition. Huntington won the 1992 [[University of Louisville]] [[Grawemeyer Award]] for this book.<ref name="grawemeyer.org">{{cite web|title=1992- Samuel Huntington, Herman Daly and John Cobb|url=http://grawemeyer.org/worldorder/previous-winners/1992-samuel-huntington-herman-daly-and-john-cobb.html|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131202231546/http://grawemeyer.org/worldorder/previous-winners/1992-samuel-huntington-herman-daly-and-john-cobb.html|archive-date=2013-12-02}}</ref>

==="The Clash of Civilizations"===
{{further|Clash of Civilizations}}
[[File:Clash of Civilizations mapn2.png|thumb|Map of the nine "civilizations" from Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations"]]
In 1993, Huntington provoked great debate among [[international relations]] theorists with the interrogatively titled "The Clash of Civilizations?", an influential, oft-cited article published in ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' magazine. In the article, he argued that, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Islam would become the biggest obstacle to Western domination of the world. The West's next big war therefore, he said, would inevitably be with Islam.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Haruna|first=Mohammed|date=26 September 2001|title=Nigeria: September 11 And Huntington's Prophecy|newspaper=Daily Trust|url=http://allafrica.com/stories/200109270278.html|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Its description of post-Cold War [[geopolitics]] and the "inevitability of instability" contrasted with the influential "[[The End of History and the Last Man|End of History]]" thesis advocated by [[Francis Fukuyama]].

Huntington expanded "The Clash of Civilizations?" to book length and published it as ''[[The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order]]'' in 1996. The article and the book posit that post-Cold War conflict would most frequently and violently occur because of cultural rather than ideological differences. That, whilst in the Cold War, conflict occurred between the Capitalist Western Bloc and the Communist Eastern Bloc, it now was most likely to occur between the world's major civilizations—identifying eight, and a possible ninth: (i) Western, (ii) Latin American, (iii) Islamic, (iv) Sinic (Chinese), (v) Hindu, (vi) Orthodox, (vii) Japanese, (viii) African, and (ix) Buddhist. This cultural organization contrasts the contemporary world with the classical notion of sovereign states. To understand current and future conflict, cultural rifts must be understood, and culture—rather than the State—must be accepted as the reason for war. Thus, Western nations will lose predominance if they fail to recognize the irreconcilable nature of cultural tensions. Huntington argued that this post-Cold War shift in geopolitical organization and structure requires the West to strengthen itself culturally, by abandoning the imposition of its ideal of democratic universalism and its incessant military interventionism. Underscoring this point, Huntington wrote in the 1996 expansion, "In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://contemporarythinkers.org/samuel-huntington/|title=A Guide to the Work of Samuel Huntington|publisher=contemporarythinkers.org}}</ref>

The identification of Western Civilization with [[Western Christianity]] (Catholic-Protestant) was not Huntington's original idea, it was rather the traditional Western opinion and subdivision before the Cold War era.<ref>[[Peter Harrison (historian)|Peter Harrison]], [http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2018/01/17/4790945.htm An Eccentric Tradition: The Paradox of 'Western Values']</ref> Critics (for example articles in {{Lang|fr|[[Le Monde Diplomatique]]}}) call ''The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order'' the theoretical legitimization of American-caused Western aggression against China and the world's Islamic and Orthodox cultures. Other critics argue that Huntington's taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account of the internal dynamics and partisan tensions within civilizations. Furthermore, critics argue that Huntington neglects ideological mobilization by elites and unfulfilled socioeconomic needs of the population as the real causal factors driving conflict, that he ignores conflicts that do not fit well with the civilizational borders identified by him, and that his new paradigm is nothing but [[Realism (international relations)|realist]] thinking in which "states" became replaced by "civilizations".<ref>see [[Richard E. Rubenstein]] and Jarle Crocker (1994): Challenging Huntington, in: Foreign Policy, Number 96 (Autumn, 1994), pages 113–28</ref> Huntington's influence upon US policy has been likened to that of historian [[Arnold J. Toynbee|Arnold Toynbee]]'s controversial religious theories about Asian leaders during the early twentieth century. The ''[[New York Times]]'' obituary on Huntington states that his "emphasis on ancient religious empires, as opposed to states or ethnicities, [as sources of global conflict] gained ... more cachet after the [[September 11 attacks|Sept. 11 attacks]]."<ref>[http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/samuel-huntington-foreign-policy-theorist-dies-at-81/ Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard Dies at 81], ''The New York Times'', December 27, 2008</ref>

Huntington wrote that Ukraine might divide along the cultural line between the more Catholic [[western Ukraine]] and Orthodox [[eastern Ukraine]]:
<blockquote>
While a statist approach highlights the possibility of a Russian-Ukrainian war, a civilizational approach minimizes that and instead highlights the possibility of Ukraine splitting in half, a separation which cultural factors would lead one to predict might be more violent than [[Dissolution of Czechoslovakia|that of Czechoslovakia]] but far less bloody than [[Breakup of Yugoslavia|that of Yugoslavia]].<ref>"[http://www.eurotrib.com/story/2014/3/1/204/17909 Testing Huntington in Ukraine]". European Tribune.</ref>
</blockquote>

===''Who Are We'' and immigration===
{{Main|Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity}}
Huntington's last book, ''Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity'', was published in May 2004. Its subject is the meaning of American [[national identity]] and what he describes as a cultural threat from large-scale immigration by Latinos, which Huntington says could "divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages". In this book, he called for America to force immigrants to "adopt English" and the US to turn to "Protestant religions" to "save itself against the threats" of Latino and Islamic immigrants. In a book review for the academic journal ''Perspectives on Politics'', Gary M. Segura, Dean of the UCLA School of Public Affairs,<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://luskin.ucla.edu/person/gary-segura | title=Gary Segura Dean UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs| date=September 4, 2019}}</ref> asserted that the book should not be considered social science because of its divisive views and rhetoric.<ref name="cambridge.org">{{Cite journal | url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/who-are-we-the-challenges-to-americas-national-identity/641E6E46CEA79FD684F0277DD3C2985E |doi = 10.1017/S1537592705460259|title = Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity|year = 2005|last1 = Segura|first1 = Gary M.|journal = Perspectives on Politics|volume = 3|issue = 3| pages=640–642 |s2cid = 143248422}}</ref> Segura also called Huntington's writing of the book unforgivable on account of Huntington's academic position, saying that the work was a polemic rather than a work of scholarship.<ref name="cambridge.org"/>

===Other===
Huntington is credited with inventing the phrase ''[[Davos Man]]'', referring to [[global elite]]s who "have little need for national loyalty, view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite's global operations".<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Huntington |first=Samuel P. |date=2004 |title=Dead Souls: The Denationalization of the American Elite |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897520 |journal=The National Interest |issue=75 |pages=5–18 |issn=0884-9382}}</ref> The phrase refers to the [[World Economic Forum]] in [[Davos]], Switzerland, where leaders of the [[economic globalization|global economy]] meet.<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/comment/story/0,,1404411,00.html Davos man's death wish], ''The Guardian'', 3 February 2006</ref>